Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

39. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

6730.

Geneva, July 29, 1989, 1356Z

SUBJECT

• START Negotiator’s End of Round Summary

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. With little more than a week to go in this round, and most of the substantive business behind us, I thought it would be useful to give you my personal assessment of the round and of the way ahead.

Round XI Pluses and Minuses

3. We approached this first Bush administration round as a reconnaissance effort, designed to help us prepare for the future. It served that function well. Like all interactions with the Soviets, this round had its pluses and minuses. On the plus side:

— The Soviet attitude, from Nazarkin on down, has been businesslike and non-polemical. Delegation members with long experience have been struck by Soviet willingness to engage in genuine give and take, to work language at the table, and to discuss and debate various alternatives.

— The round has been more productive than I anticipated in terms of improving the text and clearing brackets. Rather than simply reacting to our text, the Soviets have been providing us with text of their own more frequently than in the past. In many cases, we appear to be reaping the benefits of our suggestions laid out in round X and of the new, constructive Soviet attitude. The work hasn’t been glamorous, but it has been important.

— The Soviets have made a number of minor improvements in the text (e.g. working a definition of perimeter and portal continuous monitoring and accepting equal rights for heavy ICBM limits). Although they refused to do so this round, there is a chance they will ultimately buy our basic approach to the throw-weight protocol, thus giving us an agreed structure for all treaty documents and facilitating attainment of a longstanding U.S. goal of codified limits on ballistic missile throw-weight. In the most important substantive move, the Soviet’s appear to have accepted our demand for equal intermediate levels during the reductions period, although their approach still includes some unacceptable elements.

In sum, the pluses are real.

4. Unfortunately, the minuses are equally real:

— While showing flexibility on routine language, the Soviets (not surprisingly) have shown none at all on the major issues. Nazarkin claims to have had new material, but it has proven to be either warmed over past Soviet positions (e.g. ALCMs), or minor amplifications and clarifications of previous Soviet approaches (e.g. mobile ICBM and heavy bomber verification).

— A second, more surprising, minus has been Soviet unwillingness to engage on the President’s verification and stability initiative, despite Nazarkin’s apparent personal interest in it and press reports indicating Karpov’s endorsement. Although the Soviets agreed late in the round to discuss the subject in a preliminary way, they confined themselves to asking simple, almost pro forma questions. Some of this reluctance may stem from our inability to say anything about data exchange or early PPM, although I believe it represents another factor—while they have heard our arguments that the initiative is not meant to delay the negotiations, Nazarkin’s frequent complaints that there is nothing “new” in the U.S. position on mobiles and other issues reflects continuing Soviet suspicion about our motives in proposing the V/S initiative. Lack of Soviet engagement in this area for most of the round is a disappointment.

The Impending Ministerial

5. The September meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be the first full-blown ministerial since we completed our review. It should thus give us an opportunity to make progress in a number of areas. I have discussed possible topics with Nazarkin (who appears less well informed on ministerial preparations than we are). Together, we have outlined a short-list of START-related issues for discussion: verification and stability, ALCM/heavy bomber issues, units of account (i.e. missiles versus launchers), mobile ICBM verification and SLCMs. The first three are U.S. ideas; the last two are Soviet ones.

6. My sense of what we should aim for during the ministerial in each of these areas is:

— On verification and stability, to gain Soviet agreement that they will engage on these issues during round XII, with the object of reaching agreement on as many of the measures as possible. Beyond this, it might be possible, at the ministerial, to reach agreements “in principle” with the Soviets on achieving early accords on one or more of the President’s seven measures.

— On ALCM/heavy bomber issues, to continue to try to resolve the remaining disagreements. Because there are a number of unresolved issues in this area it might be possible—through skillful horse-trading—to reach an overall solution acceptable to both sides.

— On unit of account (an essentially technical issue that is the cause of an inordinate number of brackets), to reach an agreement based on the work on this subject now underway in Washington.

— On mobile ICBM verification, Nazarkin appears to want to build on the existing Moscow elements of common ground, although he has not been specific. This appears to be a worthwhile exercise.

The outlook for a productive discussion on SLCMs is, of course, poor. Nazarkin appears to share this assessment, but the Soviets have worked up a considerable head of steam on this issue, so they are likely to spend a good deal of time pressing their views. One question we will have to face is how to respond to Soviet entreaties to engage in a discussion of SLCM verification procedures.

Looking Ahead to Round Twelve

7. While this has been a productive round, thanks in part to excellent backstopping in Washington, we cannot automatically assume a smooth exercise next time around. We will soon run out of significant brackets not related to major issues or to gaps in the U.S. position. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with an “unproductive” round, of course, and we obviously should not alter sound positions simply for the sake of “movement”. At the same time, we should try to take advantage of the current workman-like Soviet attitude. We also need to get as many routine items out of the way as possible. In the end game, our interests will be best served if we can concentrate on few major issues.

8. All this suggests that in round XII we will need some real work to do in order to (A) keep the exercise from degenerating into a sterile exchange, (B) get the underbrush cleared away, and (C) avoid the public perception that we have put start on the back burner. This need will be partially dealt with by verification and stability—if the Soviets are willing to engage. In addition, if we do alter our position on mobiles, or if the ministerial results in movement in other areas, a substantial amount of implementation work will be required which could serve as a focus for the round.

9. However, we should not depend on such outcomes. We have said that verification and stability won’t slow down the overall pace of the negotiations. Nor should we rely on moves on mobiles which the United States may not elect to make before round XII (or ever). Thus, I believe that we should be prepared to deal with some of the major second-tier issues. Unit of account, definition of a warhead, and review of the MOU (all in the draft NSC work program) are a good start. Other possibilities would be to provide or amplify U.S. positions in areas where the JDT now has only placeholder language, such as ASBMs, intercontinental cruise missiles, future RV counting, closeout inspections, a new types definition, dealing with third country issues (i.e inspections, etc.), treaty duration, phasing of reductions (where we could build on soviet acceptance of equal intermediate ceilings), or the issue of when systems become accountable. All of these will involve detailed discussion with the Soviets which we need to get started. Having U.S. positions on some of these items would probably guarantee a productive round even if we and the Soviets are unprepared for major moves in other areas. Which specific issues we choose to tackle is probably less important than ensuring we tackle some of them. We need to avoid the charge that almost a year into the Bush administration and after an extensive formal review, the United States has little new to say about negotiated strategic arms reductions.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890653–0453. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.