Office of the Historian

240. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1

8344.
Geneva, July 27, 1991, 1057Z

SUBJECT

  • START: Irregular Sitrep #6, July 27, 1991
1.
Secret—Entire Text.
2.
My personal Sitrep as of 1100 Geneva time July 27.
3.
Distinguishability appears settled, subject to getting the text right. They agree to (a) canisters, launchers, launchers with canisters and converted launchers all “distinguishable” as defined by the treaty; (b) additional exhibitions to demonstrate distinguishability and to demonstrate that missiles could not be interchanged between launch canisters; and (c) segregated basing by restricted area, with a 60 day exception when the type of missile was being changed. In addition, the provisions on declaring the type of missile at the portal and reading the unique identifier are already agreed treaty language.
4.
Agreement on these new side by side exhibitions may not be quite as good as it may sound. There are a series of criteria for when the new exhibitions get conducted. I think that we have the hammer and they must be conducted if we want them, but until we get language agreed, it’s a little fuzzy. We don’t have treaty language, and a lot can go wrong in drafting.
5.
On the other hand, even if we dropped these new side by side exhibitions completely, we’ve met Washington minimum guidance. As a result, I think this one is behind us.
6.
A while ago we made a change in the new types definition with no formal review. I understand it caught some in Washington by surprise and want to be sure all are aware of the revised wording. Language now compares ICBMs only to ICBMs and SLBMs only to SLBMs. I frankly had always assumed that was our position, but in fact the old U.S. language required new ICBMs to be different from all existing ICBMs and from all existing SLBMs. The language was changed in the last month or so. As a result, if, for example, the Trident II were deployed ashore it could be considered a new type of ICBM if it differed from all existing ICBMs, even if it were identical to the sea-based version.
7.
I think this is nothing to worry about. I’ve been through two attempts to design a common missile (land and sea-based) and both times we decided it wasn’t feasible even at the design phase. The idea that the Soviets could simply rebase isn’t worth worrying about.
8.
Minor glitch on photos due to be exchanged at signature. Soviets can’t do SS–24 (silo) out of canister, SS–24 (mobile) out of canister, or SS–25 out of canister at treaty signature. I have agreed that those can be provided at the distinguishability exhibition. They will include the SCDMs for both missiles. All other required photographs will be provided at treaty signature.
9.
In reviewing the treaty, you will note that “agreed statements” is a growth stock. We had twelve of them ten days ago, now we have thirty-five. Most of the new ones have been in play for a while (forty percent rule, special purpose submarines), but some are the result of solving last minute issues with agreed statements. Sounds like a lot, but most make sense.
10.
Remaining substantive issues:
(A)
Site diagrams for mandatory SSI. Based on their description, all the Soviet site diagrams show is a perimeter fence. Given that the Soviets don’t yet know what’s inside that fence, I still worry about being able to finish before signature. If I can’t, I’ll agree to exchange 30 days after signature.
(B)
Procedures for technical exhibitions (inspection protocol Section XIV) are not yet agreed. Linked to the new side by side exhibitions, which may complicate resolution. Most significant issue is whether launcher and missile get exhibited in same location.
(C)
Weights. Laying down the new guidance that procedures on determining the weight by some other method get worked in the JCIC in advance. We’ll see how it plays.
(D)
Waiting Moscow approval of our proposal to make the voluntary cessation of encryption terminate after a year. The Geneva Soviets like it.
(E)
Moscow wants some—probably harmless—changes in words on acceleration profiles (what do you do if you make no measurements). We have some ideas. Should be no problem.
(F)
Problem with the agreed statement on ALCM attachment joints (described in last Sitrep). I will try new text; if it doesn’t work, I will drop it and make a statement for the record.
(G)
Notification on the departure of a mobile launcher of prototype ICBMs from its production facility is not agreed. Not sure why; Nazarkin is checking.
(H)
Language on looking in empty launch canisters is not agreed.
(I)
Still working on reference cylinders for inspections (new Annex 12 to the inspection protocol).
(J)
Soviets resisting commitment to disassemble SLBMs into stages during the exhibition conducted in connection with elimination. I will probably drop.
(K)
Bear D letters not yet worked. Need to implement the new agreement on when conducted and who pays.
11.
All Soviets depart Tuesday2 except four person clean-up crew headed by Soviet delegation executive director.
12.
Beginning the proofreading process. Final printing to start today.
13.
Unless something blows up, I expect to send my formal request for authority to initial treaty and side agreements and to sign the letters by late Sunday3 afternoon my time.
Brooks
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910718–0089. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis.↩
  2. July 30.↩
  3. July 28.↩