Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

26. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Bush¹

Washington, June 6, 1989

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

I. PURPOSE

To review major START and Defense & Space issues in preparation for the resumption of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) on June 19, 1989.

II. BACKGROUND

Before turning to discussion of specific START and Defense & Space issues, we will pick up on the 25 May NSC meeting discussion of our fundamental NST objectives. Before the negotiations resume, you need to consider the fundamental questions: Is our current approach to a START Treaty, with its inherent verification uncertainties, well-suited to advance our interests? Is our Defense & Space position of facilitating deployment of defenses sound? Several promising ideas in addition to those for discussion at this meeting were identified, but will require further study.

1. Defense & Space. In essence, our current Defense & Space position trades a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time, in return for freedom to deploy defenses at the end of that period. During the non-withdrawal period, the U.S. claims the right to conduct ABM tests in space, under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Two Defense & Space papers (at Tab D) are on the agenda. DST 001 discusses options for ensuring U.S. ABM testing rights during a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. DST 002 discusses options for protecting a right to deploy defenses after a non-withdrawal period.

DST 001—Testing rights during a non-withdrawal period. Our current position (option 1) provides a unilateral U.S. assurance that the number of ABM test satellites orbited at any one time would not exceed 15. Further, the Parties would agree to specific notification procedures regarding those satellites. These steps are intended to address stated Soviet concerns that U.S. ABM testing in space could become de facto deployment. It would also, if the Soviets agree, obtain implicit Soviet acceptance of testing under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, without subjecting the broad interpretation to negotiation. This position is designed to be fully consistent with the ABM Treaty but, as you know, there is controversy about the proper interpretation of the Treaty.

Option 2 would negotiate an explicit agreement based on the terms of what is now the U.S. unilateral assurance. Moreover, it would go beyond the ABM Treaty, inasmuch as it would permit testing in space of all ABM weapons, whether or not they are based on “other physical principles.” If successful, the option could provide better protection for U.S. testing rights, constrain Soviet as well as U.S. activities, and counter congressional efforts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. On the other hand, it could also put on the negotiating table what we already believe to be our right.

Also during the non-withdrawal period, all agencies agree we should retain our proposal to allow unlimited development, testing, and deployment of space-based sensors. This proposal is an attempt to reconcile the increasing needs and capabilities of both sides for warning and attack assessment, with the fact that there will be no way to distinguish with NTM whether or not certain sensor satellites violate ABM Treaty provisions.

DST 002—Deployment rights after a non-withdrawal period. Our current position (option 1), would explicitly give the sides the right to deploy defenses after a non-withdrawal period, upon giving six months notice. The rationale behind this position is that we are trading our non-withdrawal pledge for freedom to deploy defenses after the non-withdrawal period. This quid pro quo was worked out between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Washington Summit.

Option 2 is to reevaluate our Defense & Space objectives at the Cabinet level, and not to resume negotiations until we have done so. This option reflects the concern of some that the current U.S. position could imply to the Soviets that the U.S. will go beyond the ABM Treaty on a certain date, and push them to do the same, when in fact the U.S. may not then be prepared to deploy ABM defenses for political, technical, or budgetary reasons. In that event, we could find ourselves in a situation in which the Soviets deploy defenses but we do not. Others believe that the only practical effect of our current position would be to relieve the U.S. of the political burden of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, which does not apply to the Soviet Union. The Soviets now could withdraw from the ABM Treaty on 6 months notice.

2. START Reductions and Stability. Our goal in START should be stability and reduced risk of war, not reductions per se, but our shift in emphasis from “reductions” to “stability” needs to be handled in a way that recognizes the political risks of appearing to abandon “deep reductions.” The discussion paper² concludes that present START reductions (to 1600 missiles and heavy bombers; 4900 ballistic missile warheads; 6000 total accountable warheads) are acceptable. There are two issues in the discussion paper:

ICBM Warhead Sublimit. Should we retain the 3000–3300 ICBM warhead sublimit, which the Soviets have not accepted? At issue is whether the negotiator should indicate flexibility to the Soviets and seek a trade. On the one hand, this limit probably would not impose additional constraints on Soviet forces as long as we get the other warhead and throwweight reductions the Soviets seem prepared to accept. Others believe, however, that such a subceiling may limit future Soviet options to field a first strike ICBM force.

