Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

242. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

9019.

Geneva, August 14, 1991, 1627Z

SUBJECT

• START: Final Plenary, U.S.-USSR START Negotiations, July 29, 1991

REF:

• Geneva 08572; Soviet Unilateral Statement on Subtunnels.²

1. This is NST/START-XV-M-021. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting Date: July 29, 1991

Time: 11:00 a.m.–11:52 a.m.

Place: Soviet Mission, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.	USSR
Ambassador L.F. Brooks	Ambassador Yu. K. Nazarkin
U.S. Delegation	Soviet Delegation
(Comment: See the list of delegation attendees appended to the end of this cable. End comment.)
Ms. L.F. Brooks	Ms. S. Nazarkina
Ms. K.L. Brooks	Ms. M. Koltunova
Ms. L.R. Busser	Ms. M. Shemyakina
Ms. W.E. Furniss	Mr. V.P. Dronov (Int.)
Ms. D.A. Jones
Mr. D. Arensburger (Int.)

4. Summary: The delegations, led by the Ambassadors, met to close the final round of the negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Guests and representatives of the media also attended the meeting. Ambassador Brooks remarked on the historical significance of the treaty, on the achievements of equality, deep reductions, stability, predictability, and transparency that it embodies, on its unprecedented scope and complexity, and on the contributions of the many, including families of delegation members, who made its achievement possible. Ambassador Nazarkin also remarked on the treaty’s complexity and historical significance and then continued his remarks to note that the treaty would serve as the foundation for the further development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. He also said that its implementation would require, but ultimately free, great economic resources, and that the treaty already had critics, although it served the interests of both sides equally. (Comment: These last two points seemed specifically directed at Soviet constituencies. End comment.)

5. The Ambassadors began the initialling of the treaty and exchanged the pens used for the first page. The Ambassadors then exchanged joint and reciprocal statements and Ambassador Brooks presented unilateral statements of the U.S. side (Comment: A list of the statements is appended to the end of this cable. Ambassador Nazarkin later delivered a unilateral statement of the Soviet side on subtunnels. See Reftel. End comment.) The delegations applauded, shook hands, and retired to complete preparation of the treaty for presidential signature. End summary.

6. Subject summary: Public statements; initialling of the treaty; presentation of joint and unilateral statements. End subject summary.

Public Statements

7. The U.S. delegation, accompanied by Mrs. and Ms. Brooks, Ms. Busser, Mrs. Furniss, and Mrs. Jones arrived at the Soviet mission and were seated. Ambassador Nazarkin opened the plenary at 11:04 a.m. by welcoming Ambassador Brooks and the U.S. delegation and gave the floor to Ambassador Brooks. Ambassador Brooks made the following statement:

(Begin text of statement)

Mr. Ambassador,

My delegation and I are pleased and honored to join you in a truly historic event—the final plenary of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The first such plenary meeting took place here in Geneva exactly nine years and one month ago, on June 29, 1982. In 1982, the first draft text was all of 59 pages long. The finished document which we have before us is over 600 pages long. Today, we will initial the pages of the two copies in Russian and the two copies in English, certifying that each page is correct and that each word and phrase carries the same meaning in both languages. Tomorrow, we will take these documents to Moscow for our two presidents to sign on Wednesday³ at the summit.

The completion of the longest and most complex arms control agreement ever negotiated is an immense accomplishment. This treaty is the first to actually reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons. More importantly, it brings the strategic forces of our two countries into a more stable balance at those lower levels.

Our treaty embodies five achievements: equality, deep reductions, stability, predictability, and transparency. Equality and mutual respect are, of course, the only basis for enduring agreements between nations. Deep reductions are especially appropriate as we move beyond confrontation to cooperation. The treaty’s provisions increase stability by a major reduction in the most destabilizing and dangerous of weapons, land-based ballistic missiles and their warheads and by placing restrictions on specific types of strategic weapons. At the same time, the treaty allows the necessary flexibility that assures both sides’ security as we move toward a new world order.

If our countries are to continue on the path of cooperation and trust, they must avoid misunderstanding which can lead to mistrust. Perhaps the most important contribution of this treaty is its contribution to increasing predictability and transparency. A protocol containing over 80 different types of notifications will help both sides understand the strategic military activities of the other side. Twelve different forms of inspections and the permanent monitoring of certain ballistic missile production in each country will provide firm assurances that treaty obligations are being met. Finally, the ban on telemetry encryption, along with specific measures to improve monitoring, will lead to a new era in openness between our nations.

