Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

24. Memorandum From Richard Davis and William Tobey of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gates)¹

Washington, May 30, 1989

SUBJECT

• Deputies Committee Meeting, Wednesday, May 31, 1989, 11:00 a.m.—START Fundamental Limits, and Defense and Space

This Deputies Meeting will be your first of three meetings to review the specifics of our START and D&S positions before the negotiations resume June 19. We have worked on the presumption that given the short time available before negotiations resume, options for consideration should meet one of two standards. Proposed changes to our position should either: (1) be necessary because our current position is not consistent with our interests (in other words we could not take “yes” for an answer); or (2) be an opportunity to advance the negotiations (and/or put a Bush imprint on them), consistent with national security. In certain cases, options not meeting these standards have been included, either because an agency favors the option or in order to offer the President a real choice.

Defense & Space. Two papers (at Tab A) are on the agenda: DST 001, which discusses options for ensuring U.S. ABM testing rights during a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and DST 002, which discusses options for protecting a right to deploy defenses after a non-withdrawal period.

Our current D&S position is based on the Washington Summit Joint Statement. In essence, it trades a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time, in return for freedom to deploy defenses at the end of that period. During the non-withdrawal period, the U.S. claims the right to conduct ABM tests in space, under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Other outcomes in D&S, such as simply not having an agreement, or alternative quid pro quo are theoretically possible. They could, however, run afoul of congressional requirements for specificity of treaty obligations during ratification debates, and would back away from an agreement worked out by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

All agencies, except the JCS, favor returning to the negotiations with our current D&S position on both issues. Some favor this because they believe our negotiating capital is limited and our position is sound over the long term. Others favor returning with our current position, but believe that there are options for modifying it that would make progress, and that these options should be studied over the summer. We can sort this out after negotiations resume.

We suggest that you take the papers in order, and briefly discuss the options of each.

DST 001—Testing rights during a non-withdrawal period. All agencies, except the JCS, believe we should return to Geneva with our current position (Option 1). This position provides a unilateral U.S. assurance that the number of ABM test satellites orbited at any one time would not exceed 15. Further, the Parties would agree to specific notification procedures regarding those satellites. This would be intended to address stated Soviet concerns that U.S. ABM testing in space could become de facto deployment. It would also, if the Soviets were to agree, obtain implicit Soviet acceptance of testing under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, without subjecting the broad interpretation to direct negotiation. The current U.S. position is that the assurance and notification procedures are fully consistent with the ABM Treaty.

The JCS favor an option (Option 2) that would negotiate an explicit agreement based on the terms of the U.S. position. Moreover, it would go beyond the ABM Treaty, inasmuch as it would permit testing in space of all ABM weapons, whether or not they are based on “other physical principles.” Thus, the proposal would require negotiation and agreement. If successful, it could provide better protection for U.S. testing rights, and counter congressional efforts to legislate a narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. On the other hand, it could also put on the negotiating table what we already believe to be our right.

All agencies are agreed that we should retain our proposal to allow unlimited development, testing, and deployment of space-based sensors, regardless of their capability. This proposal would have the effect of amending the ABM Treaty. It is an attempt to reconcile the increasing needs and capabilities of both sides for warning and attack assessment, with the fact that there will be no way to distinguish with NTM whether or not certain sensor satellites are ABM capable.

If past practice holds, the Chiefs will try to defer substantive discussion on the options to the NSC meeting. Given that they stand apart from all other agencies, the meeting should simply serve to ensure that the options are fairly and completely stated.

DST 002—Deployment rights after a non-withdrawal period. Again, all agencies, except the JCS, favor returning to Geneva with our current position (option 1.). This position, building on the Washington Summit Joint Statement, would explicitly give the sides the right to deploy defenses after a non-withdrawal period, upon giving six months notice. The rationale behind this position is that we are trading our non-withdrawal pledge for freedom to deploy defenses after the non-withdrawal period. This quid pro quo was worked out between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the 1987 Washington Summit.

The JCS has suggested that we not resume D&S negotiations until fundamental U.S. objectives for D&S have been reaffirmed at the Cabinet level. (This was to have been discussed at last week’s NSC meeting, but was deferred in favor of more pressing issues.) The Chiefs’ concern is premised on the belief that the ABM Treaty offers real protection from Soviet breakout, and that if the sides are free to deploy defenses, we may be unable or unwilling to exercise this right. The JCS position is obviously extreme. Not yet having the NSD on SDI hurts. Nonetheless, the President presumably approved resumption of the NST negotiations in June. Thus, we would hope that your meeting could be used to test the seriousness of the JCS position. Unless Adm. Crowe is prepared to argue to the President that we should not resume D&S negotiations, the option should come out of the paper.

Options 3 and 4 are possibly promising variants on the U.S. position. Option 3 would entail differentiated periods of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty followed by a non-deployment period. During the first period we would be bound by the restrictive interpretation; during the second by the broad interpretation. Option 4 would change our quid pro quo for a non-withdrawal pledge to greater freedom to test ABM systems during the period. No agency now favors them, but most agree they merit further study. They were included in the paper, frankly, to give the President options other than returning to Geneva with our current position and not returning at all.

