Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

45. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

8728.

Geneva, October 5, 1989, 1734Z

SUBJECT

• Official—Informal

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. There follows draft MemCon of September 18 Arms Control Core Group (morning session), cleared by Ambs. Burt and Cooper, for further Washington clearances. The order of conversations in the START section is not chronological; things are grouped by subject. I still have the chronological version and can send it if you like.

3. Arms Control Core Group

— Wyoming Ministerial/Washington portion

— First session

4. Meeting date: September 18, 1989

— Time: 10:15 a.m.–12:40 p.m.

— Place: Department of State

5. Participants

U.S.

• Reginald Bartholomew (T), Chairman
• Ronald Lehman (ACDA)
• Richard Burt (NST)
• Stephen Hadley (OSD)
• Michael Graves (JCS)
• Paul Robinson (NTT)
• Edward Rowny (T/ART)
• Henry Cooper (NST)
• Arnold Kanter (NSCS)
• Victor Alessi (DOE)
• Read Hanmer (ACDA)
• James Timbie (T)
• Douglas MacEachin (DCI)
• James Dobbins (EUR)
• Robert Walpole (PM)
• Robert Einhorn (S/P)
• Steven Pifer (EUR/SOV)
• Eleanor Sutter (EUR/SOV), Notetaker
• Dmitri Arensberger, Interpreter
• Igor Korobovsky, Interpreter
• Dwight Roesch, Interpreter
• Galina Tunik, Interpreter

SOVIET

• Oleg A. Grinevskiy (CFE/CSBM), Chairman
• Yuriy K. Nazarkin (MFA)
• Sergey B. Batsanov (CD)
• Igor FM. Palenykh (NTT)
• Yuriy I. Roslyakov (MFA)
• Col. V.S. Koltunov (MOD)
• Gennadiy K. Khromov (C/M)
• Aleksandr Churillin (Embassy)
• Igor Neverov (Embassy)
• Andrey Lebedev (Embassy)
• Aleksandr Kuznetsov (Embassy)
• Igor Khripunov (Embassy)

6. After welcoming remarks and introductions, Under Secretary Bartholomew noted that this was the first time working groups had met before ministers, and said it ought to be considered an experiment. He suggested that the sides make their initial presentations in the core group, but save details for the sub-groups on START and chemical weapons. He proposed to begin with the nuclear and space talks. Then he offered the floor to Amb. Grinevskiy.

7. Grinevskiy agreed to begin with general presentations as Bartholomew had proposed, but noted that the more could be accomplished in structured groups, the better. He suggested adding a subgroup on nuclear testing and expressed mock concern that, since conventional arms had not been mentioned, he himself might be left unemployed. He asked why the U.S. side had excluded that issue. Bartholomew said he was sure Grinevskiy was fully employed in another forum; here it was not a question of substance, but simply a question of how best to do the work at hand. He proposed to begin with NST.

Nuclear & Space Talks

8. Nazarkin opened by recalling the list of subjects he and Amb. Burt had agreed upon in Geneva as appropriate for work at the ministerial: ALCMs, SLCMs, Mobile ICBMs, unit of account, and verification and stability measures (which he referred to in Russian as “trial measures”). Nazarkin also wanted to inform the U.S. side that the Soviet side thought the ministers would want to exchange opinions on ABM Treaty compliance. The sides had reached an impasse and were talking past each other, he said; it would be useful to see whether this problem could be overcome. The Soviet side had studied Vice President Quayle’s statement on SDI with interest, and would be interested in U.S. clarification of how that would influence the U.S. position at the negotiations.

START

9. (Note: the START section is not in strict chronological order; it has been reorganized by subject within each subject area, conversations are reported in the order in which they occurred.)

10. Nazarkin presented an introductory statement on START issues (reported piecemeal below). Bartholomew thanked Nazarkin for an interesting statement. After brief comments on selected issues (see below), Bartholomew said the U.S. side proposed to continue discussions this week, laying the groundwork for resolution of a group of issues; the U.S. side looked forward with interest to hearing Nazarkin’s ideas. Concluding that the sides had their work cut out for them in this area, Bartholomew asked Amb. Burt to offer further details. Burt said he was encouraged by Nazarkin’s comments, and amplified some of the points made by Bartholomew.