Mr. Ambassador, treaties are agreed to by governments, but they are created by people. This treaty would not have been possible without the dedicated people on both sides of this table. In this regard, I would like to thank four groups of people; Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin and his experts, my experts, both side’s interpreters and translators and our long-suffering families. It is because of our experts’ hard work, constructive ideas and non-polemic discussions that we are able to initial this treaty today. The professionalism and dedication expressed by you and your people have made this an experience I will always cherish.

Likewise, a special thanks needs to go to our families, most of whom are in our respective countries. Family separation is always difficult, and the spouses and children of those people in this room have made their contribution and deserve our thanks.

Mr. Ambassador, completing this treaty has been worth the enormous effort because it worked. We have met our mutual goals: the risk of war will be decreased and the stability of our strategic relationship enhanced. The world is a better place because of our work. On behalf of my government and my delegation I congratulate you on this great accomplishment.

Thank you.

(End text of statement)

8. Ambassador Nazarkin thanked Ambassador Brooks and then made the following statement:

(Begin text of statement)

Mr. Ambassador:

Today we are completing preparation of the START treaty and its related documents. A day from now the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the USSR will finalize this historic agreement with their signatures. For the first time in history the two countries possessing the world’s greatest arsenals of strategic offensive arms will begin the process of reducing them. Movement will begin toward reducing the level of military confrontation in the field of armaments that pose the greatest threat to all mankind.

The START treaty is without precedent. There is nothing comparable to its detailed and practicable verification system in any other agreement of its kind. The sides are exchanging an enormous amount of information about their strategic offensive arms and the accuracy of that information will be subject to verification. This will undoubtedly redound to further confidence-building between the sides.

The treaty will become a solid foundation for the development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Concluding the treaty will be a tremendous contribution to the U.S.-Soviet relationship on the military level matching the growing improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. This treaty is at the same time a weighty contribution toward creating an atmosphere of constructive cooperation between states that is in the interests of all of those states. It will expand upon and strengthen the positive change in international relations which has been taking place in the world in recent years thanks to the “new thinking” which has been making ever-increasing headway in the international arena.

And, finally, I cannot fail to mention the economic side of things. The treaty will, obviously, require great resources—to build and implement the verification system and to implement START elimination procedures. But ultimately, resources that now are used for these strategic offensive arms will be freed up to make available additional possibilities—not insubstantial at that—to convert military industry to civilian purposes. It will be possible to put these resources to use for purposes of development. I think there is no need to explain how much our country needs, especially now during this transitional period of its history, such additional economic resources.

Mr. Ambassador, I cannot ignore the fact that the treaty will have many critics. They are already in evidence. Long before today, without having seen the treaty and without knowing what it would contain, they had already begun to sharply criticize the treaty.

Mr. Ambassador, I am firmly convinced that it is possible to evaluate the treaty properly and objectively only if it is viewed as a whole which balances the interests of the sides and which have been weighed ever so scrupulously on the scales of political realities. This treaty serves the interests of both sides equally. I am certain that at this moment as the treaty leaves our hands, we are still immersed in the details that we had to negotiate through the night of July 28 and on into the early hours of July 29. And I ask myself: Do I understand the entire significance which the treaty will have in human history? Do I see all the long-term consequences that its implementation will entail?

I attempted above to answer these questions insofar as it would be possible here and now at the closing plenary session. In any case, during the entire time of our long and complicated talks we always held steadfast to the premise that the treaty’s primary goal should be to free people from mutual fear, from suspicion, and from the pernicious waste of incredibly vast amounts of resources aimed at mutual destruction.

The concluding of the START treaty is a great contribution to this noble effort. But this is not the end of the road. Just a year ago the top leadership of our two countries agreed to conduct further negotiations on nuclear and space arms and on furthering strategic stability.

Today, I wish to express deep appreciation to Ambassador Linton Brooks, head of the U.S. delegation, and to the entire U.S. component for their efforts to create a business-like and friendly negotiating atmosphere. The same sentiments apply in equal measure to Ambassador Richard Burt, former head of the U.S. delegation.

