38. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Lt. Gen (Ret) Scowcroft
- Mr Robert Gates
- Admiral Crowe
- Marshal Akhromeyev
- Col. Popov (Soviet Interpreter)
- Mr. Afanasenko (US Interpreter)
- Maj Stolberg (Joint Staff Notetaker)
Lt Gen Scowcroft: What are you impressions upon leaving the United States?
Marshal Akhromeyev: I’m leaving with much bigger hopes for the future. I’ve become convinced that most Americans stand for promoting US-Soviet ties. I talked to hundreds of Americans. All were positive on the USSR. I’m convinced that most Americans and the Administration have the same sentiments. We’re all being supplied with much information. We’ve been provided with unlimited opportunities. Practically all the US leaders talked with me.2 We still face serious issues.
Admiral Crowe: He’s been exposed to the full spectrum.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: The cynics in the US government are in the Department of Defense and on the National Security Council staff. I wouldn’t say I met cynics on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral Crowe: What about the Navy?
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I wouldn’t call them cynics. The tone of our relationship has improved much for the better. But the realities haven’t changed much—we still have work to do.
Marshal Akhromeyev: We have just started. These are old stereotypes to be changed. General Secretary Gorbachev asked Mr Gates if there was an organization in the United States which was working [Page 285] against perestroika in the Soviet Union. I’m convinced that there is no such organization here.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: No, there’s not. There is, however, still a natural caution. There’s still much suspicion on both sides.
Marshal Akhromeyev: There are still bilateral areas to work hard on. We can’t eliminate them all right away.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I was very encouraged by your approach to the conventional arms race. If we can implement the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement, this will be a major step towards removing mutual suspicion.
Marshal Akhromeyev: On the START Talks, we both have made major progress, but there are still unresolved issues. They impact on critical interests. The easy ones concerning principal are all taken care of. The U.S. has one set of questions while we have another set. What is the best way to resolve outstanding issues? We need tradeoffs to make progress at START.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I don’t disagree at all. The remaining issues are: 1) SLCMs 2) SDI program.
Marshal Akhromeyev: No, we say SDI is purely a U.S. problem. We are only concerned about territorial ABM concerns.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: The other issue is 3) Bomber counting problems. Do you see any others?
Marshal Akhromeyev: These are major outstanding issues. A future agreement will depend on resolution of these three major issues.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: It will not be easy.
Marshal Akhromeyev: That’s right. These are not minor questions. We’ve spent much money. There are also cynics—some simply don’t want weapons eliminated or reduced and others are the producers of the weapons.
Admiral Crowe: There were comments made at the House Armed Services Committee hearings about mobile missiles and the elimination of all nuclear SLCMs.
Marshal Akhromeyev: You heard these questions from the earliest stages. You know the full history. Those two issues were never resolved by SALT II. We left the negotiating table and put on boxing gloves. Now, mobiles and cruise missiles are no longer limited as had been designated by the SALT II protocols. These are now the weapons systems causing us trouble. Both of us have these systems deployed. We have mobile missiles and you don’t, while you have cruise missiles deployed. A trade off may be possible along these lines.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I assume all that we say is personal, not official.
Marshal Akhromeyev: That’s right, we’re simply exploring.
[Page 286]Lt Gen Scowcroft: It’s not easy for me to say how to make a trade in numbers because they are two very different kinds of systems.
Marshal Akhromeyev: If a trade is possible, then at a later stage in the negotiations we could approach these issues in greater detail. We’re concerned with nuclear SLCMs. You keep saying that MIRV’d mobile ICBMs are the most destabilizing system. We could combine long range nuclear SLCMs and MIRV’d mobile ICBM’s and try to achieve a radical solution to this problem.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: The problems have different sources. MIRV mobiles are perhaps manageable, but verification is a problem. This is important because of the MIRV aspect rather than the single warhead missile like the SS-25. It will be eventually in our interest to get MIRV missile out of our silos, where they are both vulnerable and lucrative targets. The SLCM problem is different because its a less destabilizing weapon.
Marshal Akhromeyev: I wouldn’t say that.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: It’s my own perspective that its less destabilizing for you rather than us. The principal problem is the impossible task of verification because of the platforms involved and problems associated with whether the cruise missiles are nuclear or conventionally equipped.
Mr. Gates: At CIA, an expert once drew me a picture of a nuclear equipped MIRV and a conventionally equipped cruise missile. They were identical.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Another option is Nitze’s. I met with Nitze several days ago but didn’t speak about a suggestion I heard that he had made. Nitze said that only naval forces should be equipped with ballistic missiles while all other ballistic missiles should be completely eliminated. This has not been reported to our political leaders, but in general seems to be a worthy idea. The difficulty is that nuclear armed cruise missiles should be scrapped. In this regard, what would be the response from Great Britain, France and China. Today they are against taking part in similar negotiations.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I believe that the ships on which these cruise missiles are deployed could have no other nuclear weapons. SLBMs would be on submarines and could be easily monitored.
