235. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
08069.
Geneva, July 22, 1991,
1637Z
SUBJECT
- START: Brooks-Nazarkin Luncheon, July 17, 1991
- 1.
- This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-381. Secret—Entire Text.
- 2.
- Meeting Date: July 17, 1991
- Time: 1:00 p.m.–2:30 p.m.
- Place: Chateau de Genthod, Geneva
- 3.
- Participants:
U.S.
- Amb. L.F. Brooks
USSR
- Amb. Yu.K. Nazarkin
- 4.
- Brooks said that some Soviet advisors had suggested that the treaty might not actually be signed at the summit. Brooks wished to make clear that the U.S. position was to complete and sign the treaty. Nazarkin said he understood.
- 5.
- Brooks said he wanted to do final conforming and printing of the joint compliance and inspection protocol and the throw-weight protocol over the coming weekend. Brooks proposed a schedule to make this feasible. Nazarkin took the schedule, but made no comments.
- 6.
- Brooks said that the U.S. side was awaiting a Soviet response to the latest U.S. conditions for allowing launch of ICBMs or SLBMs from airplanes into space. Brooks urged Nazarkin to have the Soviet proposal killed, stating that it was unlikely to be the basis for agreement.
- 7.
- Brooks told Nazarkin the U.S. side could accept 4350 kilograms as the throw-weight cutoff for defining a heavy ICBM or SLBM.
- 8.
- Brooks told Nazarkin that the U.S. side preferred to use actual solid propellant ballistic missiles during exhibitions, rather than inert missiles. Brooks noted that the use of live missiles had originally been a Soviet preference, but that, in Washington, the Soviet side appeared to back away from this preference. Brooks asked Nazarkin to ascertain the actual Soviet position. Nazarkin said he would do so.
- 9.
- Brooks said that, since the Soviet side had rejected the proposed trade of making Khabarovsk a point of entry in return for payment in hard currency, the U.S. side proposed to defer the issue of currency of payment. Nazarkin said he did not have authority from Moscow to accept deferral, but would check with Moscow.
- 10.
- Brooks told Nazarkin that he had checked on an assertion Nazarkin had made the previous day concerning the memorandum of understanding (MOU). Nazarkin had claimed that the U.S. side had taken some peacekeeper missiles out of the MOU. This was not correct. Nazarkin thanked Brooks for the clarification.
- 11.
- Nazarkin asked for a summary of the U.S. position on MOU confidentiality. Brooks said that, in the initial draft of the separate agreement listing coordinates and site diagrams, the U.S. side had included the detailed specifications for site diagrams previously found in Annex J of the MOU. On reflection, the U.S. side had concluded that, while the actual site diagrams should remain confidential, the requirements for them belonged in the treaty. The U.S. side thus proposed moving the original Annex J language back into Annex J. Brooks said this should pose no problem for the Soviet side. Nazarkin agreed, saying that the Soviet side simply needed to understand the U.S. position.
- 12.
- Nazarkin and Brooks agreed that the U.S. side would prepare an updated paper on the subject of submarine tunnels and Anderson Air Force Base.
- 13.
- Nazarkin said he was worried about Annex 9 to the inspection protocol and asked if that annex could be dropped or deferred for consideration in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Brooks said that, at a minimum, the portions on which agreement had been reached should go into the inspection protocol (IP). The two agreed to return to the subject at a later date.
- 14.
- Nazarkin asked what the acronym “STARS” stood for. Brooks said he would find out.
- 15.
- Brooks referred to a proposal Nazarkin had made the previous day for the sides to make identical statements obligating themselves to refrain from acts which would defeat the objects and purposes of the treaty prior to its entry-into-force. Brooks asked where such a statement would be made. Nazarkin said the statement would be made in Geneva. Brooks said that he could agree to such an exchange of statements.
- 16.
- Nazarkin said that the decision on the Soviet JCIC commissioner had not yet been made. The two candidates were Ambassador Masterkov and Soviet delegation member Kryuchkov. Brooks said the U.S. side would probably name Ambassador Steven Steiner, the special verification commissioner. Brooks explained that the U.S. believed it important that the approaches to the two treaties be the same and wished to draw on the expertise Ambassador Steiner had gained during the three years of INF implementation.
- 17.
- Nazarkin briefly mentioned follow-on negotiations. Nazarkin said he assumed there would be a recess in the START talks of at least half a year. The sides needed, however, to determine what next steps to take in strategic offensive arms, as well as determining how to meet [Page 1109] the 1990 summit obligation for the defense and space talks to continue without interruption. Brooks said the U.S. side had, as yet, given little thought to follow-on strategic arms negotiations.
- 18.
- Brooks said that he was worried about the ability of the sides to complete their work. He asked whether Nazarkin had authority to reach agreement in Geneva. Nazarkin said he had such authority with respect to language, but not with respect to the substance of positions. Brooks asked if Nazarkin had received instructions following the Washington ministerial. Nazarkin said he expected those instructions to arrive with General Peresypkin and Mr. Ashratov, who were due to arrive from Moscow later in the day.
- 19.
- Documents exchanged: copy of Brooks’ talking points on preparation of the JCIC and throw-weight protocols.2
Brooks