Verification & Stability Measures (General)

11. In his opening remarks regarding verification and stability measures, Nazarkin said the Soviet side was ready to discuss the Bush initiative in detail. The Soviet side was ready to sign, at the ministerial, an “umbrella” agreement on principles for implementing trial verification and stability measures. This document would contain general agreement on principles, which could be used as guidelines at the NST negotiations. Nazarkin hoped the draft he had previously given Amb. Burt would lead to agreement.

12. Bartholomew said the Soviet agreement to proceed with the verification and stability measures was a positive development. This comment was without prejudice to the question of the text proposed by the Soviet side, which would have to be reviewed in detail in the NST subgroup. The President’s initiative on strategic measures could have a positive effect on specific issues and on the whole START process, Bartholomew said. Soviet readiness to complete the strategic exercise notification agreement and the positive Soviet remarks on telemetry were encouraging. If these agreements could be concluded, he said, this would be a very positive development indeed.

13. Burt said he considered Nazarkin’s remarks on verification and stability constructive; the umbrella agreement could serve as a guide to work on verification and stability. The U.S. side was prepared, during the next two days, to discuss the draft agreement Nazarkin had provided. (See below for details of Burt’s remarks on specific measures.) Concluding his presentation on the U.S. verification and stability proposals, Burt said he thought the sides could make rapid progress in the ministerial meetings and in Round XII in Geneva.

14. Nazarkin thanked Burt for his presentation of additional specifics on the U.S. proposals. Nazarkin said he had not covered this subject in detail in his initial presentation because he thought the sides should focus first on those documents that would result from the Ministers’ meeting. There probably would not be sufficient time in Washington and Wyoming; details should be worked out in Geneva after the sides had agreed on general principles at the ministerial. The sides could exchange views in detail during the ministerial should time permit, but Nazarkin said they should focus first on items the ministers would need. Therefore Nazarkin had not discussed every U.S. proposal.

15. Thanking Nazarkin for his comments, Bartholomew said he had one observation and one question. If his understanding was correct, it appeared that it would be possible at the ministerial to agree on at least three of the seven verification and stability measures: exercise notifications, Data Denial, and STOF (though Bartholomew had questions he would like to ask Nazarkin). In addition, Bartholomew said, there would be an umbrella agreement to cover all the measures, without prejudice to detailed discussion of all measures. Bartholomew said the sides could discuss this in more detail in the subgroup, but it would be useful here if Nazarkin could expand on the Soviet concept of the relationship between agreement on these measures and the START Treaty itself and its duration.

16. Nazarkin said the agreement on principles would come first; signing it would help the delegations to work out verification and stability measures. Second, the strategic exercise agreement was ready to be signed at the ministerial; there was no problem. Concerning the other two documents (on non-encryption of telemetry and STOF), if the U.S. side accepted the Soviet proposals that would lead to one situation; if not, the discussion could continue in Geneva. Regarding STOF, Nazarkin noted, the sides would need a document to sign; they did not have one. But after discussions in the subgroup, the sides could see where things stood.

Strategic Exercise Notification

17. In his opening remarks Nazarkin said he hoped the ministers would be able to sign the agreement on advance notification of strategic exercises. The Soviet side had studied the U.S. draft handed over in Geneva, which was essentially based on the exchanges between defense ministers, and was ready to sign. The Soviet side would have some comments on the language of the Russian text handed over by the U.S. side, but Nazarkin did not feel these linguistic matters should present any obstacles to conclusion of the agreement.

18. Burt said the U.S. side also wanted to move forward on the specific verification and stability measures, and hoped the sides would be able to finalize the strategic exercise notification agreement. The U.S. understanding of its obligations under the strategic exercise notification agreement was that the U.S. would notify the USSR of the global shield exercise if it were held in a calendar year; if global shield were not being held that year, then the U.S. would notify the USSR of a major exercise involving bomber aircraft during that year. There would be a notification of one exercise per year. Based on that understanding, which Burt said he thought was shared by Nazarkin, the sides could reach agreement. Burt said the U.S. side wanted to conclude the agreement with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze this week, but would like to preserve the option for those who had done the work to sign it. He asked whether the two foreign ministers could announce publicly that they had achieved agreement, but leave the honor of signing the agreement to the defense ministers.