This is especially important when we take into account that in the framework of the negotiations now coming to an end we were able to resolve extremely sensitive national security issues requiring both consistency and firmness of us. Naturally, this almost always led to heated debate and sometimes even quarrels—at times serious ones. But we always managed to find a way to understand each other and from there we moved on.

Many of us developed warm and friendly relationships with our U.S. colleagues. This bears out the breakthrough in the U.S.-Soviet relationship and augurs well for the future.

By initialing the first U.S.-Soviet treaty on the reduction of strategic arsenals today, we are truly making history. I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Ambassador, as well as all of those on both sides who worked on the treaty, on this achievement. (End text of statement)

Initialling of the Treaty

9. Ambassador Nazarkin completed his statement at 11:32 a.m. And proposed that he and Ambassador begin initialling of the treaty. After initialling the first page of the two English and two Russian copies of the treaty, Ambassador Nazarkin and Ambassador Brooks exchanged the pens used for that purpose. The Ambassadors stood, exchanged the pens, and shook hands to the applause of the delegations, guests, and press.

Presentation of Statements

10. A short interlude followed during which representatives of the mass media were excused and Ambassador Nazarkin informed Ambassador Brooks that there was some confusion as to what was the correct version of the Joint Statement on Weapons Storage Areas. The Ambassadors agreed that the Joint Statement on Weapons Storage Areas would be exchanged later and appended to the negotiating record. (Comment: The U.S. side had inadvertently included an obsolete text. The correct statement was exchanged later that day and is included below. Subsequent to the plenary Ambassador Nazarkin delivered a unilateral statement on subtunnels. See Reftel. End comment.) Following the interlude, Ambassador Nazarkin presented the Soviet side’s joint and reciprocal statements and Ambassador Brooks responded with the same statements. Ambassador Brooks then presented the U.S. side’s unilateral statements. The following are the joint statements:

(Begin text of joint statements)

A. Joint statements

Joint Statement on New Missile Production Technology Processes

The parties agree that:

(a) Procedures for elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the protocol on procedures governing the conversion or elimination of the systems subject to the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms have been agreed upon taking into account the fact that, in manufacturing stages for such missiles, both parties currently use the technology of casting the solid propellant directly in the case of the solid rocket motor so that the cured propellant cannot be removed non-destructively.

(b) If in the future either party begins to produce stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, employing so-called “insertable cartridges” or any other technology that allows non-destructive removal of solid propellant from motor cases, that party shall inform the other party thereof at the next session of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The parties shall decide within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission what, if any, additional verification and elimination procedures are necessary, taking into account the new technology for manufacturing missiles.

Joint Statement Regarding Data Updates with Respect to Categories of Data Contained in the Memorandum of Understanding

The parties agree that, for any facility or item not listed in the memorandum of understanding under paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a notification, in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, or 3 of Section I of the notifications protocol relating to this treaty, shall be provided according to the complete list of the appropriate categories of data set forth in the memorandum of understanding or in the agreement on exchange of geographic coordinates and site diagrams relating to the treaty, regardless of the party to which such categories pertain. In this connection, due consideration shall be given to those changes that may be made in the above-mentioned categories of data pursuant to the relevant procedure provided for in the memorandum of understanding.

Joint Statement on Costs Related to the Convening of a Session of the JCIC on the Territory of One of the Parties

In connection with paragraph 3 of Section II, Section VI, and paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the parties agree that if they decide to convene a session of the commission on the territory of one of the parties, questions that may arise concerning the settlement of costs that may be incurred in connection with such a session shall be resolved prior to the convening of that session.

Joint Statement on the Ban on Support Equipment at Eliminated Facilities

The parties agree that, with respect to the ban on support equipment at eliminated facilities in paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, support equipment includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, training models of missiles, transporter-loaders of mobile ICBMs, storage cranes, launch-associated support vehicles, and driver training vehicles.

Joint Statement on Narrow Directional Beaming

The parties agree that the ban on broadcasting telemetric information from ICBMs or SLBMs using narrow directional beaming, pursuant to subparagraph 2(c) of Article X of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, is established in order to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals.

Joint Statement on the Term “Ton”

The parties agree that the English words “metric ton” and the Russian word “ton” mean 1,000 kilograms.

