Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

25. Memorandum From Richard Davis and William Tobey of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, June 5, 1989

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting on NSR–14 Arms Control Review—Defense & Space and START Issues; Wednesday, June 7, 1989, 10:45–12:00

This will be the first of three NSC meetings to review the details of our negotiating position in START and Defense & Space, before the talks resume on June 19. This meeting will continue the discussion of our basic START objectives begun during the May 25 NSC meeting, review our D&S position, continue the May 25 NSC discussion on where we are going in START, and review the basic numerical limits in START. You also may want to take the opportunity to broach the subject of a new initiative on deMIRVing.

Given the short time available before negotiations resume, the NSR-14 review has concentrated on options that meet one of two standards. They should either: (1) be necessary because our current position is not consistent with our interests (in other words we could not take “yes” for an answer); or (2) be an opportunity to advance the negotiations (and/or put a Bush imprint on them), consistent with national security. Promising approaches that require further analysis have been deferred.

At Tab I² is a meeting memorandum, with discussion papers prepared by the PCC, for you to forward to the President. Your copies of the discussion papers are at Tab II.³

Objectives for the Meeting

Our START approach was discussed briefly by the NSC at the May 25 meeting. We recommend you and the President use this opportunity to continue a frank discussion of our overall direction in START and Defense & Space. This meeting must answer the fundamental question: Is the fundamental direction of our NST approach the right one? Thus, before turning to specific START and Defense & Space issues, the agenda calls for picking upon the “heart-to-heart” discussion begun at the 25 May 1989 NSC meeting. To support this discussion, our memo for that meeting is at Tab III.⁴ The discussion should provide the basis for reviewing the basic numerical limits in START and our proposal in Defense & Space.

We understand that Secretary Cheney met in the tank with the Chiefs on this broad subject last Friday,⁵ but reached no conclusions.

Organization of the Meeting

The agenda for the meeting (Tab I, Tab B) generally follows the subjects in the discussion papers and addressed by the Deputies last Wednesday.⁶ Although the discussion paper on START only addresses specific issues on numerical limits, the participants will be prepared to continue the more general discussion at the May 25 NSC meeting of our overall direction on START. We recommend that you begin with Defense & Space.

Background on Defense and Space

Our approach in the Defense and Space Talks has sought an agreement with the Soviets that would protect our ability to deploy SDI when it is ready, constrain their ability to deploy defenses in the interim, and build domestic support for SDI. The two sides have agreed in principle to a two-part structure. First, there would be a period of a yet to be specified duration during which neither side could withdraw from the ABM Treaty. During this period, the U.S. could test, but could not deploy, SDI. Second, following the period of non-withdrawal, each side would be free to deploy defenses, the ABM Treaty notwithstanding.

The U.S. believes that it could do most, if not all, of the necessary SDI testing during the non-withdrawal period under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty (assuming that the relevant SDI components are based on “other physical principles”). By definition, the Soviets could not deploy nationwide ABM defenses during the non-withdrawal period. And, since their ABM systems are based on technologies that fall within the boundaries of the ABM Treaty, their ability to test mobile upgrades of their systems would be sharply limited.

This approach assumes (a) that the most promising SDI technologies (including Brilliant Pebbles) are deemed to be based on “other physical principles,” and (b) that the Soviets can be persuaded to accept and abide by our broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Unless both assumptions prove valid, the current approach is unlikely to achieve our objectives in D&S or with respect to SDI. However, all agree that we are unlikely to know real Soviet bottom lines in the negotiations until START is closer to completion.

Two discussion papers on Defense & Space, are attached as Tab II: One on options to permit SDI tests during a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty; and a second on options to permit us to deploy SDI after the period. All agencies, except the JCS, agree that we should return to Geneva with our current position on both issues. In some cases (OSD, Energy, ACDA) this reflects contentment with the position. For others (State) it simply reflects recognition that we cannot fundamentally alter our position in an orderly manner before June 19. The JCS approach to the Defense and Space Talks stems from their concern that we could unintentionally push the Soviets to exploit their near-term ABM advantages before we know whether we can and will deploy SDI. They worry that we could eventually find ourselves in the worst possible situation, one in which the Soviets have deployed defenses but we have not.