19. Nazarkin said he thought a way out could be found so as not to take credit for something accomplished by another ministry; he thought the working group could resolve this.

Data Denial

20. Regarding the non-encryption of telemetry, in his opening remarks Nazarkin said the Soviet side had studied the U.S. draft agreement handed over in Geneva and thought agreement was possible based on that document. There was one consideration, regarding the length of time the agreement would be in force: the Soviet side thought this agreement could be used not only to resolve this issue prior to signing the START Treaty, but even afterwards. The Soviet side proposed to solve the problem entirely. Thus, Nazarkin said, this agreement could remain in force in parallel with the future START Treaty and thus this issue would be closed; there would be no further complications in the START talks concerning this issue. Nazarkin said he would provide further details later regarding Soviet views on these issues.

21. Regarding telemetry encryption and means of impeding the broadcast of telemetry, Burt said he was encouraged by Nazarkin’s statement indicating that the Soviet side was ready to enter an agreement. He noted that Nazarkin had raised the issue of the agreement’s duration. There were two factors: first, the Soviet side was proposing an agreement of indefinite duration, yet the sides had not yet addressed the question of the duration of the START Treaty itself. Burt asked the Soviet side to clarify its position. Secondly, Burt said, there was a need to clarify whether any agreement made now could be further improved or otherwise changed in the final START Treaty. If the sides signed it now, Burt said, they might close off options of making improvements in the final START Treaty. These were trial arrangements; the goal was to learn from them. Burt suggested this subject be discussed further in the subgroup.

22. Nazarkin confirmed that the Soviet side sought to make the agreement on non-encryption of telemetry of unlimited duration. Nazarkin said he saw reason in what Burt had said concerning the need to be consistent with the START Treaty, on which the sides had not yet agreed on duration. However, he thought that in their agreement on telemetry the sides should resolve the entire issue.

23. Burt asked whether, after signing of the data denial agreement but before the conclusion of the START Treaty, a side would have the right to propose a change. Burt explained that the U.S. side saw this measure as a trial, and wanted to preserve the option to improve upon it in the START Treaty. He asked whether this could be done under the Soviet approach.

24. Nazarkin said Burt was correct in distinguishing between the U.S. and Soviet approaches. The Soviet side wanted to change the U.S. proposal on telemetry from a trial measure to a measure fully in force; thus it would be possible to eliminate one of the difficulties the sides were having in START. If the sides could agree on duration, the sides could agree on the measure right away.

Short-Time-of-Flight (STOF)

25. During his opening remarks on verification and stability measures, Burt noted that ministers had discussed the question of depressed-trajectory SLBMs last May. A ban on short-time-of-flight tests would enhance strategic stability, Burt said, because such tests could cause concern in a time of crisis. Also, he added, neither side currently has STOF SLBMs. One approach could be a ban on depressed-trajectory missiles, but that was not the only way. The problem was not only depressed trajectories—it was STOF. Therefore, Burt said, the U.S. was seeking a broader commitment to ban all STOF, whether or not they were depressed trajectories. The U.S. side was prepared to discuss this, Burt said.

26. Nazarkin agreed that STOF was not just a problem of depressed trajectories. There should be a broader approach, he said, perhaps even broader than the U.S. side had proposed, and should include not only STOF but attack warning time, because time of flight was not the only thing that was important; warning time also was important. The sides could discuss this in more detail in the subgroup, Nazarkin said, but they should concentrate on the umbrella agreement and the notification agreement.

Early PPM

27. During opening remarks on Perimeter and Portal Monitoring (PPM), Burt said the U.S. was prepared to provide further details regarding its proposal to establish early PPM of certain ICBM production facilities along the lines of the U.S. START proposal. This was consistent with the longstanding U.S. view that agreement on effective verification measures was essential if the U.S. were to drop its proposed ban on mobile ICBMs. Confidence in our ability to verify future START Treaty limits on mobile missiles could be improved if we began as soon as possible to implement, on an experimental basis, a PPM System at production facilities for MIRVed mobile or planned MIRVed mobile ICBMs—the SS–24 and the peacekeeper. The U.S. was proposing that the sides begin to implement this agreement by exchanging lists of their respective facilities for:

— Casting the solid rocket motor and/or cartridges for the solid rocket motor for the largest stage of the SS–24 and Peacekeeper, and

— Final assembly of operational missiles or their spares for the SS–24 or for the Peacekeeper.