Admiral Crowe: Not easy, but more manageable.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: It would be worth thinking about.
Marshal Akhromeyev: I also think this notion is a serious notion. If we think on this line, SALT could find solutions and confidence would grow as verification is worked.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: In certain circles this would be a very controversial issue.
[Page 287]Admiral Crowe: If we go for all nuclear weapons, the elimination of nuclear torpedoes might be possible.
Mr Gates: The range problem makes this solution more difficult.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: It could look like a U.S. concession when we have the advantage.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Maybe we couldn’t do it. The US would have to eliminate long range nuclear SLCMs while the Soviet Union would eliminate our SLCMs and MIRV mobile missiles. We’ll have problems because we’d be eliminating a whole category of missiles. We will analyze these issues. The second option is easier: a bilateral elimination of nuclear weapons except for ballistic missiles with naval forces.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I’m confused.
Marshal Akhromeyev: The two options are: 1) Eliminate long range nuclear SLCMs and MIRV mobile ICBMs—difficult but can’t rule it out. 2) Eliminate all nuclear systems with the exception of ballistic missiles with naval forces on both sides—this would be simpler for the Soviet Union.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I think our difficulties are on opposite sides—your greatest problem is with SLCMs. To reconfirm, 1) on sea launched systems, the only nuclear weapons at sea would be ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and 2) on land you would give up SS–24s and we would give up MX on railcars.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Yes. You have to present us a fair agreement. You would be obligated to eliminate more SLCMs than us, but we would make up for that by eliminating the mobile missiles.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: It’s a very interesting proposal.
Mr. Gates: There will be skeptics here on trading the rail mobile MX.
Admiral Crowe: They are dissimilar systems.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: This has a lot of merit. I suggest we look at it seriously. We might want to talk more on this, other than at ongoing negotiations.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Like now. We have discussed two options. Do you think both deserve scrutiny and analysis[?]
Lt Gen Scowcroft: Yes. May we could find a way to exchange information on both options.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Not in the open.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I agree.
Marshal Akhromeyev: What would be the best forum to exchange ideas on both options? I’ll talk to General Secretary Gorbachev about it.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: Now we don’t have such a forum.
Marshal Akhromeyv: I might suggest such a way. Now General Secretary Gorbachev has two advisors: Dobrynin and myself. We could [Page 288] invite Dobrynin onto this question to talk about it. You could extend an invitation to Dobrynin and General Secretary Gorbachev would instruct Dobrynin to come talk about it, or we could invite one of your representatives.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I think that would be a good way to keep it close to our leaders and away from our systems. We’d figure out a cover.
Marshal Akhromeyev: What would be a timetable for the next talks?
Lt Gen Scowcroft: I think we need a couple of months. I’d like to wait for our defense budget to be approved. It’s important to have something to negotiate. In a couple of months we could easily communicate back and forth. I have one question: What is your notion of all land-based MIRV ballistic missiles.
Marshall Akhromeyev: Most of your ballistic missiles are on submarines. Ours are in land-based silos. We talked on ceilings in December 1987. We agreed to be ready to cut SS–18s by 50%. Very tough debating proceeded the agreement. We are aware that these are missiles especially troubling the U.S. We agreed not to develop new types of ICBMs and only to modernize 50% of the remaining ICBMs. I believe that is where we should start. If we do away with SS–18s completely, we would be undermining our strategic potential. It would not be equitable.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: It’s an interesting point. What does modernization mean? You describe it as improving combat capability. The MX–1 called for modernization.
Marshal Akhromeyev: These specifics should be agreed upon at negotiations. Modernization means the same number of warheads, the same characteristics as understood at SALT—thrust, size, fuel tonnage, etc. It would be subject to strict verification.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: We need improvements over the SALT stipulation.
Admiral Crowe: SS–18 warheads are a concern.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Hypothetically, we would expand the number of warheads. We do have concerns for ourselves, to include bomber ALCM counting rules.
Admiral Crowe: I agree, it’s a very thorny issue.
Marshal Akhromeyev: I cannot imagine a situation in which the USSR would agree to completely eliminate SS–18s.
Admiral Crowe: This is extreme. Our Navy would say that it cannot eliminate SLCMs.
Marshal Akhromeyev: I understand that it is a delicate problem.
Admiral Crowe: Anything now is imaginable.