Heavy ICBMs. We will discuss this in greater detail at a subsequent NSC meeting. The Soviets already have agreed to reduce their “heavy” SS-18 ICBM by 50 percent. At issue is whether to satisfy our political and legal requirement for U.S.-Soviet equality, originally articulated in the SALT I Jackson amendment, by seeking the elimination of all heavy ICBMS, or by giving the U.S. a de jure right to deploy heavy ICBMs, even though—as a practical matter—we would never exercise that right.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab C.³

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

The agenda for the meeting is at Tab B.⁴

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

POINTS TO BE MADE ON START AND DEFENSE & SPACE

— I know your staffs have worked hard to complete a thorough review of our START and Defense & Space positions before talks resume in Geneva a week from Monday.

— I want to stress how important that work is, if we are to successfully conclude the Nuclear and Space negotiations that reduces the risks of war and strengthens stability. We need to ensure that our current approach will achieve that objective.

— I also know we can’t beat Gorbachev with an empty hand. I want to build on the considerable progress we already have made, but also inject fresh thinking and new ideas that will advance us toward our goal.

— Today we will focus on the policy issues underlying our approaches to START and the Defense and Space Talks. On that basis, we can decide our specific negotiating positions.

Tab D1

Paper Prepared by the Policy Coordinating Committee⁶

Washington, June 2, 1989

DST 001 (U)

Purpose. To review U.S. policy options regarding the means of assuring U.S. testing rights during a specified period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, in the context of a Defense & Space Treaty. (S)

Current Status. The United States and the Soviet Union disagree about the activities that would be permitted during a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. seeks to preserve its full ABM Treaty (broad interpretation) rights to research, development, and testing, while the Soviets have consistently rejected this position and have sought restrictions on ABM research, development, and testing beyond those agreed in 1972. (U)

In December 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union in the Washington Summit Joint Statement committed to seek an agreement, inter alia, “to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time.” The sides disagree over the interpretation of that language. The U.S. asserts the broad interpretation and seeks an indication of Soviet acceptance of that interpretation. The Soviets have rejected the broad interpretation, but have not made clear what interpretation they believe is reflected by the WSJS. Soviet views have ranged at times between an interpretation more restrictive than the narrow interpretation, and the narrow interpretation. Hence, U.S. initiatives in Defense & Space have sought to obtain an indication that the Soviets accept our interpretation of the WSJS before a Defense & Space Treaty is signed. (S)

U.S. Position: Space-based Testing Initiative. To clarify testing permitted during the non-withdrawal period and to address stated Soviet concerns that U.S. testing in space could become de facto deployment, the U.S. stated on 28 October 1988 in an authoritative unilateral assurance that:

“In order to demonstrate that the testing of space based components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, does not represent the deployment of such components, the United States is prepared to carry out such permitted testing only from designated ABM test satellites. Any space object in earth orbit from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory shall be designated as an ABM Test satellite. Further, it is the view of the United States that the number of U.S. designated ABM test satellites in orbit simultaneously shall not exceed a number well short of that associated with any realistic deployed capability. The United States believes the number 15 falls well below that threshold.” (S)

To help clarify ABM testing permitted during the non-withdrawal period and to provide for greater predictability, the U.S. also proposed in the draft Predictability Protocol that the Parties shall provide each other with the following data:

1. Identification, no more than 12 hours after launch of each space object in earth orbit from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is to be tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory;

2. Notification within 12 hours after the re-entry of an ABM Test Satellite from its orbit or after a change in orbit; and,

3. Notification of a test using such a space object in earth orbit to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory no less than two hours prior to the conduct of any such test.

