Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

232. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva (Brooks) to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva¹

July 15, 1991

SUBJECT

• Washington Decisions

While I was in Washington, I met with the UNGROUP and got a number of decisions.

Specific Issues

The UNGROUP made the following decisions:

1. We have authority to culminate the Andersen AFB/Sub Tunnel Deal that was offered in Washington. Our preferences, in order, are our Agreed Statement, their Agreed Statement, the unilateral statements.

2. We have authority to tell the Soviets that our offer to swap hard currency for Khabarovsk remains on the table but that we will defer currency issue until after signature and accept Ulan Ude in the interim.

3. We won’t challenge the Soviet decision to call the SS–N–23 a type 1(b) missile. We won’t make any tracking fixes. We’ll make a statement in the final plenary (Furniss to draft) that we consider that the SS–N–23 should be a type 1(a) but that we accept it as a type 1(b) without prejudice to our ability to raise issues in the future.

4. We will accept 4350 kg (throw-weight of SS–19) as the cut-off in the heavy SLBM/heavy ICBM definition.

5. We will tell the Soviets we want to verify dimensions only on live missiles. We can accept that if they can. If they balk, we’ll phone home. Photographs of U.S. SLBMs will be inert missiles; can’t have a live missile with a shroud horizontal.

6. We can accept 10 reentry vehicle inspections a year with no increase for downloading.

7. We can accept either one or two cooperative measures after an operational dispersal (and no inspections). If the Soviets balk, we can accept nothing.

8. We can require roofs of fixed structures for road mobile ICBMs to be openable.

9. Furniss has the mandatory SSI site diagrams. We can discuss with the Soviets. We can show them the sample Soviet diagrams we want. Sample is to do this.

10. We thought the Soviets had agreed to a one time exhibition of all BEAR D. Now they say (a) only valid before signature; thereafter we just get to see one and (b) we pay, hard currency. Cost is $20K for the base in the European USSR, $142K for the base in the Asiatic USSR, and $152K for both. We are to try to get them off this and phone home if we can’t.

11. On stub silo launchers, we can: (a) give Soviets the list and coordinates of the stub launchers they haven’t declared, (b) tell them it will be a big flap if they violate their agreement and don’t declare, (c) offer to avoid the flap by dropping the requirement if they will accept our swimmer delivery vehicle Agreed Statement.

12. We won’t seek provisions in the treaty for random selection of missiles/stages for exhibition. We will seek a peg to allow raising this in the JCIC. O’Fallon is to draft such a peg.

General Procedures and Authority

Since we are to finish in two weeks, I have been authorized to settle all issues without reference to Washington except:

Those relating to PPCM, SSI, stage dimensions and telemetry

Space launch from airplanes

Distinguishability (only if I can’t get old and new launchers and launch canisters distinguishable by NTM)

RV sized objects on front section

Anything that removes restrictions on NDM-limited retired ICBMs

Verification of silos by GPS

Accepting any Soviet walkback on fixed structures.

Accepting ALCMs as “treaty-limited items.”

For everything else, I have been given the following instructions: “Get it done; tell us how it came out.” This includes the authority to jettison all IP equipment annexes if the Soviets won’t agree to them.

Effective now, we are out of the RFG business. For things I have to go to Washington on, I’ll E-mail something back, get a phone response from NSC, and follow-up with a cable later. Tim will put out details of how this will work.

We will probably drop asterisked pages. I will check with Washington after the London meeting. Baker and Bessmyrtnykh agreed that everything is a package.

The delegation should plan on remaining in Geneva for about 10 days after signature to finish MEMCONS. In return, we will not worry about timely MEMCONs until after signature.

1. Source: Department of State, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation Subject Files, 1983–2005, Washington Ministerial July 10–16, 1991, Result of Ministerials. Secret.