START Fundamental Limits. A discussion paper prepared by the PCC on START numerical limits and heavy ICBM limits is at Tab B. The paper identifies three issues which at least one agency believed should be reviewed before we return to Geneva. We recommend that you guide the discussion through these issues in the order they are presented in the paper.

1. Delivery vehicle limit. Should we propose to raise the 1600 limit on delivery vehicles (heavy bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs)? There was consensus in the May 20 Deputies meeting on the Defense Strategy Review that we should retain this limit for now. The paper reaches a similar conclusion. (You should note that, while there is consensus on this point outside of the NSC staff, we believe Brent continues to have reservations and may think that the 1600 limit is too low.)

The 1600 limit will accommodate plausible alternatives for the post-START U.S. force structure. However, there is a long-term tension between the 1600/4900 limits and deMIRVing options which the Deputies are scheduled to discuss next week. We do not anticipate extensive discussion of this issue. You may want to confirm consensus on 1600, drawing on the following points.

— The paper concludes that we should retain the 1600 limit on delivery vehicles, at least for now. It is not in our interest to expend the political capital at this point to raise a limit agreed at the highest levels, which may constrain the Soviets more than the U.S., and which may encourage the Soviets to reopen issues resolved in our favor.

— In our discussion of the Defense Strategy Review (NSR-12) on May 20 there was consensus that we should retain 4900/6000 and that we should retain 1600 for now.

— Certain options the PCC is developing that could encourage a shift to single warhead ICBMs may make increases in 1600 desirable. The Deputies Committee will discuss these possible new initiatives next week.

2. ICBM Warhead Sublimit. Should we offer to trade the 3000–3300 ICBM warhead sublimit for an appropriate Soviet concession? Our proposed sublimit will not constrain the U.S. under any foreseeable post-START force and the Soviets have stated that they will not exceed 3300 ICBM warheads. However, the Soviets have refused to accept our sublimit unless we also agree to parallel limits on SLBM warheads and ALCMs, which have been unacceptable to us.

All agencies agree that we should not simply withdraw the 3000–3300 sublimit when we return to Geneva. Agencies in the PCC disagreed, however, on the value of the sublimit. JCS, State, DCI and ACDA see it as largely tactical, and favor giving the negotiator flexibility to trade it for a Soviet concession. They have made a case that the sublimit does not impose additional significant constraints on Soviet capabilities given the 4900 warhead limit and throwweight limit, and that gaining Soviet acceptance of a limit that affects only ICBMs would cost us more negotiating capital than it would be worth.

OSD, DOE and Ambassador Rowny have argued in general terms that a larger ICBM force would probably only be useful as part of a first strike strategy and, therefore, we should retain the sublimit. It is not clear, however, whether their opposition is primarily substantive or tactical.

We recommend that you use this discussion to draw out the Deputies on the substantive importance of this limit. If anyone believes this is a critical element of the U.S. proposal, we need to know that now, so we can pursue it much more seriously in Washington, to determine a realistic strategy for gaining Soviet acceptance. If all agree that falling off our sublimit proposal is primarily a tactical question, timing is not critical and we do not have to take this step before resumption. (You should keep in mind, however, that some have included dropping this sublimit as part of a negotiating package on new initiatives.)

3. Heavy ICBMs. A major U.S. objective in START has been to reduce Soviet heavy ICBMs. The Soviets have agreed to reduce their SS-18s by 50%. They have objected, however, to our proposed ban on flight-testing, production, and modernization of heavies. The current issue is whether to modify our position and 1) seek the total elimination of heavy ICBMs and/or 2) modify our proposed bans.

A significant consideration is the longstanding U.S. policy and legal requirement that any arms reduction agreement provide for U.S.-Soviet equality. Our current position would result in ultimate equality as the reliability of existing SS-18s degrades over time, the force ages and is retired.

There are four options:

— One option, favored in the PCC by OSD and Ambassador Rowny, would reach equality by eliminating all heavies, either during the 7-year reduction period or over a longer period. Flight-testing might be permitted during this period.

— A second option is to stay with our current approach.

— ACDA has proposed the third option, that we permit flight-testing in return for further (unspecified) cuts, but not the elimination of the SS-18.

— The fourth option, favored in the PCC by State, JCS and DOE, would adopt a contingency position of the Reagan Administration, never tabled, that would permit flight-testing and limited modernization of Soviet heavies (including the recently deployed SS-18 Mod 5) in return for an equal legal, but not practical, right for the U.S. to deploy a heavy ICBM.

We believe an acceptable ultimate resolution of this issue probably rests along the lines of option four. In view of the history and significance of the issue, it must be handled with particular care. A proper tradeoff in the negotiations is not yet in view and nothing need be tabled in the first round. Your objective in this meeting should be to ensure that the issues and options are fairly stated. You should be aware that certain new initiatives and mobile ICBM options under consideration may decrease the number of heavies the Soviets may retain.