Joint Statement on Charter Flights

The parties agree that in order to facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, questions concerning the use of chartered flights, if necessary for the transport of inspectors, monitors, equipment for the conduct of inspections, and equipment and supplies for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities shall be considered in the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Joint Statement Concerning Currency of Payment for Costs Relating to Implementation of the START Treaty

The parties note that the issue of currency of payment for costs relating to implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is not yet resolved and shall be deferred, without prejudice to the position of either party, for subsequent consideration in a broader context with respect to both the treaty and to other U.S.-Soviet agreements in the area of arms limitations.

Joint Statement Concerning Interpretive Data

The parties understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section II of the telemetry protocol relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are necessary to verify compliance with provisions of the treaty.

The parties also understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the telemetry protocol shall not apply to parameters not specified in that subparagraph.

Joint Statement on Weapon Storage Areas

The parties agree that the formulation “weapon storage area” as used in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms means a location, shown on a site diagram, for the long-term and short-term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear armaments. Such locations shall be depicted on site diagrams of facilities subject to inspection pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of the inspection protocol.

Joint Statement on Exchange of Site Diagrams

Recognizing the importance of the exchange of site diagrams to guarantee reciprocal rights in respect to suspect site inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities listed in Annex I to the memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a data base relating to this treaty that are subject to suspect site inspection shall meet the criteria in Annex J to the memorandum of understanding. The parties agree that facilities or portions of facilities that are involved in the production of solid rocket motors shall not be subject to inspection. The parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities subject to suspect site inspection shall be exchanged no later than 30 days after the date of signature of the treaty.

Joint Statement in Connection with Procedures for Confirming Launch Weight

The sides understand that, in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section XIV of the inspection protocol, they assume the obligation to agree within the JCIC procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs with the purpose of confirming the launch weight of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in launch weight before the beginning of deployment of any such new type of ICBM or SLBM. The parties further understand that they are obligated to negotiate such procedures in good faith, and without efforts to artificially hinder agreement on such procedures so as not to delay the deployment of such an ICBM or SLBM.

B. Reciprocal Statements:

U.S. Statement on Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information

The U.S. side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the treaty, the parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the treaty. In this connection, the U.S. side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the agreement between the governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20–23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the memorandum of understanding regarding the establishment of the data base for the treaty of December 8, 1987. The U.S. side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the treaty.

Soviet Statement on Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information

The Soviet side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the treaty, the parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the treaty. In this connection, the Soviet side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the agreement between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the memorandum of understanding regarding the establishment of the data base for the treaty of December 8, 1987. The Soviet side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the treaty.

Statement of Policy by the United States of America Concerning Encryption and Jamming

The United States of America, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the treaty. The United States of America declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the treaty, whichever is sooner.

Statement of Policy by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Encryption and Jamming

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the treaty, whichever is sooner.

U.S. Statement on Launch-Associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles

The U.S. side has taken note of the Soviet side’s statement and believes that such information would be helpful in discussing compliance concerns when and if such concerns are considered in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Statement by the Soviet Side on Launch-Associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has vehicles in its inventory that resemble launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles. In the event that a compliance concern arises because of the presence of such a vehicle at an eliminated facility, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will either provide information on the features of such vehicles that distinguish them, by national technical means of verification, from launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles, or provide clarification about what the vehicle is and the reason for its presence at the eliminated facility.

U.S. Statement on Non-Circumvention of the START Treaty

The United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, except with the United Kingdom. The United States attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace. As a result, the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. This is what we have referred to as “the existing pattern of cooperation” between the United States and the United Kingdom. It currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapons system. In this regard, the United States endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that “the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States.”

Soviet Statement on Non-Circumvention of the START Treaty

The Soviet side takes note of the statement, made by the United States in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between the USSR and the U.S., to the effect that the United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the START treaty, except with the United Kingdom.

It also notes the statement made by the U.S. side to the effect that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union also takes into account the fact that the United States of America endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that “the British Strategic Force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States.”

If the United States were to alter its existing pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom on strategic offensive arms in such a way that the terms and purposes of the START treaty would be circumvented and the strategic balance altered, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider its supreme interests jeopardized. In that case, in accordance with Article XVII of the treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider that it has the right to withdraw from the treaty.