28. The sides would also exchange a general description of the production and assembly process at each listed facility and specific information, including dimensional data, on the missile-related items that exit each facility. Burt offered to provide additional details in the subgroup. Finally, he said, the sides would declare how many of their SS–24s or Peacekeepers currently exist and where they are located.

Unique Identifiers

29. In his opening remarks on the subject of unique identifiers, Burt said the U.S. was pleased that the Soviet side had accepted the U.S. concept of unique identifiers during Round XI. He noted that the task of writing treaty provisions to implement this concept would be made much easier if each side could demonstrate to the other the technology it would use in applying unique identifiers, or tags, to missiles. This initiative would allow each side to demonstrate in technical detail its ideas on this subject. As the first step of a process that would culminate in such a demonstration, Burt said, the U.S. proposes that the sides agree on a mutually convenient time for a briefing of Soviet experts on the U.S. approach to tagging technology and how our tagging concept would work in conjunction with PPM and OSI. Of course, he continued, the U.S. would expect a similar briefing for U.S. experts on the Soviet approach.

RV Inspections

30. In his opening remarks Burt said the U.S. side had also devoted considerable detailed thought to RV inspections. The purpose of the U.S. proposal was to demonstrate each side’s proposed inspection procedures for verifying that specified types of ICBMs and SLBMs have no more than the number of RVs attributed to them. Burt offered to provide additional details in the NST subgroup.

Data Exchange

31. In his opening remarks on data exchange, Burt described the U.S. suggestion that the sides exchange and periodically update data for fully agreed categories in the draft MOU before treaty signature. The purpose of this suggestion, he explained, was to enhance confidence and prepare more completely for treaty implementation.

ALCMs

32. In his opening remarks Nazarkin said the time was ripe to resolve the ALCM issue. Noting this, Bartholomew asked how the Soviet side proposed to pick the apple from the tree. Burt recalled that in Geneva he and Nazarkin had discussed ALCM issues extensively and had agreed that this could be an area for discussion at the ministerial. Burt cited several ALCM issues on which the sides still disagreed: the ALCM attribution rule, how to distinguish nuclear and conventional ALCMs, whether to count conventional ALCMs in the START limits, the ALCM range threshold, non-deployed ALCMs, and numerical limits. Burt said he agreed with Nazarkin that the sides should be able to resolve these issues; he seconded Bartholomew’s hope that the Soviet side would have ideas on how to resolve them. Replying, Nazarkin said he thought that at this meeting the sides could really continue the search for a solution.

Mobile ICBM Verification

33. Regarding mobile ICBMs, during his opening remarks Nazarkin recalled that the Soviet side had presented proposals during Round XI. The Soviet approach to a solution included verification. The Soviet side hoped the U.S. side had had time to study the Soviet proposals, and was awaiting the U.S. response.

34. In his reply to Nazarkin, Bartholomew noted that the U.S. side was also prepared to discuss ways to expand the elements of common ground on mobile ICBM verification. Burt said that the Soviet side had presented some interesting ideas during the last round. Proposing that the sides discuss additional elements of common ground, he handed over a U.S. list of such elements for possible agreement (attached) and offered to explain each of the concepts in the subgroup.

35. Nazarkin said the Soviet side also looked forward to a productive dialogue on mobile ICBMs. He had not seen the document Burt had handed over and would have to study it, but its appearance showed the U.S. side was thinking about how to address this issue and the Soviet side welcomed this move.

Unit of Account

36. In his opening remarks regarding unit of account, Nazarkin recalled that the sides had exchanged views in detail during Round XI; he thought the problem could be solved. Nazarkin had a detailed proposal to make, but he would not dwell on it at this point; it was technical. He hoped the working group could work out an acceptable solution to report to ministers.