RECOMMENDATION

That you read the papers at Tab A and B and use the points outlined above in guiding discussions at the Deputies Meeting on START and D&S.²

Approve ___________ Disapprove ___________

Judyt Mandel and Condi Rice concur.

Tab A1

Paper³

Washington, May 26, 1989

DST 001 (U)

Purpose. To review U.S. policy options regarding the means of assuring U.S. testing rights during a specified period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, in the context of a Defense & Space Treaty. (S)

Current Status. The United States and the Soviet Union disagree about the activities that would be permitted during a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. seeks to preserve its full ABM Treaty (broad interpretation) rights to research, development, and testing, while the Soviets have consistently rejected this position and have sought restrictions on ABM research, development, and testing beyond those agreed in 1972. (U)

In December 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union in the Washington Summit Joint Statement committed to seek an agreement, inter alia, “to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time.” The sides disagree over the interpretation of that language. The U.S. asserts the broad interpretation and seeks an indication of Soviet acceptance of that interpretation. The Soviets have rejected the broad interpretation, but have not made clear what interpretation they believe is reflected by the WSJS. Soviet views have ranged at times between an interpretation more restrictive than the narrow interpretation, and the narrow interpretation. Hence, U.S. initiatives in Defense & Space have sought to obtain an indication that the Soviets accept our interpretation of the WSJS before a Defense & Space Treaty is signed. (S)

U.S. Position: Space-based Testing Initiative. To clarify testing permitted during the non-withdrawal period and to address stated Soviet concerns that U.S. testing in space could become de facto deployment, the U.S. stated on 28 October 1988 in an authoritative unilateral assurance that:

“In order to demonstrate that the testing of space based components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, does not represent the deployment of such components, the United States is prepared to carry out such permitted testing only from designated ABM test satellites. Any space object in earth orbit from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory shall be designated as an ABM Test satellite. Further, it is the view of the United States that the number of U.S. designated ABM test satellites in orbit simultaneously shall not exceed a number well short of that associated with any realistic deployed capability. The United States believes the number 15 falls well below that threshold.” (S)

To help clarify ABM testing permitted during the non-withdrawal period and to provide for greater predictability, the U.S. also proposed in the draft Predictability Protocol that the Parties shall provide each other with the following data:

1. Identification, no more than 12 hours after launch of each space object in earth orbit from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is to be tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory;

2. Notification within 12 hours after the re-entry of an ABM Test Satellite from its orbit or after a change in orbit; and,

3. Notification of a test using such a space object in earth orbit to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory no less than two hours prior to the conduct of any such test.

Thus, should the Soviets accept the current U.S. draft predictability protocol, they would necessarily accept certain ABM testing in space, thereby implicitly accepting some aspects of the broad interpretation. (S)

U.S. Position: Space-based Sensors. The U.S. has also proposed that the sides agree not to object, “on the basis of the ABM Treaty, to the development, testing, and deployment . . . of space-based sensors.” In explaining this initiative to the Soviets, the U.S. noted that satellite sensor programs are vitally important to both sides in providing warning of an attack, and thus are also vitally important to stability. Furthermore, it is very difficult and, as both sides improve their systems, becoming increasingly more difficult to distinguish independently between space-based sensors capable of substituting for ABM radars and those that are not. Thus, limitations on the capability of deployed space-based sensors are neither desirable nor verifiable. The U.S. has presented to the Soviets a definition of “space-based sensors” in the context of this proposal; but it has not been agreed to by the Soviets. (S)

Soviet Position. The Soviets have criticized the sensor proposal as undermining the ABM Treaty and they have responded negatively to the additions to the Predictability Protocol proposed by the U.S. in association with our assurance on testing of space-based components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles.

As a means of identifying testing activities in space that would be permitted during the non-withdrawal period, the Soviets proposed in April 1987 that the sides negotiate a “list” of criteria for devices to be banned from launch into space, using as a starting point their proposed “list” of performance parameters. Under the Soviet concept, everything below the specifications or thresholds for devices banned from being tested or stationed in space would be allowed for testing or stationing in space. In October, 1987, the Soviets clarified the “list” proposal: devices below the list thresholds could be put into space for any purpose, whether ABM-related or not. Production and ground-based test range activities involving devices not on the list and those with critical parameters above the thresholds would be permitted. The Soviets also proposed at this time, that, alternatively, the sides could agree to “observe the ABM Treaty as signed and ratified in 1972.” (S)

Since the Washington Summit, the Soviets have alluded to the “list” proposal only in the context of discussing “data sensors” and have emphasized the WSJS language, without defining what that language means. We do not know whether or not the Soviets have abandoned the broader scope of the “list” proposal. (S)

The U.S. responded that the “list” proposal was too complex, inherently unverifiable, and imposed restrictions on SDI beyond those of the ABM Treaty agreed to in 1972, and in many cases the values proposed were in effect more restrictive than even the narrow interpretation. (S)

Soviet negotiating tactics (including a refusal to work a joint draft treaty text) are consistent with what appears to be their strategy in the Defense & Space talks: to defer issues and serious discussion in the hope that a change in U.S. administration or Congressional pressure might cause the U.S. to pull back from its SDI program, and failing that to defer the issue until a START Treaty is closer at hand, when greater pressure may be brought to bear on the U.S. (S)

