Office of the Historian

213. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1

5711.
Geneva, May 21, 1991, 1339Z

SUBJECT

  • START: Brooks-Nazarkin Coffee, May 17, 1991
1.
This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-099. Secret—Entire Text.
2.
Meeting Date: May 17, 1991
–
Time: 10:00 a.m.–10:50 a.m.
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Place: Relais de Chambesy Restaurant, Geneva
3.
Participants:

U.S.

  • Amb. L.F. Brooks

USSR

  • Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin
4.
After discussing organizational issues briefly, Brooks and Nazarkin turned to a brief discussion of throw-weight as part of the new types definition. Brooks said that his discussion with Obukhov2 had left him confused. It was clear that the Soviet side did not like the U.S. suggestion to combine an increase in throw-weight with a 15 percent increase in first stage volume. It was unclear, however, whether the problem was the concept of volume or the value of 15 percent. Nazarkin said that Soviet instructions did not cover volume at all and that the Soviet side was simply trying to understand the U.S. approach and report it to Moscow.
5.
Nazarkin said the Soviet side had been surprised by the U.S. reaction to its new types proposal. The idea of a throw-weight change plus a 5 percent change in length had been suggested to the Soviet side by Assistant Secretary Hadley. The Soviet side therefore had anticipated quick U.S. acceptance of this proposal.
Brooks said that he was unaware of such a suggestion having been made. If Secretary Hadley had, in fact, made such a suggestion it was as part of a brainstorming session and was not intended as a formal or informal U.S. proposal. By now, Brooks continued, Nazarkin must realize that U.S. negotiators frequently offered personal suggestions that, upon further analysis, proved infeasible. Brooks said that the U.S. side was still studying the Soviet approach, although, as he would discuss during a more formal session that afternoon, the Soviet proposal in its present form was almost certainly too loose to be acceptable.
6.
Brooks then turned to the notification of the flight testing of a new kind of strategic offensive arm. He recalled that Nazarkin had said that he would have some thoughts on this subject. Nazarkin said he was not yet ready to make a specific proposal but that he hoped to be able to do so in the future. (Comment: The Soviet side objects to waiting one year after initial flight testing prior to receiving a new kinds notification. It claims this delay could result in insufficient time for JCIC deliberation. End comment.)
7.
Nazarkin said that Colonel Koltunov would return to Moscow the following day to join the party accompanying the Soviet chief of general staff Moiseyev to Washington. Brooks said that the U.S. side did not anticipate significant discussion of START during the upcoming meeting. The best thing that could be done next week to facilitate START, Brooks continued, was to resolve the CFE issues. Nazarkin said that Koltunov was accompanying the party because he was also the general staff expert on the Vienna talks. (Comment: This is a new insight and very difficult to believe. Koltunov is stretched very thin in covering his START responsibilities. If he is also a CFE expert, he is superhuman. End comment.)
8.
Brooks informed Nazarkin that he had that morning announced the selection of Mr. Timothy R. Sample as his new deputy. Nazarkin asked Brooks to convey the congratulations of the Soviet side to Mr. Sample.
Brooks
  1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Baker-Nazarkin Memcons 1991. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Brooks; cleared by Kangas; approved by Brooks.↩
  2. See Document 212.↩