Marshal Akrhomeyev: We do not wish to exercise pressure.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: We might think about the possibility of modernization of land-based ballistic missiles and freezing the deployment [Page 289] of highly MIRV’d land-based ballistic missiles. Eventually the SS-18 would become obsolete. Both sides could prevent or restrict the additional deployment of the SS-24 and the MX to replace silo-based MIRV missiles.
Marshal Akhromeyev: We’ll think about it.
Admiral Crowe: This addresses what we’re concerned with.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: It’s important if we can take steps in the right direction to expand confidence.
Marshal Akhromeyev: That is absolutely correct. The answers to these questions should be found in a future treaty.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: We will think very carefully to understand your personal reflections. We will not be held to anything on our side.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Remember what happened to the “walk in the woods.” Let this stay quiet.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: This is not a bad idea. We’ll keep this discussion between ourselves and will include Dobrynin.
Marshal Akhromeyev: There is one question left to pose: what of the necessity to negotiate naval forces? This is quite a political problem to the USSR. It bears personally on the political leaders of our country. When the Cold War began you deployed large naval forces and bases around the world. These bases were not only directed against the USSR. But the bases actually surrounded the USSR. I don’t know who to blame, but the Soviet Union deployed powerful ground forces in Europe. Those two threats balanced each other. Nuclear weapons came into existence. We’re now negotiating on START and CFE. We made a radical decision that we should be prepared for radical reductions in Europe to make NATO and the Warsaw Pact even. We will cut ½ million men, to include 300,000 members of the ground forces. With the U.S. Vienna proposal we would further reduce our forces by ½ million men. Our 1,600,000 man ground force component would be down to 800,000 men, so all the threat talk about the Soviet Union would disappear. Once we have a radical solution to CFE, we still have to find a solution to the naval force question. Gorbachev is concerned about a security regime which would reduce forces in Europe but would keep naval forces at their present level. We have no credible answer to this. The answer is to begin naval talks. We will not use the naval talks to disarm you. If the talks are not started, a radical solution to CFE is in doubt. When we reach an agreement on CFE and the treaty is ready for signing, but the naval forces situation is the same as today, no one in the USSR will be ready to sign.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: The are two elements: CFE and naval forces. Our naval problem is the requirement to reinforce Europe. As requirements decline, we may assume that some reductions will be translated to the [Page 290] naval forces. In a sense, the USSR is surrounded. That is the reverse from the U.S. In Europe and Asia we saw the Soviet Union push out in all directions.
Marshal Akhromeyev: We can exclude China.
Mr Gates: Not in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: You had the military benefit of internal lines of communication. You have large forces nearby. Our naval forces developed to respond to you around the land mass.
Marshal Akhromeyev: There are now different circumstances.
Admiral Crowe: There’s a glitch. He’s not determined to eliminate the whole Navy, but focus on the aircraft carrier.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Our principal policy is to not damage US national interests and to consider the national interest of the Soviet Union.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: The threat is the size of carrier aircraft and the numbers of aircraft on board designed for strikes against the Soviet Union. There are not more than 25 such aircraft on each carrier.
Admiral Crowe: About 32.
Marshal Akhromeyev: I didn’t want to discuss this in detail. It would be useful to start discussion on the forces of the two sides.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: As regional changes develop, we would look at these as practical matters. Naval forces reflect the naval competition on the two sides over the narrower mission of maintaining lines of communication in the Atlantic.
Marshal Akhromeyev: I would also imagine that our naval forces would be cut, to include attack submarines which is a U.S. concern. We feel a larger time pressure. Soon this will have a negative bearing on all in our life.
Mr Gates: It’s important that people on both sides not become too impatient. Large changes on both sides clearly can’t be separated from historical relations on both sides. There are also positive attitudes in this country. One problem here are impatient people and people who want relations to move faster than conditions [warrant]. Political evolution on both sides has not progressed far enough. While naval forces are important, relations must continue to evolve.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Once we start talking on the subject of the navy, it will take years.
Lt Gen Scowcroft: The premise for our talks is that there are no forbidden subjects for conversation.
END
- Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Special Separate USSR Notes Files, Gorbachev Files, OA/ID 91126–002, Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989–June 1990 [2]. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House. The memorandum is handwritten. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume.↩
- On July 28, Akhromeyev met with Baker in the Secretary’s Office at the Department from 11:10 a.m.–12:05 p.m. to discuss the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations. (Department of State, STARS, Document Number 198918482-0) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Akhromeyev met with Bush and other top officials in the Oval Office that same day from 2:09–3:04 p.m. No memorandum of conversation was found. Following the afternoon Oval Office meeting, Baker departed for France for the International Conference on Cambodia. He returned to Washington on July 31.↩