SDI Testing Requirements. The President decided on the basis of NSR-12 that the goals of the SDI program will remain unchanged, and that the program presented to Congress will focus on evaluating the potential of the most rapidly advancing technologies such as Brilliant Pebbles. In light of this guidance, a proposed test program for evaluation of the Brilliant Pebbles concept is being developed and reviewed for compliance with the ABM Treaty. This program consists of 12 flight tests to be completed by mid-FY92. While the compliance certification process has not yet been completed for these tests, we expect to conduct them consistent with the “restrictive” interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This test program would also be compatible with the U.S. unilateral assurance on testing in space and proposed Predictability Protocol notification measures. (S)

It is not clear at this time how long and to what extent additional, useful Brilliant Pebbles testing can be carried out after mid-FY92 consistent with the restrictive interpretation, or for that matter the broad interpretation. However, development and testing of Brilliant Pebbles, if they are regarded as “based on other physical principles,” would probably proceed more usefully under the broad interpretation after mid-FY92. If the broad interpretation applies to Brilliant Pebbles, system development and testing could proceed unrestricted to the point where an ABM system is “created,” resulting in a faster rate of growth in confidence in technical feasibility than a program conducted under the restrictive interpretation. (S)

If the concept for a Brilliant Pebbles system is not determined to be “based on other physical principles,” it could not be developed and tested under the broad interpretation. We would then have to test under the restrictive interpretation. While this would still permit us to increase confidence in the feasibility of the technology, the rate of increase, and perhaps its absolute value would be less than could be achieved under a broad interpretation program. (S)

N.B. No determination has yet been made as to whether an ABM system incorporating the Brilliant Pebbles concept would be an ABM system “based on other physical principles.” This issue includes considerations beyond those associated with the issue of whether kinetic energy ABM weapons are based on OPP. (S)

Options. Options for assuring U.S. testing rights during a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty are intended to insure U.S. legal rights and political support to conduct testing necessary to establish the feasibility of effective strategic defenses and to avoid the need to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to complete such testing. (S)

1. Affirm the current position. This option would entail continuing to use the current U.S. working paper when we return to negotiations in Geneva. (S)

Those who favor this option believe that the U.S. unilateral assurance and predictability protocol proposal would gain implicit Soviet acknowledgment of certain ABM Treaty testing rights during the non-withdrawal period, reduce treaty interpretation debates during and after ratification, provide a militarily meaningful distinction between permitted testing and prohibited deployment of OPP ABM systems in space, and satisfy stated Soviet concerns regarding that distinction. They argue further that the U.S. completed its Defense & Space position only late in Round X, and that we have not yet even had an opportunity to explain fully the position to the Soviets. (S)

Option 1. is supported by: State, ACDA, OSD, Amb. Rowny and the Defense & Space Negotiator. (S)

2. Negotiate a new space-testing proposal. This would entail negotiating an agreement with the Soviets based on the space testing initiative described above. However, it would apply to testing of all space-based weapons systems whether or not they are OPP:

In order to ensure that the testing of space-based ABM interceptor missiles or components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles does not represent the deployment of such components, the United States proposes that the Parties confine such testing to designated ABM test satellites. Any platform based in space from which an ABM interceptor missile or a component capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory, shall be designated an ABM test satellite. Further, the number of designated ABM test satellites orbited simultaneously by either side shall not exceed X. (S)

Those who support this option argue that despite some progress on the Predictability Protocol and hints of maneuver room on the sensor proposal, a unilateral testing assurance does not provide a common U.S.-Soviet understanding of what is and is not allowed during the non-withdrawal period, and would constrain the U.S. without constraining the Soviets. They believe that negotiating reciprocal space-based testing constraints and allowances is the best mechanism for reaching agreement on research development, and testing activities during the non-withdrawal period. Finally, they argue that such an approach would likely enhance the probability for Congressional ratification and allay Allied concerns about strategic imbalances. (S)

This option is supported by [omission in the original] (S)

Future Work. Additional options for assuring U.S. testing rights during a specified period of non-withdrawal (e.g. differentiated periods of testing restrictions during the non-withdrawal period under restrictive, broad, or broader-than-broad interpretations of the ABM Treaty or pursuit of the Soviet “list” proposal) were considered, but not included in the paper because no agency believes that such options would be possible to analyze thoroughly before we return to the negotiations in Geneva. These options, plus a more detailed analysis of SDI testing requirements, will be embodied in the D&S work program. Moreover, additional consideration must be given to the issue of whether or not the U.S. should now establish policy on what systems are or are not based on other physical principles. (S)

Sensor Proposal. The U.S. initiative on sensors is separable from the options and issues discussed above. Nonetheless, it would affect what activities occur during the non-withdrawal period. All agencies support the current position on space-based sensors because restrictions on testing and deployment of space-based sensors are neither desirable nor verifiable. They argue that both the United States and the Soviet Union will be improving their space-based early warning and attack assessment capabilities and that these improvements will make it increasingly difficult for the sides to verify compliance with the ABM Treaty. Finally they note that the Soviets expressed interest in discussing this proposal further in their last plenary statement, albeit in the context of their “list” proposal. (S)

