Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

37. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

6211.

Geneva, July 15, 1989, 1127Z

SUBJECT

• START Mid-Round Guidance

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. To date round XI has proven to be a useful reengagement/reconnaissance exercise. My meetings with my Soviet counterpart have generated proposals from them on the ALCM counting rule, SSI unique identifiers and continuous monitoring/PPM. The Soviets have also elaborated on their road mobile and rail mobile verification positions and on heavy bomber inspections. I have presented the President’s verification/stability initiative and we are in the process of executing our guidance in the five working groups related to the treaty text and protocols. The Soviet approach has been constructive. They seem eager to resolve issues and remove brackets.

3. I believe that much more could be accomplished in the remainder of this round if additional guidance could be provided in a variety of issue areas. More detailed guidance requests will follow, but I would like to draw your attention in a general way to opportunities the U.S. delegation has identified.

Joint Draft Treaty Text

4. U.S. positions in the treaty text are in relatively good shape with the exception of NDMs, PPM and suspect site inspection, all of which are already in Washington’s field of view. RV counting for future types of missiles, and our position on downloading, remains a major gap in the U.S. position. We also need additional guidance on the conversion of ICBMs and SLBMs to space launch vehicles. The Soviets appear interested in making progress on this issue, but we are unable to answer many of their questions, some of which are detailed in the annotated text of the JDT prepared by the delegation last fall and in the reporting cable on the treaty text working group of July 14.² An other issue on which progress can be made is the unit of account for ICBMs and SLBMs in counting against the 1600 limit. There appears to be no real substantive difference between the sides on this issue. I could continue to press them to accept deployed ICBMs and SLBMs as the unit of account, try to negotiate a unit of account which combines deployed missiles and launchers, or accept launchers as the unit of account in return for Soviet acceptance of the U.S. position on related issues (e.g., their agreement that there are no non-deployed heavy bombers). Instructions giving the delegation flexibility to pursue possible solutions to this issue would be helpful.

Memorandum of Understanding

5. I recommend that Washington conduct a thorough scrub of the MOU, which has been started several times, but never completed. This would provide the following specific results: technical data entry requirements that support verification needs; defined criteria for site diagrams, line drawings, and equipment photographs; and defined locational accuracies.

Mobile ICBM Verification

6. We are having intensive discussions of the new Soviet proposals for verifying mobile ICBM systems. Most U.S. thinking to date has understandably gone into the obligations related to routine movements and dispersals out of and into restricted areas and rail garrisons. The Soviets have introduced a new category of movements, called “relocations,” which involve long-distance, one-way transits in which launchers and missiles travel separately. Examples are the initial transit away from the production facility and transits to a test range or C or E facility. One interpretation of the current U.S. position is that these types of movements should be included in our category of “routine movements.” Another possibility is that these are qualitatively different movements from those envisioned in the “training, maintenance and testing” category in the Moscow elements of common ground. Aside from the question of what to call such movements, there is the more important substantive issue of what notifications should be required. The Soviets are saying that “relocations” should only require a post-notification within 48 hours after arrival at the destination.

7. The other major development is the Soviet dropping of “deployment area” for road-mobile ICBMs, even though it was their idea originally. The adverse effect of this, however, is softened by another change which, for the first time, accepts our position that all routine movements out of restricted areas will require both pre- and post-notification. In light of this, we need to decide whether to continue to press for the concept of deployment areas.

Throw-Weight Protocol

8. Emphasizing that the concept of “range capability” is the key to the entire U.S. throw-weight protocol, the Soviets have repeatedly expressed concern that the protocol does not provide the specific data and methodology needed to calculate this theoretical value. If I can satisfy the Soviets on this point, it is conceivable that I can sell them on the general U.S. approach. (They have not mentioned the Soviet draft protocol so far this round.) While being careful not to compromise sensitive sources and methods, we need to be as forthcoming as we can in making the calculation of “range capability” more explicit.

Conversion or Elimination Protocol

9. We need to determine what items of a missile are subject to elimination. The U.S. side has argued in Geneva that only those elements of a missile enumerated in the protocol are exempted from elimination, i.e., reentry vehicles and guidance set. The Soviet position is muddled but is closer to the argument that only those missile parts explicitly cited for elimination are subject to elimination; everything else may be salvaged. We need guidance on whether we should include an explicit statement in the protocol that all elements of a missile not exempted from elimination must be eliminated.

10. In addition the U.S. side needs to determine how it plans to eliminate SLVs. U.S. procedures for elimination of ICBMs or SLBMs converted for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space (erstwhile SLVs) do not make clear whether only the first stage of a converted missile is accountable as a space launch vehicle or all stages of such a missile are accountable.

11. We have yet to define “a missile.” The basic U.S. Treaty defines a missile as the first stage motor of a treaty-accountable solid ICBM or SLBM, or simply the first stage of a liquid ICBM or SLBM. However, U.S. procedures for the C or E protocol presume that an entire missile is preserved for elimination, including all stages and the PBV. In other words, for the purposes of the C or E protocol, the U.S. side is defining a missile differently from a missile elsewhere referred to in the basic treaty. By the logic of the U.S. approach, the United States could not destroy extra first stages of Minuteman or Poseidon missiles under the treaty, since the U.S. side has agreed orally and U.S. language implicitly provides for elimination of entire missiles. Thus, the U.S. side could be caught in the paradox of having to keep extra first stages on the books as non-deployed missiles.

Inspection Protocol

12. I believe additional guidance on a more discriminating use of the term “inspection site” would enable us to describe our inspection procedures more clearly and deflect Soviet criticism.

13. In answering Soviet questions, it has become evident that the term “inspection site” has variable meanings depending on whether it relates to ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber-related facilities. As a result, we cannot specify whether or not site diagrams define the boundaries of the “inspection site.” Our use of the term could also imply that heavy bomber bases are subject to inspection, which they are not. Only heavy bombers are inspectable under defined conditions.

14. In addition, the Soviets have also agreed conceptually to exchange lists of inspectors, monitors, etc. Before entry into force, thereby bringing us closer together on this point. However, they cannot agree to codify such a prior obligation in the treaty per se. I believe the problem could be bridged by a side agreement concluded simultaneously with the signing of the treaty to exchange lists before entry into force, while referring in the treaty to the exchange of lists as an accomplished fact (analogous to the data MOU). Washington approval of this suggested approach before the end of round XI would allow us to develop this convergence.

Verification and Stability

15. Material received from Washington thus far puts us in good shape to engage the Soviets on tagging, strategic exercise, RV inspections and telemetry encryption. As Washington is well aware, we are undercutting the presumed seriousness of the President’s proposal by our inability to say anything on data exchange or to provide any details on early PPM. On short-time-of-flight (STOF), I continue to need answers to our earlier questions and recommendations. Of greatest value would be some indication of the form in which a STOF commitment is to be recorded.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890609–0160. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Reference is to telegram 6403 from NST Geneva, July 20, 1989 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890623–0358)