Thus, should the Soviets accept the current U.S. draft predictability protocol, they would necessarily accept certain ABM testing in space, thereby implicitly accepting some aspects of the broad interpretation. (S)

U.S. Position: Space-based Sensors. The U.S. has also proposed that the sides agree not to object, “on the basis of the ABM Treaty, to the development, testing, and deployment . . . of space-based sensors.” In explaining this initiative to the Soviets, the U.S. noted that satellite sensor programs are vitally important to both sides in providing warning of an attack, and thus are also vitally important to stability. Furthermore, it is very difficult and, as both sides improve their systems, becoming increasingly more difficult to distinguish independently between space-based sensors capable of substituting for ABM radars and those that are not. Thus, limitations on the capability of deployed space-based sensors are neither desirable nor verifiable. The U.S. has presented to the Soviets a definition of “space-based sensors” in the context of this proposal; but it has not been agreed to by the Soviets. (S)

Soviet Position. The Soviets have criticized the sensor proposal as undermining the ABM Treaty and they have responded negatively to the additions to the Predictability Protocol proposed by the U.S. in association with our assurance on testing of space-based components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles.

As a means of identifying testing activities in space that would be permitted during the non-withdrawal period, the Soviets proposed in April 1987 that the sides negotiate a “list” of criteria for devices to be banned from launch into space, using as a starting point their proposed “list” of performance parameters. Under the Soviet concept, everything below the specifications or thresholds for devices banned from being tested or stationed in space would be allowed for testing or stationing in space. In October, 1987, the Soviets clarified the “list” proposal: devices below the list thresholds could be put into space for any purpose, whether ABM-related or not. Production and ground-based test range activities involving devices not on the list and those with critical parameters above the thresholds would be permitted. The Soviets also proposed at this time, that, alternatively, the sides could agree to “observe the ABM Treaty as signed and ratified in 1972.” (S)

Since the Washington Summit, the Soviets have alluded to the “list” proposal only in the context of discussing “data sensors” and have emphasized the WSJS language, without defining what that language means. We do not know whether or not the Soviets have abandoned the broader scope of the “list” proposal. (S)

The U.S. responded that the “list” proposal was too complex, inherently unverifiable, and imposed restrictions on SDI beyond those of the ABM Treaty agreed to in 1972, and in many cases the values proposed were in effect more restrictive than even the narrow interpretation. (S)

Soviet negotiating tactics (including a refusal to work a joint draft treaty text) are consistent with what appears to be their strategy in the Defense & Space talks: to defer issues and serious discussion in the hope that a change in U.S. administration or Congressional pressure might cause the U.S. to pull back from its SDI program, and failing that to defer the issue until a START Treaty is closer at hand, when greater pressure may be brought to bear on the U.S. (S)

SDI Testing Requirements. The President decided on the basis of NSR-12 that the goals of the SDI program will remain unchanged, and that the program presented to Congress will focus on evaluating the potential of the most rapidly advancing technologies such as Brilliant Pebbles. In light of this guidance, a proposed test program for evaluation of the Brilliant Pebbles concept is being developed and reviewed for compliance with the ABM Treaty. This program consists of 12 flight tests to be completed by mid-FY92. While the compliance certification process has not yet been completed for these tests, we expect to conduct them consistent with the “restrictive” interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This test program would also be compatible with the U.S. unilateral assurance on testing in space and proposed Predictability Protocol notification measures. (S)

It is not clear at this time how long and to what extent additional, useful Brilliant Pebbles testing can be carried out after mid-FY92 consistent with the restrictive interpretation, or for that matter the broad interpretation. However, development and testing of Brilliant Pebbles, if they are regarded as “based on other physical principles,” would probably proceed more usefully under the broad interpretation after mid-FY92. If the broad interpretation applies to Brilliant Pebbles, system development and testing could proceed unrestricted to the point where an ABM system is “created,” resulting in a faster rate of growth in confidence in technical feasibility than a program conducted under the restrictive interpretation. (S)