37. Bartholomew noted that the sides had already had extensive discussions on the subject of unit of account; resolving this issue would result in the elimination of many brackets in the JDT. The U.S. side was prepared to discuss the issue in the experts’ group so that brackets could be eliminated.

38. Burt recalled that in Round XI both sides had agreed that the issue of ballistic missile unit of account should be resolved at the ministerial. Their differences were well known. In the U.S. view, the missiles were the weapons and therefore should be counted; the Soviet side favored a reference to launchers. However, there were places in the JDT where both sides favored a reference to both the missile and the launcher. Burt suggested that the sides try in the subgroup to identify a phrase that would include both missiles and launchers.

SLCMs

39. During his opening remarks Nazarkin repeated the Soviet feeling, expressed during Round XI, that SLCMs were an extremely important issue. In Geneva the sides should focus on SLCM verification, just as they had done on mobile ICBM verification; if they could do this, he said, a solution to the SLCM problem would be in sight; this would be a step in that direction.

40. In a final comment during his own opening remarks, Burt said that while he didn’t like to end on a negative note, the U.S. side had very serious problems with any concept of effective verification of SLCMs. The U.S. side was always open to hearing Soviet ideas, but was convinced that effective verification was not possible. The declaratory approach was well worth consideration, Burt said.

41. Replying, Nazarkin said that in the Soviet view the correct approach was to discuss verification; the Soviet side would like to show the U.S. side the possibility of solving the problem of verification, just as the sides were trying to do with mobile ICBMs. Therefore the Soviet side was calling for a joint effort.

Defense & Space (D&S)

42. At the close of his opening remarks, Burt said that Amb. Cooper would respond to the Soviet questions concerning Defense & Space and the Vice President’s remarks on SDI.

43. In opening the discussion on Defense & Space, Bartholomew said that, as in START, the fundamental U.S. interest in Defense & Space is to reduce the risk of nuclear war by strengthening deterrence and stability; he said U.S. positions on SDI and on Defense & Space remained unchanged. The president had said the U.S. would develop SDI and deploy it when it was ready. The vigorous research program was continuing, Bartholomew said, with bipartisan support from the congress and substantial, sustained funding. Important advances had been made, though more work was needed to determine feasibility. Because of the work already completed, the advances made thus far, the promise of advanced, effective defenses and their potential to reduce further the risk of war, Bartholomew said it was the strong view of the U.S. side that a Defense & Space Treaty must not foreclose new and stabilizing technologies, and indeed must permit their exploration and eventual deployment. Bartholomew noted that Nazarkin had raised questions on this subject, and turned the floor over to Cooper.

44. Cooper said that regarding the reference to changes in the U.S. SDI Program, he wanted to re-emphasize what Bartholomew had said: the U.S. position on SDI and D&S issues remains unchanged. Cooper encouraged the Soviet side to review the tape of Vice President Quayle’s interview with the LA Times; this would reveal that the printed report had been taken out of context, because the substance of the Vice President’s comments in it showed a clear commitment to the SDI Program; he emphasized on several occasions President Bush’s commitment to seek to develop a strategic defense system and deploy it when ready.

45. Cooper said that Round XI of the Defense & Space talks had not made meaningful progress, although the sides had had an interesting discussion on the offense-defense relationship. The Washington Summit joint statement was an important milestone in the sides’ negotiations on Defense and Space, Cooper said; it laid a solid foundation for a Defense and Space Treaty. But the Treaty must build on, and clarify, the Washington Summit understandings, Cooper continued; it must not merely codify language that had been interpreted in sharply different ways by the two sides. The U.S. recognized that these differing interpretations reflected differing positions on substance; clearly, they must be resolved if there was to be fundamental progress. But Cooper said procedural obstacles ought not to be allowed to exacerbate matters. Even though both sides had tabled texts with common language over a year ago, no joint draft text of the Defense & Space Treaty exists, despite public pledges by the Soviet Foreign Minister. The U.S. could not understand why the Soviet side had imposed such an artificial obstacle, unless its purpose was to delay the talks.