Tab A2

Paper⁴

Washington, May 26, 1989

DST 002 (U)

Purpose. To review U.S. policy options with respect to rights of the parties after a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in the context of a Defense & Space Treaty. (S)

Current Status. The sides have not resolved to U.S. satisfaction what happens at the end of the non-withdrawal period. At the Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed that each side would have the right to choose its course of action. This was codified in the Washington Summit Joint Statement that, “intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side would be free to decide its own course of action.” (S)

The U.S. made clear at the time its view that this right included the right to deploy strategic defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty, and that the Defense & Space Treaty must reflect this. (S)

Gorbachev said that while he did not like the idea of a right to deploy, he “could accept it” if there were a specified non-withdrawal period, and in this context, after the specified period, “each side would be free to choose its own course of action.” This formulation was embodied in the Washington Summit Joint Statement and the U.S. draft Defense & Space Treaty. (S)

The Soviets refused, however, to acknowledge that the Washington Summit Joint Statement language provided this right, arguing that a side would have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty at that time in order to deploy defenses. The Soviets continue to assert that at the end of the non-withdrawal period, a side merely recovers its Article XV withdrawal rights under the ABM Treaty. Thus, the Soviets believe that the Defense & Space agreement should terminate at the end of the non-withdrawal period. (S)

U.S. Position. The U.S. seeks agreement to a Defense & Space Treaty of unlimited duration which would have the sides retain certain ABM Treaty constraints after the non-withdrawal period “until a Party chooses a different course of action.” The U.S. draft treaty text also provides (as a condition for agreeing to a non-withdrawal period) that “if, after the specified period, either Party decides to deploy strategic ballistic missile defenses that are prohibited by the ABM Treaty, then that Party shall give six months written notice to the other Party of its intention to deploy such defenses. In this event, this notice requirement shall supersede the notice provision of Article XV of the ABM Treaty. Following the six month notification period, all remaining ABM Treaty provisions shall be considered terminated unless the Parties agree otherwise.” This position is embodied in Article III, paragraph 2. of the U.S. draft treaty text. (S)

Soviet Position. The Soviets seek a Defense & Space agreement of a duration limited to that of the non-withdrawal period, after which, unless agreed otherwise, the sides would return to the ABM Treaty regime and recover their Article XV withdrawal rights. That is, the Soviets would make the “right to deploy without further reference to the ABM Treaty” one of the subjects for negotiations prior to the end of the non-withdrawal period. If the sides fail to reach agreement on this, or other issues, the sides would return to the ABM Treaty after the non-withdrawal period.

Options. Options for dealing with what rights the parties have after the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty should diminish political barriers to deployment of effective strategic defenses while maintaining ABM Treaty constraints on Soviet ballistic missile defenses until the United States is ready to commit itself to deployment of defenses. (S)

1. Affirm the current position. This would entail making explicit a right to deploy defenses after the non-withdrawal period by maintaining Article III, paragraph 2. of the U.S. draft treaty text, detailed above. (S)

Those who support this option believe the provisions are consistent with what President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to. They argue the provisions are necessary to guarantee the quid pro quo of the Defense & Space Treaty; trading agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy defenses for a specified period of time, in return for freedom to deploy strategic defenses afterwards, without further reference to the ABM Treaty. They also argue that clarifying WSJS language will avoid interpretation debates after ratification. Finally, they argue that this provision is necessary to facilitate deployment of strategic defenses because withdrawing from the ABM Treaty could be a difficult political barrier. (S)

This option is supported by State, OSD, ACDA, Amb. Rowny and the Defense & Space Negotiator.

2. Reevaluate U.S. Defense & Space Objectives. This option would entail not resuming the Defense & Space talks until the fundamental U.S. objectives in D & S have been reaffirmed at the Cabinet level.

Those who support this option believe that one of the basic intents of the National Security Review, to identify the objectives of DST, has not yet been accomplished. They argue that the President’s objectives for DST should be clearly stated before proceeding further with discussion of negotiating positions. They also believe that to simply reaffirm previously held positions—that were based on a different set of national security parameters—could prove to be a serious mistake and result in a lost opportunity for the USG. Those who hold this view believe that Article III would have the effect of specifying a date certain when the U.S. would withdraw from the ABM Treaty and that this could provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity/right to deploy a territorial defense that the United States may be unable or unwilling to exercise. (S)

3. Non-withdrawal X years, non-deployment Y years. This option would entail seeking agreement to a non-withdrawal period of x years; followed by a non-deployment period of [2] [y] years, during which the sides would have intensive discussions on a cooperative transition and have unlimited testing rights; after which, unless the Parties agree otherwise, each would be free to deploy strategic defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty. (This option could be implemented in conjunction with options for differentiated periods of permitted testing activities discussed in DST 001.) (S)

