Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

44. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Burt) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, September 13, 1989

SUBJECT

• NST Issues in the Gorbachev Letter

We now anticipate that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will deliver Chairman Gorbachev’s letter to the President before going out to Wyoming. Although we do not know specifically what the letter will cover, Embassy Moscow has been told that it will focus in large part on NST. This memo outlines some of the kinds of NST initiatives that might be in the letter or that Shevardnadze could unveil in Wyoming.

START

Soviet options for initiatives in START include both procedural and substantive approaches. Procedurally, Gorbachev could try either of two gambits. He could challenge the President to accept a commitment to a negotiating timetable² in START, similar to the President’s proposed 6–12 month timetable for CFE. A variation could link Soviet acceptance of the President’s CFE timetable with U.S. acceptance of a Soviet-proposed timetable for START. Such a proposal would permit the Soviets to argue that it is they who are demonstrating the political will to complete the START treaty. It would be intended to put the U.S. on the defensive if we responded with our “no artificial deadlines”³ policy by contrasting it with our approach to CFE.

Substantively, a Soviet initiative would reflect one of three possible schools of thought in Moscow: the first, advocating unilateral reductions; the second, advocating changes in specific START positions; and the third, advocating no Soviet moves in START without evidence of U.S. flexibility.

I. The first approach, reflecting the perceived requirements of perestroyka, is that the Soviets move ahead unilaterally with reductions already contemplated in START, e.g., initiating SS–18 reductions before the treaty enters into force.⁴ This course would parallel Soviet announcements regarding conventional forces in Europe and might similarly benefit Gorbachev politically by subjecting strategic military forces to the same economic pressures as domestic projects.

A variation on this approach would link unilateral reductions with a challenge to the U.S. to undertake reciprocal actions. The Soviet argument could parallel that which we employed in presenting the President’s verification/stability measures—that the sides could achieve stability and predictability benefits by implementing now certain reductions or exercising restraint in certain programs, such as decommissioning SSBNs, limiting ALCM deployments or observing a moratorium on SLCM production. Unlike a purely unilateral move, this approach would probably be intended to serve primarily symbolic, propaganda goals. If so, it would reflect a compromise option, possibly with those who want to slow down the START process.

II. A second approach would entail taking concrete steps to move START forward by proposing solutions to overcome current impasses. These solutions could represent serious movement in the Soviet position and display that Gorbachev is in control of the START decision-making process in Moscow. Several candidate options are consistent with this approach.

— First, the Soviets could accept one or more of our verification/stability measures (VSM) and propose to work the details in Wyoming and Geneva. However, they will certainly argue that several of the measures should be extended to cover cruise missiles and heavy bombers. Nazarkin hinted to me on several occasions that he thought Moscow would respond favorably to these proposals.⁵ Karpov implied this also, and mentioned specifically that VSM should be expanded to cover strategic systems other than ballistic missiles.

— A second possibility would be on SLCMs.⁶ We have been getting lots of signals that the Soviets have been considering a number of different approaches to SLCMs. The SLCM issue is highly visible, both in Western Europe and in the strategic community, so a SLCM proposal would be presented as a dramatic initiative to break the START deadlock.⁷ A Soviet proposal on SLCMs would likely reflect some of the possibilities that have already been floated with us or in the public arena.

For example, Nazarkin pressed hard for the establishment of a working group to discuss SLCM verification and suggested that the Soviets could accept each side’s freedom to mix nuclear and conventional systems within a negotiated aggregate ceiling. A SLCM initiative is likely to repeat these ideas, possibly including also a proposal to demonstrate Soviet verification technology. A more dramatic initiative, despite possible Soviet Navy opposition, would pick up on Karpov’s proposal last summer to ban nuclear SLCMs. On a different tack, there is some evidence that Moscow might be willing to defer SLCMs to START II.⁸ At RAND last year, Sagdeyev suggested that Soviet concerns about SLCMs circumventing START could be resolved for now by establishing SLCM limits, ensured by “political guarantees,”⁹ while deferring the details of verification to a follow-on negotiation.

— A third possibility, for which our evidence is sketchier, is that the Soviets may step up to our interest in deMIRVing options. Despite Akhromeyev’s view that any consideration of such options must await START II, a move on a MIRVed mobile ban is conceivable.¹⁰ New IC projections, indicating more SS-25s, SS-N-23s and single RV-SLBMs, suggest that the Soviets may have more flexibility than we to accommodate a deMIRVing option along the lines of those we discussed in the strategic review last spring. If they were so inclined, they might expect that such an initiative would be well received in Congress given the problem of funding missile modernization.

III. The third substantive approach would reflect the views of those who believe that Moscow has already made too many START concessions and that the START process should be slowed down, either to delay agreement or to keep up the pressure on the U.S.¹¹ This approach suggests that the Gorbachev letter would contain boilerplate language at best, but in any case not represent an effort to bring closure to outstanding START issues. Shevardnadze’s recent public complaints about the lack of U.S. progress are consistent with this approach.

Defense and Space

A D&S initiative at the ministerial would suggest that the Soviets believe that funding and technical difficulties with SDI might make the Administration more willing to strike a deal to limit defenses. A Soviet initiative would clearly be designed to appeal to those in Congress who would reduce or constrain the growth of the program, possibly by offering a concession intended to make an Administration rejection difficult and costly.

The most likely initiative would include a proposal that both sides observe the development and testing limitations of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. On several occasions, Soviet officials have said they are ready to dismantle Krasnoyarsk in exchange for the narrow.¹² Last summer, a senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official also suggested that the Soviets would consider dismantling the ABM system around Moscow. A proposal that offered to dismantle Krasnoyarsk and the Moscow ABM system in exchange for the narrow interpretation would be publicly popular and would have significant support in Congress.¹³

Alternatively, the Soviets could try to flesh out their 1987 list proposal which would establish performance thresholds for testing in space. Nazarkin raised the possibility in Geneva that the Soviets would be willing to return to their list proposal, although he did not put forward any new ideas. This option seems less likely, however, both because of the technical difficulties of negotiating such an agreement and because it would win less support in the Congress, and thus put less pressure on the Administration.

Conclusion

We should expect that Gorbachev will make a move in START designed to gain the negotiating initiative by showing that he is able to make tough decisions on issues affecting Soviet strategic forces, while maintaining pressure on the U.S. to demonstrate the same political will. Possibly by eliminating a major roadblock to agreement, he will try to exact a price for the U.S. not showing the same flexibility on START as we have suggested on CFE. A move in Defense and Space is possible and would reflect a Soviet strategy to strike a deal while they calculate domestic support for SDI to be eroding.

1. Source: Department of State, STARS, Document Number 198921085-0. Secret. Sent through Bartholomew.
2. Baker underlined “a negotiating timetable.”
3. Baker underlined “no artificial deadlines” and emphasized the quotation marks.
4. Baker underlined “initiating SS-18 reductions before the treaty enters into force.”
5. Baker underlined “that he thought Moscow would respond favorably to these proposals.”
6. Baker underlined “on SLCMs.”
7. Baker underlined “a SLCM proposal would” and “presented as a dramatic initiative to break the START deadlock.”
8. Baker underlined “defer SLCMs” and “START II.”
9. Baker underlined “establishing SLCM limits,” “ensured,” and “‘political guarantees.’”
10. Baker underlined “a MIRVed mobile ban is conceivable.”
11. Baker underlined “the START process should be slowed down, either to delay agreement or to keep up the pressure on the U.S.”
12. Baker underlined “dismantle Krasnoyarsk in exchange for the narrow.”
13. Baker drew brackets around this sentence.