46. Regarding substance, Cooper continued, the U.S. side would be happy to hear any new ideas from the Soviet side on moving forward in the Defense & Space negotiations. Cooper stressed several points:

— The U.S. will not accept an ambiguous agreement that simply codifies the language of the Washington Summit joint statement. Ambiguity is a formula for failure in Defense & Space as in any other arms control forum.

— The U.S. was encouraged in Round XI by Soviet calls for working out a “common approach” on the right to deploy and a “mutual understanding” on the scope of the non withdrawal commitment. The U.S. side would like to hear more about this.

— The U.S. was pleased that the Soviet side had accepted some important U.S. concepts for predictability measures over the last year, but regretted that further progress had not been made in Round XI. U.S. proposals for visits to laboratories and briefings, and for the inclusion of research in the field of strategic ballistic missile defense are sound and deserve Soviet support. The U.S. side would like the Soviet side to consider not excluding activities that take place earlier in the acquisition cycle than can be observed by NTM. This Soviet approach lessens opportunities to build confidence and enhance predictability, by protecting against the risk of technological surprise.

— The U.S. likewise would urge the Soviet side to pursue the U.S. concept for building confidence with regard to the testing of space-based ABM systems based on other physical principles and their components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles. The U.S. assurance of October 28, 1988, and U.S.-proposed notification measures, are designed to build confidence that testing is not creating a cover for prohibited deployment and is not a base for a territorial defense.

— The U.S. space-based sensors proposal is a practical means to solve the verification problems posed by advancing technology for such sensors.

47. Finally, Cooper said, the U.S. position remains that a START Treaty should not be held hostage to a defense treaty. A key premise of the ABM Treaty was that it would be soon followed by implementation of significant limitations on and reductions of strategic offensive forces. This did not take place. Instead, Soviet strategic weapons had increased four-fold, and U.S. weapons two-fold. Thus the U.S. will not pay again for a START Treaty with new limits on defenses, Cooper concluded.

48. Grinevskiy thanked the U.S. side for such a broad presentation of its position. Nazarkin proposed that the sides begin with the negative and end with the positive; Bartholomew countered that it was better that way than the reverse.

49. Nazarkin said Cooper had presented a gloomy picture of the situation concerning the negotiations and the ABM Treaty. Nazarkin agreed with that assessment; unfortunately the situation was at a dead end. But Nazarkin absolutely disagreed with the reasons Cooper had given; he categorically rejected the accusations against the Soviet side for creating this situation and being against constructive dialogue. Nazarkin said that in his experience when accusations began, that meant that the side making the accusations was not interested in a solution; the Soviet side had other interests and therefore had no interest in making accusations against the U.S. side. The Soviet side wanted to search for a solution. Nazarkin hoped that in Wyoming the sides would be able to exchange opinions and jointly find a way out of a situation where they were really talking past each other. But for that a joint effort would be required and not accusations.

50. Cooper said that while he agreed in general with Nazarkin’s appraisal of the D&S negotiations, he did not agree that things were at a dead end. Cooper said he had gone through the specifics of the U.S. position, including the need to clarify the Washington Summit joint statement, which the sides agreed should be the foundation of a D&S Treaty. He had only pointed out that the fact that there was no JDT was due to the Soviet side’s refusal to include U.S.-proposed language in the document. Cooper said he would like to see a change in this approach; it would be a positive sign if the Soviet side agreed to work on text, just as the sides had done for the predictability protocol. This would be a basis for progress.

51. Grinevskiy asked whether anyone on the Soviet side wished to comment. (No one did.)

Compliance

52. Turning to the subject of compliance, Bartholomew cited the Secretary’s statement last May that the President feels strongly that the arms control process cannot be sustained without scrupulous observance of all arms control agreements and undertakings related to them. He recalled that at the last round of the standing consultative commission the U.S. side had dropped some issues from the SCC agenda. Bartholomew noted that on other compliance concerns which the U.S. side had raised the Soviet side had not responded. He cited the examples of the U.S. requests that the two remaining flat twin radars be dismantled and that the Soviet side cease concurrent operations. Bartholomew said he wished to underscore the need for the Soviet side to move immediately to correct the serious ABM Treaty violation at Krasnoyarsk, which is a significant violation of a central provision of the treaty. He said the Soviet side should state—without conditions—how and when the dismantlement of this illegal radar would occur. Bartholomew wanted to make clear what he had said at the previous arms control working group meeting: the U.S. side could not agree to Soviet proposals linking dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar to agreement by the parties to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. Similarly, he said, the Soviet proposal linking dismantlement of Krasnoyarsk to dismantlement of the large Phased-Array Radar (PAR) at Thule and no construction of the Fylingdales PAR is unacceptable.

