Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

236. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

8574.

Geneva, August 5, 1991, 1506Z

SUBJECT

• START: Brooks-Nazarkin Coffee, July 18, 1991

1. This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-403. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting Date: July 18, 1991

• Time: 11:45 a.m.–12:45 p.m.
• Place: Relais de Chambesy Restaurant, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

• Amb. L.F. Brooks

USSR

• Amb. Yu.K. Nazarkin

4. Brooks noted that some members of the Soviet delegation had asked whether follow-on negotiations would be discussed at the summit. Brooks was authorized by Washington to state the following: First, the U.S. Government stood by the 1990 joint summit statement. Second, the summit had just been announced and the agenda was still under development. If the Soviet side wished to raise questions about follow-on negotiations in Moscow, it should indicate that fact through diplomatic channels as part of the preparations for the overall meeting. Naturally, the United States would be prepared to discuss the subject. Third, given the workload on the delegations in Geneva, the U.S. Government did not propose there be any discussion of follow-on negotiations in Geneva before the summit.

5. Nazarkin asked for confirmation that there would be no discussion of follow-on negotiations in Geneva before the summit. Brooks said Nazarkin was correct. Brooks asked that his information be passed on to Moscow. Nazarkin said he would do so.

6. Brooks proposed discontinuing the use of pages with asterisks to represent agreement on only part of a package. Brooks noted that the foreign ministers had agreed that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed, and that maintaining two sets of pages was a burden on translators and typists. Nazarkin said he agreed, but would give final approval after discussion with his delegation.

7. Brooks proposed a final plenary on Friday, July 26, to exchange the various statements now being developed. Brooks stressed that this would be a “no surprises” event. Nazarkin agreed.

8. Brooks said that one subject on which the U.S. side would wish to make a statement at the final plenary was the SS–N–23 SLBM. Brooks reviewed for Nazarkin the history of negotiations concerning this SLBM, which the U.S. side believed was a Type 1(A) missile under the throw-weight protocol, but which the Soviet side claimed was a type 1(B) missile. Brooks said the U.S. side had accepted the Soviet throw-weight calculations based on the SS–N–23 being treated as a 1(B) missile, but wished to make a statement to preserve its rights to raise issues in the joint compliance and inspection commission over the throw-weight of future, similarly designed, ICBMs or SLBMs. Brooks then handed over a copy of the draft U.S. statement.² Nazarkin said he would discuss the subject with his experts.

9. Nazarkin asked when the two sides would sign the various letters which were to accompany the START treaty. Brooks said his preference would be to do so before leaving for Moscow, probably at the same time the treaty was initialed, but that it might be necessary to sign them in Moscow.

10. Brooks noted that there was agreement between the sides on a numbering scheme for annexes to the inspection protocol and to the memorandum of understanding. This numbering scheme would speed production of the final treaty by allowing the printing of individual annexes.

11. Brooks said he would provide a paper on a solution to the issue of submarine tunnels and Andersen Air Force Base. The paper would be based on discussions in Washington. Nazarkin said he would study the paper when received.

12. Brooks and Nazarkin agreed on the need for a meeting later that lay on the subject of launcher and canister distinguishability. Brooks said it was important to understand the Soviet position. Nazarkin complained that the Soviet side did not understand the U.S. position. Brooks promised to study Article III, paragraph 6 before the meeting.

13. Nazarkin asked for clarification of Brooks’ current proposal with regard to currency of payment. Brooks said that the U.S. offer to accept hard currency in return for shifting the Asian point of entry to Khabarovsk remained on the table. Since the Soviet side rejected this approach, however, Brooks proposed (a) leaving Ulan Ude as the Asian point of entry, (b) dropping the Soviet paragraph requiring payment in convertible currency, and (c) including in the final plenary reciprocal statements saying that the question of currency of payment would be solved in broader context after treaty signature. Nazarkin said he thought such a solution would work and hoped to have authority to accept it by Monday, July 21.

14. Nazarkin said the Soviet side had problems with the U.S. management regime for retired and former ICBMs and SLBMs. Nazarkin asked if such missiles could not simply be treated as non-deployed missiles. Brooks said that this was, in essence, the U.S. proposal and asked for specific problems. Nazarkin said he was not certain of the exact problems, but promised to provide them to Brooks later in the day.

15. Returning to a discussion held the previous day, Nazarkin asked if Brooks could drop the U.S. proposal for treaty language allowing more than one storage building at a monitored facility. Nazarkin said that, because of bureaucratic considerations in Moscow, gaining approval would be time-consuming. Perhaps the U.S. side could simply make a unilateral statement that it would raise the issue in the joint compliance and inspection commission. Brooks said he would consult with his delegation and return to the subject later that day.

16. Nazarkin said that Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov, Soviet technical expert Katayev, General Ladygin and Colonel Koltunov would arrive Sunday. Brooks said that, while he was sure such luminaries would be of great assistance, it appeared that what the Soviet side needed was translators. Nazarkin agreed and said he hoped that translators would also arrive. Nazarkin said that he would propose that Obukhov maintain general supervision, but not get involved in the types of details that Brooks and Nazarkin had discussed that day. Brooks said the U.S. side would adapt to any Soviet organization which helped get the job done.

17. Documents exchanged: Draft U.S. statement on SS–N–23 SLBM.

Brooks

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Baker-Nazarkin Memcons 1991. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Brooks; cleared by Kangas; approved by Brooks.
2. Not found.