Those who would support this option believe it would help overcome the political barrier of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy strategic defenses by logically connecting the right to deploy without further reference to the ABM Treaty to the outcome of discussions on a cooperative transition, rather than to a non-withdrawal pledge. The onus for failure of the discussions (should it occur) would fall on the Soviets, providing the U.S. with a stronger political argument for deployment. Also, in conjunction with proposals for differentiated periods of permitted testing activities, it could shorten the time under the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (S)

This option is not now supported by any agency. (S)

4. Drop the right to deploy in exchange for unlimited testing rights during the non-withdrawal period as a quid pro quo for a non-withdrawal period. This option would instead entail making explicit a right to test all space-based weapons, regardless of physical principle, as the quid pro quo for a non-withdrawal period. At the end of the non-withdrawal period, the sides would simply regain their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Or, this option could be implemented in conjunction with Option 2. in DST 001, which would make explicit such a right. (S)

Those who would support this option believe that the most important U.S. interest is to demonstrate the feasibility of strategic defenses through realistic testing, and that if this can be done, it will naturally diminish the political barriers to deployment of defenses. They also would argue that there is little practical difference between the political difficulty in providing six months notice of an intention to deploy defenses and six months notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. (S)

This option is not now supported by any agency. (S)

Future Work. Options considered in this paper were limited to those that could conceivably be implemented as we return to the negotiations in Geneva in June. Moreover, options 3 and 4 are included in the paper despite the fact that no agency now supports them. Some agencies believe that these are promising options, which merit further consideration, but would not be appropriate to table now. Moreover, other options must and will be considered. In this work, thorough analysis of our negotiating position in light of SDI deployment objectives stemming from the President’s decision on the course and funding of the SDI program will also be considered. (S)

Tab B

Paper Prepared by the Policy Coordinating Committee⁵

Washington, May 6, 1989

START 01C

NSR 14 START Review Paper One—Fundamental Limits

Purpose. To review options for modifying the U.S. position on fundamental numerical limits under START.

Background. The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on the following fundamental limits under START:

— 6,000 warheads

— 1,600 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers

— 4,900 warheads on ballistic missiles

— 1,540 warheads on no more than 154 heavy ICBMs

In addition the United States has proposed a sublimit of 3,000–3,300 warheads on ICBMs. The Soviet Union has indicated such a sublimit would only be acceptable in return for a similar sublimit on warheads on submarine launched ballistic missiles.

There is consensus that the 6,000 total warhead limit and the 4,900 ballistic missile warhead limit do not require review. Options for modifying other limits are presented in this paper.

Issue 1—The 1,600 limit on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. A limit of 1,600 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers has been agreed to by the Soviets and confirmed by the two sides in statements issued following summit meetings. It represents roughly a one-third reduction from the current inventory of Soviet delivery vehicles. By seeking a percentage reduction in delivery vehicles less than the percentage reduction in total warheads, the United States proposal encourages deMIRVing.

The 1,600 limit will constrain Soviet post-START forces. The United States post-START force mix has not yet been determined. The extent to which the 1,600 limit constrains the United States depends on U.S. decisions on ICBM modernization, the number of Trident SSBNs to be deployed, the continuation of the Reykjavik bomber counting rule, and Soviet acceptance of the position that former heavy bombers not count in the 1600 limit. If the United States elects to deploy substantial numbers of the small ICBM or deMIRV Minuteman III, the 1,600 limit could constrain the United States. If the United States elects not to deploy the small ICBM and the Soviets accept U.S. counting rules, the 6,000 limit will be significantly more constraining than the 1,600 limit.

The principal argument for raising the 1,600 limit is that doing so will enhance strategic stability by encouraging deMIRVing. Because this is a central element, it will be easier politically to propose a change now than later. Raising the 1,600 limit, with the 6,000 and 4,900 warhead limits unchanged, would increase the attractiveness of deploying bombers and single RV ballistic missiles. Both contribute to strategic stability. Over time, therefore, a higher delivery vehicle limit could lead to restructuring the strategic forces of both sides in a stabilizing direction. A second advantage of raising the 1,600 limit is that it would provide the United States with greater flexibility in structuring its post-START strategic forces.

The principal argument against altering the 1,600 limit is that is not in the United States interest to expend the political capital to change a fundamental limit, agreed to at the highest level, which may be more constraining on the Soviet Union than on the United States. Raising the 1600 number could have a political downside in appearing to move away from deep reductions. The claim of “50 percent” reductions is already suspect. The President has specifically directed that the political consequences of altering agreed positions be taken into account. In addition, reopening agreed fundamental limits could encourage the Soviets to reopen settled issues important to the United States such as the Reykjavik bomber counting rule.

The existing U.S. position already encourages deMIRVing to some extent and enhances strategic stability by reducing the number of warheads on fixed, land-based ballistic missiles. We may not wish to increase the 1600 limit absent a decision to move toward a force structure on our part which requires such an increase; it is not in our interest to provide the Soviets latitude we do not require. Finally, current unresolved issues in START (downloading ballistic missiles; counting conventional bombers in the 1600 limit) could be significant. We may not have these issues resolved before our return.

