Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

214. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

5758.

Geneva, May 22, 1991, 1007Z

SUBJECT

• START: Brooks-Nazarkin Coffee, May 21, 1991

1. This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-109. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting Date: May 21, 1991

– Time: 10:05 a.m.–11:00 a.m.

– Place: Relais de Chambesy Restaurant, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

• Amb. L.F. Brooks

USSR

• Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin

4. Brooks said that he had received only sketchy reports from ongoing discussions in Washington between General Moiseyev and various U.S. officials.² As Brooks understood it, a START working group had been formed which had discussed new types, ALCMs, and data denial. Brooks had been told that, in that working group, Colonel Koltunov had objected strongly to the U.S. ALCM position. Brooks asked if Nazarkin could elaborate.

5. Nazarkin said he was not aware of the specific issues Koltunov had raised. The Soviet side, however, did not intend to reopen any settled ALCM issues. Thus, Nazarkin presumed that Koltunov was referring only to unresolved issues.

6. Brooks asked the travel plans of deputy minister Obukhov. Nazarkin professed not to know when or if Obukhov would return to Moscow. (Comment: Other Soviets had suggested Obukhov would leave in early June. End comment.)

7. Nazarkin asked Brooks how long it would take to finish their work if CFE were resolved. Brooks said that, with the exception of data denial, he thought three to four weeks was feasible. Data denial was more complex and Brooks was reluctant to speculate, given the continuing difficulty Washington was having in establishing a U.S. position. Brooks then asked Nazarkin to assess the mood on the Soviet delegation.

8. Nazarkin said that, as other Soviets had made clear, the Soviet side was discouraged by U.S. inability to engage. Nonetheless, Nazarkin continued, he personally remained hopeful. The sides had already solved such enormously difficult issues as heavy missiles, SLCMs, and ALCMs. The remaining issues were nothing in comparison to what had already been accomplished. Nazarkin said that what was necessary now was for the U.S. side to show some movement. The Soviet side had additional flexibility in its instructions, but was not authorized to employ it until there was movement on the U.S. side. (Comment: Nazarkin did not specify the area of additional flexibility; Brooks had the impression it was general. End comment.) In Nazarkin’s view three to four weeks would be enough time to complete the treaty, possibly including data denial if the U.S. side accepted the Soviet approach.

9. Brooks recalled a suggestion Nazarkin had made the day before that new types of mobile ICBMs not have their warhead attributions lowered. Nazarkin clarified that the Soviet suggestion had referred to new mobile ICBMs which were considered new types only because of the throw-weight criterion. Brooks said that, while the suggestion was helpful, he did not believe that, standing alone, it would resolve the new types issue. Thus, Brooks recommended Nazarkin not submit the proposal to Moscow until the sides could craft a comprehensive solution to new types. The Soviet idea might well form an element in such a comprehensive solution. Nazarkin agreed.

10. Brooks referred to Richard Pipes’ recent book (“The Russian Revolution”) on the Soviet Union. Nazarkin said he had not read the work but had heard excepts of it broadcast over Radio Liberty. He found them very interesting and was looking forward to the opportunity to read the book.

11. Nazarkin expressed Soviet disappointment over the departure of NST special assistant Catherine Scott, commenting that the Soviet side believed she had been both pleasant to deal with and quite effective. Brooks said that he and Nazarkin were in complete agreement on this point but that Scott would continue to be involved in START issues with her new responsibilities in Washington.

12. Documents Exchanged: None.

Brooks

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Baker-Nazarkin Memcons 1991. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Brooks; cleared by Kangas; approved by Brooks.
2. Reference is to Soviet Chief of the General Staff General Mikhail Moiseyev, who was in Washington May 20–21 to negotiate outstanding U.S.-Soviet differences over the CFE Treaty.