U.S. Statement on the SS–N–23

Paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the throw-weight protocol describes the method for determining the throw-weight of “ICBMS or SLBMs, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.” The U.S. side understood that this method for determining throw-weight was negotiated specifically to address design characteristics that are unique to the RSM–54 SLBM, known to the U.S. side as the SS–N–23. However, the Soviet side now asserts that the throw-weight of the SS–N–23 should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of the throw-weight protocol. The Soviet side also informed the U.S. side that the accountable throw-weight of the SS–N–23, 2800 kg, was determined on the basis of the 1(b) method.

While the U.S. side believes the SS–N–23 is of 1(a), not 1(b), design; for purposes of calculating throw-weight, the U.S. side accepts the SS–N–23 as a type 1(b) SLBM. However, the U.S. side stresses that this acceptance is without prejudice to our right to contest in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission the throw-weight values of any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporates a design similar to the SS–N–23, if such throw-weight values are based on the 1(b) method.

Soviet Statement on the SLBM SS–N–23

In connection with the U.S. statement on the SLBM SS–N–23 (RSM–54) the Soviet side confirms that the throw-weight of that missile should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of Section I of the throw-weight protocol to the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, since in terms of its design the SLBM SS–N–23 does not belong to missiles, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

In this connection, the Soviet side states that there is no ground for raising an issue related to determining the throw-weight pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the throw-weight protocol for any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporated a design similar to the SLBM SS–N–23 (RSM–54).

U.S. Statement on Attachment Joints

With respect to the inclusion of the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex G and H to the memorandum of understanding, the attachment joints used on bombers belonging to the United States of America are of a design that allows the attachment of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. In the U.S. view, such armament attachment joints are inappropriate for use as specified features that make heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Further, since such armament attachment joints are installed on airplanes belonging to the United States of America other than heavy bombers, their presence is not sufficient to consider an airplane to be a heavy bomber.

Soviet Statement Concerning the Purposes of Inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of Data on the Distance Between Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

The Soviet side makes the following statement concerning the purposes of inclusion in the memorandum of understanding of data on the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Noting the importance of verification of the provisions of the treaty relating to counting the number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers, the Soviet side states that the technical data “distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs to pylon, measured on pylon” and “distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCM to launcher” are included in annexes G and H to the memorandum of understanding in order to confirm the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of a type, category, and, if applicable, variant, is equipped.

The Soviet side agrees that, since the design of attachment joints used on heavy bombers of the United States of America is such that it permits the suspension of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear arms, joints for attaching weapons shall be considered as a non-mandatory distinguishing feature for categories of heavy bombers listed in Sections (II) and (III) of Annex G to the memorandum of understanding.

C. Unilateral statements by the U.S. side:

Unilateral Statement by the United States of America Concerning the B–2 Heavy Bomber

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to the B–2 heavy bomber. This statement will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and will be politically binding.

The United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B–2 heavy bombers for long-range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight-tested from a B–2 heavy bomber.

The United States of America recognizes that the first flight test of a long-range nuclear ALCM from a B–2 heavy bomber will require that: B–2 heavy bombers be exhibited pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the treaty; B–2 heavy bombers be subject to inspection pursuant to the provisions of the treaty; and all other provisions of the treaty that pertain to heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested apply to B–2 heavy bombers.

The United States of America recognizes that requirements under the treaty referred to in this statement will also apply with equal force to heavy bombers, both of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of any new type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested.

U.S. Statement on Underground Structures

The U.S. side believes that construction of any additional underground structures adjacent to waters in which ballistic missile submarines operate and comparable in size and configuration to the ones located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagel’ Naya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, would raise concerns regarding compliance with the obligation provided for in Article V, paragraph 26 of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. For its part, the United States does not have such underground structures, does not plan to construct and will not construct any such underground structures while the START treaty remains in force. The U.S. side proceeds from the premise that the Soviet side will exercise similar restraint.

(End text of statements)

11. The Ambassadors agreed that the texts of the statements would be included in the negotiating record as reflecting the positions of the sides. (Comment: The sides had previously agreed that all statements exchanged at the final plenary would be made public. End comment.) Having completed the agenda for the final START plenary, the sides adjourned at 11:52 a.m. to complete the preparation of the treaty for signature in Moscow.

