233. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
7911.
Geneva, July 17, 1991,
1646Z
SUBJECT
- START: Brooks-Nazarkin Coffee, July 16, 1991
- 1.
- This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-374. Secret—Entire Text.
- 2.
- Meeting Date: July 16, 1991
- –
- Time: 4:30 p.m.–5:30 p.m.
- –
- Place: Relais de Chambesy Restaurant, Geneva
- 3.
- Participants:
U.S.
- Amb. L.F. Brooks
USSR
- Amb. Yu.K. Nazarkin
- 4.
- Summary. Brooks reviewed the events of the just-concluded July 11–14 Washington ministerial and provided a copy of the elements of common ground from that ministerial. Nazarkin made suggestions to expedite the final two weeks of negotiations. Nazarkin said Moscow could accept ten reentry vehicle inspections, with no additions for downloading. At Nazarkin’s request, Brooks agreed to drop his proposal to exchange draft site diagrams. Nazarkin said he was instructed [Page 1102] to suggest that the sides undertake an obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and the purpose of the treaty after signature but before ratification. End Summary.
- 5.
- Subject summary. Organizational issues; Bear D exhibitions; reentry vehicle inspections; MOU issues; PPCM issues; relationship between INF and START; acts defeating the object and purpose. End Subject Summary.
Organizational Issues
- 6.
- Brooks reviewed the events of the just-concluded July 11-14 Washington ministerial and provided a copy of the elements of common ground from that ministerial. Brooks said that the U.S. side would be tabling implementing language as soon as possible. Nazarkin said the Soviet side had received neither instructions nor a debrief from the ministerial. Nazarkin did not expect Obukhov or Koltunov until at least the coming weekend. Brooks stressed that treaty drafting could not be held up awaiting Koltunov’s return. Nazarkin agreed.
- 7.
- Nazarkin made a number of suggestions to help organize and expedite the final two weeks of negotiations. He proposed dropping large meetings and, where possible, simply exchanging documents by courier. Nazarkin noted that the Soviet side had asked for more translators, but was currently understaffed.
- 8.
- Nazarkin proposed expanded two-on-two meetings focusing on the various treaty documents. Nazarkin suggested starting with the inspection protocol (IP) the following day. Nazarkin also proposed creation of two ad hoc sub-groups. The first, consisting of Shemyakin, Polyakov, Dowdy and Brown, would deal with Annexes 1–7 and Annex 13 of the inspection protocol. The second, consisting of Lebedev, Perlovsky and Haver, would deal with Annexes 8–12. These groups could meet following the initial two-on-two. Brooks and Nazarkin could subsequently meet to confirm their work. Brooks said he would discuss the subject with his delegation and be in touch shortly.
- 9.
- Nazarkin suggested a detailed review, in a similar two-on-two format, of the notifications protocol. Brooks proposed this be done the next Saturday.2 Nazarkin agreed.
- 10.
- Nazarkin said that he was aware that the U.S. delegation did not like working with Mr. Zaytsev. In turn, the Soviet delegation had doubts about finishing the treaty if Dr. O’Fallon continued to lead the IP effort. It would be necessary, Nazarkin continued, to deal with this situation. Brooks said that the U.S. side regarded O’Fallon highly and that he could not agree to any approach which detached her from her inspection protocol responsibilities.
- 11.
- Nazarkin said he had instructed his delegation not to worry about whether or not there were asterisks on pages. Brooks said that he expected to be in a position to propose formally the deletion of asterisked pages later in the week. The two ministers had made it clear that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed, and there was no need to further document that fact by the use of asterisked pages.
- 12.
- Nazarkin said that Soviet legal advisor Kalinkin was reviewing the various exchanges of letters and side agreements and hoped shortly to be in a position to discuss the topic with U.S. legal advisor Brown. Brooks said he would pass this on to Brown. Brooks urged that Kalinkin also expedite his preparations for conforming the protocol on the joint compliance and inspection commission. The document needed to be printed in the next few days. Nazarkin agreed.
Bear D Exhibitions
- 13.
- Brooks said that there would be one significant problem with side letters. The new Soviet position on Bear D exhibitions would cause considerable problems. Nazarkin said that he was aware of the potential problems. Nazarkin recalled that he had asked Brooks about the letters in question shortly before the Washington ministerial. It was Nazarkin’s belief that the text had not been agreed. Brooks said that Nazarkin was correct, but noted that there had never been any hint from the Soviet side of the new positions presented in Washington. Brooks further noted that inspecting all B–1s was a Soviet request, just as inspecting all Bear D’s was a U.S. request. Brooks had not, however, heard any suggestion that the Soviet side would pay for such inspections. Nazarkin said that he took the point.
Reentry Vehicle Inspections
- 14.
- Brooks asked whether Moscow had approved the use of the global positioning system (GPS) during reentry vehicle inspections. Nazarkin said Moscow had not. Nazarkin then asked if Brooks had given further thought to a possible trade in this area. Brooks said he could agree to ten reentry vehicle inspections, with no additions for downloading, in return for Soviet acceptance of the GPS. Nazarkin said that the Soviet side could accept ten inspections, but not the explicit trade of inspections for GPS.
MOU Issues
- 15.
- Nazarkin said that the U.S. side, while agreeing to exchange of site diagrams 30 days after signature, also proposed exchanging draft site diagrams in advance. This would delay work, Nazarkin asserted. Brooks said he would be prepared to drop the U.S. proposal, but asked for time to consult with Curtin before doing so.
- 16.
- Nazarkin asked why the U.S. side had deleted eleven non-deployed rail-mobile peacekeeper ICBMs from the memorandum of understanding. Brooks said he was unaware of any deletion and would look into the subject. (Comment. Nazarkin was wrong. End Comment.)
PPCM Issues
- 17.
- Nazarkin asked about the number of road exits at monitored facilities, asserting that the sides had agreed on two road exits of one meter width for personnel exits. Brooks said that Nazarkin was correct, but noted that Moscow had rejected the agreement. If Nazarkin could agree to those figures, Brooks was prepared to agree as well. Nazarkin said he believed that he could agree.
Relationship between INF and START
- 18.
- Nazarkin said he wished to raise the relationship between INF and START. Brooks said that he could accept the Soviet proposal not to have simultaneous inspections. He might be able to accept a few hours’ period between inspections to avoid overlap. The Soviet position of no inspections within 12 days was, however, unacceptable. Further, the U.S. side would not accept the Soviet proposal to have a single inspection count under both START and INF. Nazarkin said the two should discuss the issue when they reviewed inspection protocol issues. Brooks agreed.
Acts Defeating the Object and Purpose
- 19.
- Nazarkin said he was instructed to suggest that the sides undertake an obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and the purpose of the treaty after signature but before ratification. Nazarkin provided the text of a possible statement to this effect.3 The Soviet proposal, Nazarkin continued, was based on the Article XVIII of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In response to Brooks’ question, Nazarkin said there were no specific acts the Soviet side had in mind. The idea came from Moscow lawyers, not Moscow political officials. Brooks said he would study the issue and consult with delegation lawyers.
- 20.
- Documents exchanged: English language copy of Washington ministerial elements of common ground. Soviet proposed statement on refraining from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
Brooks