If the concept for a Brilliant Pebbles system is not determined to be “based on other physical principles,” it could not be developed and tested under the broad interpretation. We would then have to test under the restrictive interpretation. While this would still permit us to increase confidence in the feasibility of the technology, the rate of increase, and perhaps its absolute value would be less than could be achieved under a broad interpretation program. (S)

N.B. No determination has yet been made as to whether an ABM system incorporating the Brilliant Pebbles concept would be an ABM system “based on other physical principles.” This issue includes considerations beyond those associated with the issue of whether kinetic energy ABM weapons are based on OPP. (S)

Options. Options for assuring U.S. testing rights during a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty are intended to insure U.S. legal rights and political support to conduct testing necessary to establish the feasibility of effective strategic defenses and to avoid the need to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to complete such testing. (S)

1. Affirm the current position. This option would entail continuing to use the current U.S. working paper when we return to negotiations in Geneva. (S)

Those who favor this option believe that the U.S. unilateral assurance and predictability protocol proposal would gain implicit Soviet acknowledgment of certain ABM Treaty testing rights during the non-withdrawal period, reduce treaty interpretation debates during and after ratification, provide a militarily meaningful distinction between permitted testing and prohibited deployment of OPP ABM systems in space, and satisfy stated Soviet concerns regarding that distinction. They argue further that the U.S. completed its Defense & Space position only late in Round X, and that we have not yet even had an opportunity to explain fully the position to the Soviets. (S)

Option 1. is supported by: State, ACDA, OSD, Amb. Rowny and the Defense & Space Negotiator. (S)

2. Negotiate a new space-testing proposal. This would entail negotiating an agreement with the Soviets based on the space testing initiative described above. However, it would apply to testing of all space-based weapons systems whether or not they are OPP:

In order to ensure that the testing of space-based ABM interceptor missiles or components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles does not represent the deployment of such components, the United States proposes that the Parties confine such testing to designated ABM test satellites. Any platform based in space from which an ABM interceptor missile or a component capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory, shall be designated an an ABM test satellite. Further, the number of designated ABM test satellites orbited simultaneously by either side shall not exceed X. (S)

Those who support this option argue that despite some progress on the Predictability Protocol and hints of maneuver room on the sensor proposal, a unilateral testing assurance does not provide a common U.S.-Soviet understanding of what is and is not allowed during the non-withdrawal period, and would constrain the U.S. without constraining the Soviets. They argue that this lack of understanding is a product of the still ambiguous Washington Summit Joint Statement phrase “. . . while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” They believe that negotiating reciprocal space-based testing constraints and allowances is the best mechanism for clarifying that ambiguity. They also argue that reaching agreement on the text of the current Defense & Space Treaty including the testing assurance would merely constitute Soviet recognition of unilateral U.S. space testing constraints and would in no way impose similar constraints on the Soviets. Without a negotiated space-based testing limit, they argue, the Soviets could abide by the proposed reciprocal notification provisions while conducting unconstrained testing and still perhaps deploy under the guise of that testing. Finally, they argue that such an approach would obviate the OPP vs. non-OPP dilemma, likely enhance the probability for Congressional ratification and allay Allied concerns about potential strategic imbalances. (S)

This option is supported by the JCS (S)

Future Work. Additional options for assuring U.S. testing rights during a specified period of non-withdrawal (e.g. differentiated periods of testing restrictions during the non-withdrawal period under restrictive, broad, or broader-than-broad interpretations of the ABM Treaty or pursuit of the Soviet “list” proposal) were considered, but not included in the paper because no agency believes that such options would be possible to analyze thoroughly before we return to the negotiations in Geneva. These options, plus a more detailed analysis of SDI testing requirements, will be embodied in the D&S work program. Moreover, additional consideration must be given to the issue of whether or not the U.S. should now establish policy on what systems are or are not based on other physical principles. (S)