12. Documents exchanged:

A. U.S. side: Text of Ambassador Brooks’ public statement; texts of joint, reciprocal, and U.S. unilateral statements.

B. Soviet side: Text of Ambassador Nazarkin’s public statement; texts of joint and reciprocol statements.

13. List of delegation attendees:

U.S	USSR
Mr. T.R. Sample	Mr. L.A. Masterkov
Dr. E.M. Ifft	Mr. V.V. Zharkov
Dr. N.M. O’Fallon	Gen-Lt N.N. Detinov
Mr. D.A. Jones	LtCol G.D. D’Yachenko
Bgen G.L. Curtin	Mr. G.A. Zaytsev
Mr. W.E. Furniss	Col V.S. Koltunov
Dr. J.L. Kangas	Mr. S.V. Kryuchkov
Dr. E.J. Dowdy	Mr. Yu. I. Roslyakov
Mr. T. Graham Jr.	Col S.L. Shemyakin
Mr. M.L. Brown	Mr. V.S. Artem’Yev
Ms. J. Zdravecky	Col M.V. Ashunin
Ms. C.F. Scott	Col V.V. Dmitriyev
Mr. E.P. Joseph	Col V.S. Dmitriyev
Mr. P.C. Lembesis	Mr. B.R. Ivanov
Mr. M.J. Biedlingmaier	Mr. V.A. Kazakov
Ms. S.A. Bowling	Mr. G.F. Kalinkin
LtCol B. Brown	Mr. A.A. Kardashev
Mr. J.A. Canty	Col A. Ya. Kirilyuk
Capt R. Crosby	Mr. M.A. Lebedev
Lt P.G. Davis	Capt A.G. Perlovskiy
Mr. R.S. Dean	LtCol A.N. Pronin
Col J.A.E. Engelbrecht	Mr. A.V. Zvezdin
Mr. P.A. Foley	Mr. V.P. Dronov
Mr. J.W. Garrison	Mr. A.A. Ikonnikov
LtCol S.L. Harris	Mr. A.A. Nikolayev
Maj C.B. Haver	Mr. Ye. N. Pronin
Mr. R.C. Heath	Mr. N.S. Razgonov
Mr. R.B. Leeds	Mr. Ye. A. Tikhomirov
LtCol J.D. Luetkemeier	Ms. I.P. Tsyurupa
Ms. B.A. Meyer	Col D.V. Trenin
Mr. P.J. Persiani	Gen-Maj A.S. Peresypkin
Capt C.C. Petersen	Mr. V.L. Katayev
Lt R. Pierson	Mr. E. A. Ashratov
Mr. R.R. Ringenberg	Mr. S Boyarshchinnov
Ms. L.F. Rusten
Mr. S.R. Schless
Mr. B. Seward
Dr. P.L. Sholl
Ltc K.K. Siemon
Mr. S.A. Solomon
Maj R.B. Smith
Col J.D. Swahn
LtCol G.K. Vankeuren
LtCol F.E. Waller

14. List of statements included in final START plenary

Joint Statements:

— Statement on New Missile Production Technology Process;

— Statement Regarding Data Updates with Respect to Categories of Data Contained in the Memorandum of Understanding

— Statement Related to the Convening of a Session of the JCIC on the Territory of One of the Parties

— Statement on the Ban on Support Equipment at Eliminated Facilities

— Statement on Narrow Directional Beaming

— Statement on the Term “Ton”

— Statement on Charter Flights

— Statement Concerning Currency of Payment for Costs Relating to Implementation of the START Treaty

— Statement Concerning Interpretive Data

— Statement on Weapon Storage Areas

— Statement on Exchange of Site Diagrams

— Statement in Connection with Procedures for Confirming Launch Weight

Reciprocal Statements:

— U.S. Statement on Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information

— Soviet Statement on Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information

— U.S. Statement of Policy Concerning Encryption and Jamming

— Soviet Statement of Policy Concerning Encryption and Jamming

— U.S. Statement on Launch-Associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles

— Soviet Statement on Launch-Associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles

— U.S. Statement on Non-Circumvention of the START Treaty

— Soviet Statement on Non-Circumvention of the START Treaty

— U.S. Statement on the SS–N–23

— Soviet Statement on the SLBM SS–N–23

— U.S. Statement on Attachment Joints

— Soviet Statement Concerning the Purposes of Inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of Data on the Distance Between Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

Unilateral statements by the United States of America:

— Unilateral Statement by the United States of America Concerning the B–2 Heavy Bomber

— U.S. Statement on Underground Structures

Brooks

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910778–0128. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.
2. See Document 243.
3. July 31.