53. Bartholomew said the U.S. side took this position with the view that compliance with agreements is not something that can be traded for something else. Bartholomew said U.S. criteria for determining whether the violation has been corrected remain: treaty-prohibited radar capability and lead-time advantage must be eliminated; verification by NTM; no new verification requirements. The U.S. side continues to believe that satisfying these criteria would require the Soviet side to dismantle the transmitter and receiver and their foundations, Bartholomew said. The U.S. side remains willing to listen to any new proposals from the Soviet side that would meet our criteria; the U.S. side cannot sign START or Defense & Space agreements until the Krasnoyarsk violation has been corrected. Concluding, Bartholomew said the Krasnoyarsk radar is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty and will continue to raise the question of material breach and proportionate response until it is resolved.

54. Nazarkin remarked that it appeared the U.S. side was finishing all its presentations on a negative note. Though he had already said what he thought of that, unfortunately now he would have to end his own presentation on a negative note. Nazarkin said the Soviet side was still concerned regarding the Thule and Fylingdales radars and felt they were violations of the ABM Treaty. However, these issues were being considered in a special forum and Nazarkin did not think the sides should complicate the present talks with mutual recriminations.

55. Bartholomew countered that his negative remarks had been uttered with a positive intention—to ask the Soviet side to remove an obstacle to the sides’ common purpose. If his effort to advance this common objective by asking for something from the Soviet side as labeled “recrimination,” then there would be many more recriminations. Bartholomew said he also did not want to spend much time on this issue, but since the Soviet side had raised the subject of Thule and Fylingdales, he had to note that these radars were in existence in 1972, and their modernization was permitted by the Treaty. This was an important question, Bartholomew said, and the sides would have to return to it—quietly, dispassionately, but persistently—as long as it was unresolved, in order to get rid of an obstacle to their common interest.

56. Regarding Bartholomew’s good intentions, Grinevskiy noted that the “road to hell” was paved with good intentions. Bartholomew countered that he had started to think the sides’ differences were more profound than the “road to hell.” Grinevskiy noted that of the radars mentioned, one continued to function. The Soviet side was not refusing to discuss these complicated problems, he said; the U.S. side had concerns, the Soviet side had concerns, the sides would have to find solutions. Grinevskiy said he did not mind the fact that sharp issues were being raised at these talks, because they also had to be resolved. Summing up, Grinevskiy said the sides definitely had the opportunity at this ministerial to find ways to complete agreements on two major issues noted here. He did not exclude the possibility that other issues might be added after the Burt-Nazarkin meeting. The sides had opportunities to resolve issues of substance and to make progress. The working groups could do this based on assignments from the main group.

57. Bartholomew agreed with Grinevskiy’s description of the situation. He thought it was wise to accentuate the positive, and there had been positive elements to this discussion. It should be possible to do substantial business on the issues discussed. After a twenty-minute break, Bartholomew suggested that an NST Subgroup Meet at 2:30 that afternoon. He suggested that the main group cover Chemical Weapons (CW) before lunch so that a subgroup could be created in the afternoon; the group could then turn to Nuclear Testing (NTT) issues and create another subgroup with AMB. Robinson. The main group could cover the rest of the arms control agenda and decide at the end of the day how to proceed further. Grinevskiy agreed to Bartholomew’s suggestions and suggested that the sides turn to CW issues; Bartholomew offered the floor to the Soviet side.

[Omitted here are sections on biological and chemical weapons]

69. The sides agreed to resume the arms control working group at 2:30 p.m. Bartholomew said the morning session had been productive and said the U.S. side looked forward to a productive afternoon session.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890862–0290. Secret. Sent priority.