Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

234. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

7944.

Geneva, July 18, 1991, 1412Z

SUBJECT

• START: Irregular Sitrep #1, July 17, 1991

1. Secret–Entire Text.

2. As I discussed during the ungroup meeting on July 15, I will, from time to time, be sending you personal sitreps on progress in Geneva. This is the first, as of close of business July 17.

3. Obukhov and Koltunov have not returned and there is no firm date for them to do so. Nazarkin claims Koltunov’s absence will not preclude working throw-weight and telemetry. I am skeptical. Peresypkin and Ashratov did return, apparently bringing elements of common ground and instructions.

4. I agreed to drop the exchange of draft site diagrams due to workload.

5. I’ve told the Soviets that we want to kick the can on hard currency since they rejected our deal. Nazarkin says he lacks authority to remove the paragraph requiring such payment. Since, in theory, we agreed to kick the can on this months ago, I smell a rat. If the provision isn’t dropped by early next week, I will recommend a demarche in Moscow.

6. I have agreed to have both sides make the following identical statements in our final plenary.

Begin text:

For the purpose of contributing to the implementation of the agreements under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/the United States of America undertakes to refrain, on the basis of reciprocity, from any acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, beginning from the date of its signature and until its entry into force or until one of the parties shall have informed the other party of its intention not to ratify the treaty.

End text.

I will probably suggest changing “undertakes to refrain, on the basis of reciprocity to “affirms that it will, as required by international law and on the basis of reciprocity”, but will live with the statement as is if necessary. The statement simply restates the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and is similar to statements we have made in the past.

7. The Soviets agreed to one meter wide personnel exits at facilities subject to continuous monitoring. We agreed to two road exits.

8. I agreed to the following package deal:

A. Mandatory extension of baseline and new facility inspections of road mobile bases to allow time to complete the inspection. (our position)

B. No requirement to split into subgroups for baseline and new facility inspections of road mobile bases. (our position)

C. Verification that one silo at a test range, chosen from among those declared to be empty, actually is empty. (their position)

D. If there are no ICBMs at a base and a side elects to inspect anyway during RVOSI, it counts as against the annual quota. (their position, but trivial)

E. Use of GPS to verify positions during RVOSI, using the precautions we proposed in June. (our position)

F. Annual quotas of 15 data update inspections, three formerly declared facility inspections and ten reentry vehicle inspections, with no increase for downloading.

G. PPCM starts 30 days (instead of the 45 they wanted) after entry into force. (our position, but trivial)

H. Six day separation between START inspections and INF inspections at the same SS–25 base. (basically their position, although they wanted 12 days)

I. No separation between two START inspection or two INF inspections at the same SS–25 base. (our position)

J. No counting a single inspection at the same SS–25 base under both START and INF. (our position)

9. For Steve Steiner. Six day separation between START inspections and INF inspections at the same SS–25 base isn’t as bad as you think. START limits us to two inspections a year at any one base. Thus the maximum a base could be sheltered from inspection is 12 days a year if we do multiple inspections at one base, which, with 15 quotas for 75 facilities, we probably won’t do. Getting GPS and adequate time for road-mobile baseline seemed worth it.

10. Gary Curtin has asked for updated technical data for annex F of the MOU. Need it ASAP.

11. Rapid turnaround of informal guidance requests has been a big help and a big morale booster.

12. Overall situation: Soviets (and most of us) stunned by thought of finishing in 13 days. Soviets saying the right things, but not clear they can move paper fast enough. More when we know more.

Brooks

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910687–0119. Secret; Immediate.