Sensor Proposal. The U.S. initiative on sensors is separable from the options and issues discussed above. Nonetheless, it would affect what activities occur during the non-withdrawal period. All agencies support the current position on space-based sensors because restrictions on testing and deployment of space-based sensors are neither desirable nor verifiable. They argue that both the United States and the Soviet Union will be improving their space-based early warning and attack assessment capabilities and that these improvements will make it increasingly difficult for the sides to verify compliance with the ABM Treaty. Finally they note that the Soviets expressed interest in discussing this proposal further in their last plenary statement, albeit in the context of their “list” proposal. (S)

Tab D2

Paper Prepared by the Policy Coordinating Committee⁷

Washington, June 2, 1989

DST 002 (U)

Purpose. To review U.S. policy options with respect to rights of the parties after a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in the context of a Defense & Space Treaty. (S)

Current Status. The sides have not resolved to U.S. satisfaction what happens at the end of the non-withdrawal period. At the Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed that each side would have the right to choose its course of action. This was codified in the Washington Summit Joint Statement that, “intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side would be free to decide its own course of action.” (S)

The U.S. made clear at the time its view that this right included the right to deploy strategic defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty, and that the Defense & Space Treaty must reflect this. (S)

Gorbachev said that while he did not like the idea of a right to deploy, he “could accept it” if there were a specified non-withdrawal period, and in this context, after the specified period, “each side would be free to choose its own course of action.” This formulation was embodied in the Washington Summit Joint Statement and the U.S. draft Defense & Space Treaty. (S)

The Soviets refused, however, to acknowledge that the Washington Summit Joint Statement language provided this right, arguing that a side would have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty at that time in order to deploy defenses. The Soviets continue to assert that at the end of the non-withdrawal period, a side merely recovers its Article XV withdrawal rights under the ABM Treaty. Thus, the Soviets believe that the Defense & Space agreement should terminate at the end of the non-withdrawal period. (S)

U.S. Position. The U.S. seeks agreement to a Defense & Space Treaty of unlimited duration which would have the sides retain certain ABM Treaty constraints after the non-withdrawal period “until a Party chooses a different course of action.” The U.S. draft treaty text also provides (as a condition for agreeing to a non-withdrawal period) that “if, after the specified period, either Party decides to deploy strategic ballistic missile defenses that are prohibited by the ABM Treaty, then that Party shall give six months written notice to the other Party of its intention to deploy such defenses. In this event, this notice requirement shall supersede the notice provision of Article XV of the ABM Treaty. Following the six month notification period, all remaining ABM Treaty provisions shall be considered terminated unless the Parties agree otherwise.” This position is embodied in Article III, paragraph 2. of the U.S. draft treaty text. (S)

Soviet Position. The Soviets seek a Defense & Space agreement of a duration limited to that of the non-withdrawal period, after which, unless agreed otherwise, the sides would return to the ABM Treaty regime and recover their Article XV withdrawal rights. That is, the Soviets would make the “right to deploy without further reference to the ABM Treaty” one of the subjects for negotiations prior to the end of the non-withdrawal period. If the sides fail to reach agreement on this, or other issues, the sides would return to the ABM Treaty after the non-withdrawal period.

Options. Options for dealing with what rights the parties have after the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty should diminish political barriers to deployment of effective strategic defenses while maintaining ABM Treaty constraints on Soviet ballistic missile defenses until the United States is ready to commit itself to deployment of defenses. (S)

1. Affirm the current position. This would entail making explicit a right to deploy defenses after the non-withdrawal period by maintaining Article III, paragraph 2. of the U.S. draft treaty text, detailed above. (S)

Those who support this option believe the provisions are consistent with what President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to. They argue the provisions are necessary to guarantee the quid pro quo of the Defense & Space Treaty; trading agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy defenses for a specified period of time, in return for freedom to deploy strategic defenses afterwards, without further reference to the ABM Treaty. They also argue that clarifying WSJS language will avoid interpretation debates after ratification. Finally, they argue that this provision is necessary to facilitate deployment of strategic defenses because withdrawing from the ABM Treaty could be a difficult political barrier. (S)

This option is supported by State, OSD, ACDA, Amb. Rowny and the Defense & Space Negotiator.