The Chiefs are concerned that our current approach during the non-withdrawal period of providing “unilateral assurances” to the Soviets could tie our hands but leave the Soviets much freer to break out of the ABM Treaty. JCS would prefer that the testing which the sides could do under ABM Treaty be mutually agreed, so that both we and the Soviets faced the same constraints. Others believe that this would be true in any event because the Soviets now are bound only by the broad interpretation, which underpins the U.S. position.

The Chiefs likewise are concerned that the current U.S. position, which would permit us to deploy SDI anytime after the non-withdrawal period (upon six months notice), virtually obliges the Soviets to do whatever they can to be ready to deploy defenses themselves at the end of the non-withdrawal period. They then would be free to do so, whether or not we were ready ourselves. The Chiefs may prefer that our position be changed so that there is a longer interval (e.g., two years) between a decision to deploy defenses and the time at which deployments could actually begin. Other agencies OSD, ACDA, Energy take the view that by exercising their rights under Article XV of the ABM Treaty, the Soviets could now deploy nationwide ABM defense upon six months notice. Those agencies believe that the only practical effect of our current position would be to relieve the U.S. of the political burden of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, which does not apply to the Soviet Union.

Despite the JCS misgivings, their representatives have not been very vocal during the NSR-14 review, and neither the PCC nor the Deputies Committee seemed willing to critically review our current approach to the D&S talks. The NSC also may be inclined to duck, but the Chiefs have now gone on record with a formal request that the President address their concerns about our D&S positions before negotiations resume in Geneva. We expect Adm. Crowe may raise the issue during the Wednesday NSC meeting.

Defense and Space Issues for Discussion

Our current Defense & Space position builds on the December 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement. In essence, it trades a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time, in return for freedom to deploy defenses at the end of that period. During the non-withdrawal period, the U.S. claims the right to conduct ABM tests in space based on “other physical principles,” under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Review of our Defense & Space position has been divided under two broad headings—options for assuring U.S. testing rights during the non-withdrawal period (DST 001), and options with respect to the deployment rights of the parties after the non-withdrawal period (DST 002).

During the non-withdrawal period. Our current position (Option 1) provides a unilateral U.S. assurance that the number of ABM test satellites orbited at any one time will not exceed 15. Further, the Parties would agree to specific notification procedures regarding tests involving those satellites. The proposal is intended to address stated Soviet concerns that U.S. ABM testing in space could become de facto deployment. It would also, if the Soviets agree to the notification provisions, obtain implicit Soviet acceptance of ABM testing in space, without subjecting the broad interpretation to negotiation. The position is designed to be fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. Option 1 is supported by State, OSD, Energy, ACDA, and the Defense & Space Negotiator.

Option 2 would negotiate an explicit agreement based on the terms of what is now the U.S. unilateral assurance. Moreover, it would go beyond the ABM Treaty, inasmuch as it would permit testing in space of all ABM weapons, whether or not they are based on “other physical principles.” The JCS believe that this would provide better protection of U.S. testing rights and bind the Soviets to identical standards. Other agencies worry that willingness to explicitly negotiate on the right to test in space would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and risk losing rights we now believe to be ours.

Also during the non-withdrawal period, all agencies agree that we should retain our proposal to allow unlimited development, testing, and deployment of space-based sensors. This proposal is an attempt to reconcile the increasing needs and capabilities of both sides for warning and attack assessment, with the fact that there will be no way to distinguish with NTM whether or not certain sensor satellites violate ABM Treaty provisions.

After the non-withdrawal period. Our current position (Option 1) builds on the Washington Summit Joint Statement, and would explicitly give the sides the right to deploy defenses after a non-withdrawal period, upon giving six months notice. The rationale behind this position is that we are trading our non-withdrawal pledge for freedom to deploy defenses after the non-withdrawal period. This quid pro quo was worked out between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Washington Summit. This option is supported by State, OSD, Energy, ACDA, and the Defense & Space Negotiator.

Option 2 is to reevaluate our Defense & Space objectives, at the Cabinet level, and not to resume negotiations until we have done so. This option is favored by the JCS. It reflects their worry that the current U.S. position could imply to the Soviets that the U.S. will go beyond the ABM Treaty on a certain date, when in fact the U.S. may not then be prepared to deploy ABM defenses for political, technical, or budgetary reasons. We had hoped to [omission in the original] Unfortunately, the JCS has been reluctant to suggest specific alternatives to the present position, but Options 3 and 4 may provide a framework for such a discussion, should the Chiefs or others want to pursue the issue.

