Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

241. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

8844.

Geneva, August 12, 1991, 0908Z

SUBJECT

• START: Brooks-Nazarkin Meeting, July 29, 1991

1. This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-535. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting Date: July 29, 1991

• Time: 12:30 a.m.–1:45 a.m.
• Place: Soviet Mission, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

• Amb. L.F. Brooks
• Mr. T.R. Sample
• Mr. W.E. Furniss
• Dr. N.M. O’Fallon
• Mr. M.L. Brown
• Dr. E.M. Ifft
• Ms. J.R. Zdravecky
• Ms. C.S. Scott
• Mr. D. Roesch (Int.)

USSR

• Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin
• Mr. E.A. Ashratov
• Mr. S.V. Kryuchkov
• Mr. Yu. I. Roslyakov
• Gen. F.I. Ladygin
• Amb. L.A. Masterkov
• Mr. V.L. Katayev
• Col. S.L. Shemyakin
• Mr. B.R. Ivanov
• Mr. N.S. Razgonov (Int.)

4. Summary: The Soviet side argued that the U.S. side should drop its proposal for exhibitions of variants of the SS–24, 25, and 18, but finally accepted the U.S. language. Nazarkin confirmed the Sample-Kryuchkov agreement on solid rocket motors, the Ifft-Masterkov agreement on former and retired types and accepted the U.S. language for a joint statement on weighing. End Summary.

5. Subject Summary: Exhibition of variants; miscellaneous. End Subject Summary.

Exhibition of Variants

6. Nazarkin said that he had called a meeting at this late hour because the Soviet side had discovered a problem in the inspection protocol. He said that Annex 11, para 5(a) on exhibitions of the SS–24, 25, and 18 had been previously agreed upon. However, the U.S. side now insisted on adding a clarification that “each variant shall be exhibited”. He urged the U.S. side to drop this new language, as the concept of exhibiting variants of these missiles had not been mentioned previously.

7. Brooks said that this was simply a tracking fix. It was fully consistent with agreed language in Section XIV which provided for exhibitions of ICBMs and SLBMs of each type and variant. The concept that variants would be exhibited had been agreed upon by the sides for months. Nazarkin noted that Section XIV was fully agreed upon, and that the Soviet side would not depart from this. However, the problem was that para 5(a) of Annex 11 referred to specific types of ICBMs.

8. Ashratov said that Annex 11 referred to early initial exhibitions of existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The Soviet side had taken into account in this provision that there would be a display of variants. However, when the sides agreed on the display of specific types of ICBMs, the U.S. side did not state that all variants of types should be exhibited. The Soviet side understood that the main purpose of the language was to confirm technical characteristics in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The dimensions of these missiles differed from one another by less than three percent. Three percent, Ashratov continued, was the allowed margin of error for measurements within the framework of the treaty. Thus, in this case, there was no specific need to exhibit variants.

9. In a heated response, Brooks interrupted Ashratov and asked Nazarkin whether the position being presented was the official position of the Soviet government. If so, Brooks said, many tired people could get some sleep since there would be no treaty signing that week. Brooks pointed out that this provision had been agreed upon for several months, and had been discussed extensively when negotiated. Brooks noted that in recent days the sides had agreed that differences greater than three percent would be called variants, but there could also be variants which differed by less than three percent. Therefore, Brooks said, how could the Soviet side stand by language which called for the exhibition of variants, agree that variants would be listed in the MOU, but say that these particular variants did not count?

10. After a long recess to allow the Soviet delegation to confer privately, Nazarkin asked Brooks to read the language that the U.S. side wanted to include in para 5(a) of Annex 11. Brooks said that following “SS–25, SS–24, SS–18” the U.S. side wanted to insert “, and variants thereof.” Nazarkin said that the Soviet side would accept the U.S. language. (Comment: It is clear that this was a last ditch attempt by the military-industrial representatives to gain lost ground. Though not directly witnessed, it appears that the MFA and general staff representatives made a stand against this attempt. This interpretation was later confirmed, though obliquely, by Nazarkin to Brooks. End Comment.)

Miscellaneous

11. Nazarkin said that he also wanted to confirm agreements reached on other matters. First, he said that the Soviet side accepted the proposal made by Sample earlier in the day concerning locational restrictions on solid rocket motors. This included language to go in the agreed statement, Article IV, and relevant provisions of the MOU, Annex I.

12. Nazarkin also said that the sides had reached agreement in principle on the thirty-fifth agreed statement on the subject of dual inspections. He asked whether the U.S. side had specific language to propose. Brooks said that he had some language, and would provide it in the morning.

13. Nazarkin said that he wanted to confirm the language for the agreed statement on retired and former types agreed to earlier by Ifft and Masterkov. Brooks agreed.

14. Brooks noted that if the sides were to make a joint plenary statement on weighing, he needed a reaction to the U.S. draft. Nazarkin said that the Soviet side accepted the U.S. language in full.

15. Nazarkin also noted that the sides needed to finalize the third country basing letters, which needed some updating from the November, 1990 drafts. Brooks agreed.

16. Documents exchanged: None.

Brooks

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910767–0561. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to USNMR SHAPE.