Consensus—Issue 1. All agencies agree the United States should retain the existing 1,600 limit.

Issue 2—ICBM Sublimit. The United States has proposed a sublimit on warheads on ICBMs. The formal U.S. position is such a sublimit should be 3,000; we have also indicated a willingness to accept 3,300. An ICBM sublimit is intended to encourage force restructuring in a stabilizing direction, that is away from ICBMs. A sublimit of either 3,000 or 3,300 would not constrain the United States under any of the post-START force mixes currently under discussion. The Soviets have stated that they do not expect to exceed 3,300 ICBM warheads under START. They have refused, however, to accept a formal sublimit unless there are parallel sublimits on warheads on submarine launched ballistic missiles and ALCMs. The United States, in turn, has refused to accept SLBM or ALCM sublimits on the grounds that (a) such sublimits discourage, rather than encourage, movement to a more stabilizing force structure and (b) such sublimits unduly constrain the U.S. post-START force mix.

Some believe that current Soviet non-heavy ICBMs have little capability to threaten U.S. silos and that the Soviet SLBM force will gain such a capability as soon, or nearly as soon, as the non-heavy ICBM force. In this view an ICBM warhead sublimit adds little to our security; it will not restore the survivability of fixed silos and is far less important than the ballistic missile sublimit in limiting Soviet capability to barrage mobile ICBM deployment areas. If the United States elects to deploy mobile ICBMs and to allow such deployment under START, the need for such a sublimit may be further reduced.

Thus some believe it may be appropriate to drop the sublimit in return for an appropriate Soviet concession, for example looser restrictions on air-breathing systems or tighter restrictions on heavy ICBMs. From the negotiability perspective, pressing the argument for this sublimit to constrain Soviet hard target kill could lead to counterpressure to constrain Trident II (D-5) which also has the capability to destroy hardened silos. The United States has consistently opposed such SLBM sublimits.

Others note that any Soviet ICBM deployments above 3000 would probably be useful only as part of a Soviet first strike strategy and thus would be threatening. They note that seeking numerical limits on Soviet ICBM warheads has been part of the U.S. START position since 1982.

Options—Issue 2. All agencies agree that the initial U.S. position when talks resume should be to retain the existing 3,000 - 3,300 sublimit. There is disagreement over whether the Negotiator should encourage the Soviets in the belief that we have flexibility with regard to this sublimit. State, ACDA, the JCS and the PCI’s representative would have the Negotiator seek appropriate tradeoffs, with the understanding that the specific quid would be referred to Washington for approval. OSD, DOE, and Ambassador Rowny would direct the Negotiator not to indicate any U.S. flexibility with regard to this sublimit, at least for now.

Issue 3—Heavy ICBMs. A major goal of the U.S. START position has been to reduce the threat from Soviet heavy ICBMs. From the U.S. standpoint Soviet SS-18s, which could not survive a U.S. attack in any substantial numbers, exist only to provide a first strike capability against hardened targets or for barrage attack.

Our current position on heavy ICBMs indirectly provides for ultimate U.S.-Soviet equality by banning heavy ICBM testing and modernization, with the result that as existing SS–18s age they will become less effective and ultimately obsolete. NSDD–290⁶ provided flexibility, never used, to allow testing and modernization of Soviet silo-based heavy ICBMs, subject to allowing the U.S. a comparable formal right to deploy heavy ICBMs. All agree that the U.S. would not actually exercise this right, and that other treaty provisions banning new heavy ICBMs make even the formal right a hollow one.

There is a longstanding U.S. policy requiring that any arms reduction agreement provide for U.S.-Soviet equality. The policy is important to Congress and was initially articulated in 1972 in the Jackson amendment, which added the following clause to the September 30, 1972 Joint Resolution on strategic offensive arms:

“[The Congress] urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided the Soviet Union.”

The Congress rejected attempts to alter this to refer to “overall equality” (i.e., considering technology differences), equality of “strategic forces” (allowing non-treaty limited items such as SLCM to figure in the balance), or equality in “nuclear arms.”

While the Jackson amendment itself was non-binding, the principles underlying it have been given legal force by subsequent legislation and appear to represent a continuing sense of Congress. In the SALT II debate, for example, the Senate Armed Services Committee interpreted the Jackson amendment as requiring “equal numbers of intercontinental strategic forces taking into account throw-weight.” The SASC concluded SALT II was “unequal because it confers on the Soviet Union the right to deploy modern, large ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, a right denied to the United States.”

Given this background, there is a political question as to whether allowing the Soviets de jure (or even de facto) superiority in a given category (in this case heavy ICBMs) meets the intent of the Jackson amendment. More generally, any U.S. position resulting in Soviet superiority in any category of strategic arms must be examined for consistency with the basic principle of equal rights and limits.