Option 3 would provide for a non-withdrawal period of x years, followed by a non-deployment period of y years. This option could be implemented in conjunction with options for differentiated periods of testing rights, e.g. testing under the restrictive interpretation during the first period and removing all restrictions on testing during the second period. During the second period, the sides would (as under the current U.S. position) conduct intensive discussions on a cooperative transition to defenses. At the end of the period both sides would be free to deploy defenses, unless agreed otherwise. This option could address the JCS concerns by lengthening the period of time after the expiration of the non-withdrawal period before a side could deploy defenses. At present, no agency favors this option, but most believe it merits further study.

Option 4 would drop the right to deploy in favor of unlimited testing rights during the non-withdrawal period as the quid pro quo for U.S. acceptance of a non-withdrawal period. This option would secure greater rights for ABM testing during a non-withdrawal period. After the period, the sides would simply return to the ABM Treaty, and six months notice would be required to withdraw from the Treaty. This option could address the JCS concerns because we would simply return to status quo at the end of the non-withdrawal period. Others would oppose it because it would maintain political barriers to U.S. deployment of defenses that the Soviets do not face. No agency now supports this option, but some believe it merits further study.

Background on START

The specific numerical limits (6000/4900/1600) in START reflect the overall objectives of reducing the strategic nuclear forces on both sides, and concentrating those reductions in “fast flying” ballistic missiles. Other limits, notably the halving of the S-18 force and ballistic missile throwweight, and the U.S. proposed subceiling on ICBM RVs, reflect the view that ICBMs are the most destabilizing part of the strategic force mix. The “counting rules” embedded in these limits further encourage the two sides to emphasize “slow flying” airbreathers over ballistic missiles, and result in the overall START reductions being much less than the widely quoted “50 percent.”

These limits would force the Soviets to reduce their traditional heavy reliance on ICBMs, thus reinforcing a process that already is underway. It also would encourage them—and us—to place greater emphasis on bombers and cruise missiles, notwithstanding the sorry state of our air defenses, and the somewhat problematical future of our bomber modernization program. At issue is whether the force structures that these basic numerical limits encourage would enhance stability and reduce the risks of war while maintaining an effective deterrent.

START Issues for Discussion

The Defense Strategy Review (NSR–12) concluded that:

— Present START reductions do not imperil military sufficiency although deeper reductions might.

— Our goal should be stability and reduced risk of war, not reductions, per se.

— Likely START reductions probably do not save money.

— Plausible arms control alterations of the ratio of Soviet hard target kill warheads to U.S. silos will not solve the ICBM vulnerability problem.

— Downloading and deMIRVing may be good ideas on grounds of flexibility, but mobility and strategic defense are better approaches to solving the ICBM vulnerability problem.

— START allows us to keep an adequate SSBN force.

The discussion paper for this meeting builds on these conclusions and examines the specific numerical limits in START. It concludes:

— We should retain the 1600 limit on delivery vehicles, at least for now. It is not in our interest to expend the political capital at this point to raise a limit agreed at the highest levels, which may constrain the Soviets more than the U.S., and which may encourage the Soviets to reopen issues resolved in our favor.

— We should retain the 4900/6000 warhead limits.

— When negotiations resume, we should retain the 3000–3300 ICBM warhead sublimit, which the Soviets have not accepted. At issue is whether the negotiator should indicate flexibility to the Soviets and seek a trade.

— There is no consensus on whether we should modify our proposed ban on heavy ICBM production, flight-testing and modernization. At issue is whether to satisfy the Jackson amendment on U.S.-Soviet equality by seeking the elimination of all heavies, or by giving the U.S. a de jure right to deploy heavy ICBMs.

We recommend you confirm the consensus that the basic START levels (6000 warheads, 4900 ballistic missile warheads, and 1600 delivery vehicles) remain in our interest. (We understand you have reservations on the 1600 number that you may wish to raise at this point.) The discussion should also confirm that our shift in emphasis from “reductions” to “stability,” in our rationale for START, recognizing that it needs to be handled in a way that takes account of the political risks of appearing to abandon the goal of “deep reductions.” You may want to use this issue to return to the question (which you broached at the May 25 NSC meeting) of whether it is in our interest to encourage a long-term Soviet shift to air-breathing systems. Alternatively, you may want to defer consideration of this question until next week’s NSC meeting that will consider our specific negotiating positions on air-breathing systems.