2. Reevaluate U.S. Defense & Space Objectives. This option would entail not resuming the Defense & Space talks until the fundamental U.S. objectives in D & S have been reaffirmed at the Cabinet level.

Those who support this option believe that one of the basic intents of the National Security Review, to identify the objectives of DST, has not yet been accomplished. They argue that the President’s objectives for DST should be clearly stated before proceeding further with discussion of negotiating positions. They also believe that to simply reaffirm previously held positions—that were based on a different set of national security parameters—could prove to be a serious mistake and result in a lost opportunity for the USG. Those who hold this view believe that Article III would have the effect of specifying a date certain when the U.S. would withdraw from the ABM Treaty and that this could provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity/right to deploy a territorial defense that the United States may be unable or unwilling to exercise. (S)

3. Non-withdrawal X years, non-deployment Y years. This option would entail seeking agreement to a non-withdrawal period of x years; followed by a non-deployment period of [2] [y] years, during which the sides would have intensive discussions on a cooperative transition and have unlimited testing rights; after which, unless the Parties agree otherwise, each would be free to deploy strategic defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty. (This option could be implemented in conjunction with options for differentiated periods of permitted testing activities discussed in DST 001.) (S)

Those who would support this option believe it would help overcome the political barrier of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy strategic defenses by logically connecting the right to deploy without further reference to the ABM Treaty to the outcome of discussions on a cooperative transition, rather than to a non-withdrawal pledge. The onus for failure of the discussions (should it occur) would fall on the Soviets, providing the U.S. with a stronger political argument for deployment. Also, in conjunction with proposals for differentiated periods of permitted testing activities, it could shorten the time under the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (S)

This option is not now supported by any agency. (S)

4. Drop the right to deploy in exchange for unlimited testing rights during the non-withdrawal period as a quid pro quo for a non-withdrawal period. This option would instead entail making explicit a right to test all space-based weapons, regardless of physical principle, as the quid pro quo for a non-withdrawal period. At the end of the non-withdrawal period, the sides would simply regain their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Or, this option could be implemented in conjunction with Option 2. in DST 001, which would make explicit such a right. (S)

Those who would support this option believe that the most important U.S. interest is to demonstrate the feasibility of strategic defenses through realistic testing, and that if this can be done, it will naturally diminish the political barriers to deployment of defenses. They also would argue that there is little practical difference between the political difficulty in providing six months notice of an intention to deploy defenses and six months notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. (S)

This option is not now supported by any agency. (S)

Future Work. Options considered in this paper were limited to those that could conceivably be implemented as we return to the negotiations in Geneva in June. Moreover, options 3 and 4 are included in the paper despite the fact that no agency now supports them. Some agencies believe that these are promising options, which merit further consideration, but would not be appropriate to table now. Moreover, other options must and will be considered. In this work, thorough analysis of our negotiating position in light of SDI deployment objectives stemming from the President’s decision on the course and funding of the SDI program will also be considered. (S)

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSC Meetings Files, OA/ID 90001–006, NSC0021—June 07, 1989—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Defense Policy, Space Issues. Secret. Copied to Quayle and Sununu. A stamped notation indicates Bush saw the memorandum on June 7. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Bush presided over a meeting of the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room on June 7, lasting from 10:51–11:50 a.m. No minutes were found.
2. Attached but not printed. See Tab B, Document 24.
3. Not attached.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. Secret.
6. Secret. Brackets are in the original.
7. Secret. Brackets are in the original.