The current U.S. position provides for formal equality in heavy ICBM limits (i.e., limits apply to both parties), but an indirect prohibition on U.S. heavy ICBMs through a ban on new silos. In addition to the 154/1540 limit, the current U.S. position imposes additional constraints designed to prevent any modernization or replacement of heavy ICBMs or their silos. Over time, these constraints—including bans on flight testing, on production or deployment of additional SS–18s, and on production/testing/deployment of new or modernized heavy ICBMs—would degrade the assessed reliability of Soviet heavy ICBMs. The ultimate result would be equality as the SS–18s age and are eliminated.

The current Soviet position provides a formal right to have heavy ICBMs only to the Soviet side. The Soviets have said in both Moscow and Geneva that they are ready to agree to a ban on development, production and deployment of “new types” of heavy ICBMs and to a ban on mobile heavy ICBMs and heavy SLBMs, assuming we can agree on what a “type” is. The Soviets also state they will accept (unspecified) constraints on modernization of existing heavy missiles. The Soviet position would, however, allow flight testing.

The previous administration provided contingency guidance which specified certain rights the United States should seek in return for allowing heavy ICBM flight testing and modernization. No decision to table this guidance was made. The intent of insisting on formal rights was to meet the strictures of the Jackson amendment; if the Soviets were allowed to retain heavy ICBMs indefinitely, the United States must have comparable rights.

The Soviets are increasing the capability of their SS–18 force by deploying the SS–18 Mod 5. Some believe that if we allow retention of this missile, the existing threat will grow considerably and the benefits of the 50 percent reduction in the Soviet heavy ICBM force will be reduced significantly. The throwweight of the SS–18 Mod 5 is 10–20 percent greater than the SS–18 Mod 4; [7 lines not declassified]

If START were to ban modernization and completely phase out the SS–18, some believe the threat to the U.S. would be reduced significantly. The Soviet SS–24 Mod 2 now being deployed in silos does not have counterforce potential comparable to that of even the SS–18 Mod 4. The earliest projection of a SS–24 follow-on with significant hard target kill capability is for a 1995–1996 IOC. Others note that 1995–1996 is before the end of the START drawdown period; thus the SS–18 counterforce threat would be replaced, not eliminated. In addition, Soviet SSBNs may also acquire a counterforce capability by the mid to late 1990s.

A complete ban on SS–18s would also reduce Soviet breakout potential. [4 lines not declassified]

Options—Issue 3. No agency favors immediately modifying the U.S. position and allowing testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs in return for comparable formal U.S. rights. Four options for dealing with heavy ICBMs should be considered:

— Option 1—Modify the existing United States position by seeking the negotiated elimination of all heavy ICBMs. Variants could include (a) eliminating all 308 missiles over the seven year START phase in period, (b) eliminating the second 154 missiles over some longer period, and/or (c) allowing flight testing (but not modernization of heavy ICBMs during their elimination period. This option is favored by OSD and Ambassador Rowny, although Ambassador Rowny would not pay a high negotiating price for it.

— Option 2—Retain the existing formal U.S, position, rescinding the contingency guidance developed in the last Administration. This approach requires a decision (which need not be made now) on whether a baseline can be negotiated which would preclude SS–18 Mod 5 deployment. If SS–18 Mod 5’s were allowed, the U.S. throwweight approach would count all SS–18’s at the throwweight of the Mod 5. This option would ban heavy ICBM flight testing and would ultimately lead to the “withering away” of the heavy ICBM force. This option is favored by the DCI’s representative and is acceptable to Ambassador Rowny as a fallback.

— Option 3—Retain the existing formal U.S, position, rescinding the contingency guidance developed in the last Administration. Relax the flight test ban in the future only in return for further reduction (perhaps by one half) in the 154 heavy ICBMs. This approach also requires a decision on whether a baseline can be negotiated which would preclude SS–18 Mod 5 deployment. It rejects formal equality as a right the United States is unlikely to exercise. This option is favored by ACDA.

— Option 4—Retain the existing contingency guidance, modifying the U.S. position and allowing testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs in return for comparable formal U.S. rights, but do not table it at this time. Under this approach the United States would wait until an appropriate time and then would make this concession only in return for significant Soviet movement in other areas. This option is favored by State, DOE, and the JCS, and is acceptable as a fallback to the DCI’s representative.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSC/DC Meetings Files, OA/ID 90010–007, NSC/DC 028—May 31, 1989—NSC/DC Meeting on NSR–14/Defense and Space/Start Fundamental Limits. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Kanter. A stamped notation indicates Gates saw the memorandum.
2. Gates did not indicate a preference. According to the Summary of Conclusions, the Deputies Committee met on May 31 from 11 a.m. to noon in the Situation Room, and agreed that: “With a re-write of a JCS rationale in favor of their option in the first Defense & Space paper, the Defense & Space papers on activities during and after a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty are ready for consideration by NSC principals”; and that “START papers on SNDV limits, ICBM sublimits, and heavy missiles are ready for consideration by NSC principals.” (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSC/DC Meetings Files, NSC/DC 028—May 31, 1989—NSC/DC Meeting on NSR–14/Defense and Space/Start Fundamental Limits, Keywords: Start)
3. Secret.
4. Secret. Brackets are in the original.
5. Secret. Brackets are in the original.
6. Scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, 1981–1988, Document 244.