If you do decide to raise it in the context of our fundamental START limits, you could note that the May 25 NSC discussion of this issue did not reach a conclusion on the basic issue.

— We have proposed counting rules in START for bombs and cruise missiles that encourages a shift to air breathing systems. (Bombs and short-range missiles count as one per heavy bomber, regardless of how many are deployed; ALCMs count as ten per heavy bomber, regardless of how many are deployed; SLCMs are not limited.)

— In order to maintain our own force flexibility we have also proposed to distinguish between bombers that can carry ALCMs and those that cannot; and between nuclear and conventional ALCMs. Neither of these distinctions can be verified with reasonable confidence.

— The present loose limits on air-breathers also gives lie to the argument that START will yield “deep reductions” to “6000” weapons,” an issue that could become a serious public relations problem in the future.

— However, the alternative of proposing stricter limits on bombs and ALCMs could reduce significantly the number of weapons the U.S. could deploy under START, leaving us open to criticism that START is “undercutting deterrence.”

We believe it would be useful for the NSC principals to confirm explicitly that even though the U.S. has no air defense, the future of the B-l as a penetrating bomber may be limited, and the B-2 may prove to be unaffordable, we still want to encourage a long-term Soviet shift to air-breathing systems.

ICBM Sublimit. Our proposed sublimit will not constrain the U.S. under any foreseeable post-START force and the Soviets have stated that they will not exceed 3300 ICBM warheads. However, the Soviets have refused to accept our sublimit unless we also agree to parallel limits on SLBM warheads and ALCMs, which have been unacceptable to us.

All agree that we should not simply withdraw the 3000–3300 sublimit when we return to Geneva. Some see the sublimit as largely tactical; however, in the Deputies’ meeting, only the JCS favored giving the negotiator flexibility now to trade it for a Soviet concession, arguing that gaining Soviet acceptance would cost us more negotiating capital than it is worth. OSD argued that preserving the sublimit was important because a larger ICBM force would be useful as part of a first strike strategy.

We recommend that you attempt to draw out the participants on the substantive importance of this limit. If this is a critical element of the U.S. proposal, we need to think much more seriously about a realistic strategy for gaining Soviet acceptance. If this is primarily a tactical question, it would be helpful for the negotiator to know that. (You also should keep in mind, however, that some have included dropping this sublimit as part of a negotiating package on new initiatives to be discussed by the NSC later.)

Heavy ICBMs. The final issue in the discussion paper is whether to modify our position on heavy ICBMs and 1) seek the total elimination of heavy ICBMs and/or 2) modify our proposed bans on flight-testing, production, and modernization of heavies. The Soviets have agreed to reduce their S-18s by 50 percent, but object to our proposed bans. We understand you want to defer this issue until the NSC takes up the subject of mobile ICBMs next week.

However, you may want to raise in this meeting two broader policy questions on two broader policy questions: (a) given agreement on a 50 percent reduction in S-18s, how important is it—strategically and politically—to negotiate further reductions in heavy ICBMs and (b) given Jackson amendment sensitivities is it sufficient for the U.S. to have a de jure right to deploy heavies, or does U.S.-Soviet equality require that all Soviet heavies be eliminated.

Bob Blackwill and Condi Rice concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward the meeting memo to the President at Tab I.⁷

Attachments⁸

Tab I	Meeting memo to the President
	Tab A Discussion Papers
	Tab B Agenda
	Tab C List of Participants
	Tab D Introductory Points
Tab II	Discussion Papers
Tab III	Memo for 25 May NSC Meeting

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSC Meetings Files, OA/ID 90001–006, NSC0021—June 07, 1989—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Defense Policy, Space Issues. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Kanter.
2. Printed as Document 26.
3. Attached but not printed. See Tabs D1 and D2, Document 26.
4. Attached but not printed. See Document 23.
5. June 2. No minutes were found.
6. See footnote 2, Document 24.
7. Scowcroft did not indicate a preference. The memorandum is printed as Document 26.
8. The List of Participants, cited here as Tab C, was not attached. The Talking Points and Agenda for the June 7 NSC meeting are printed as Tab A and Tab B, Document 26.