Office of the Historian

215. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1

5919.
Geneva, May 24, 1991, 1629Z

SUBJECT

  • START: Brooks-Nazarkin Coffee, May 23, 1991
1.
This is NST/START MEMCON-XV-M-120. Secret—Entire Text.
2.
Meeting Date: May 23, 1991
–
Time: 10:00 a.m.–10:45 a.m.
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Place: Relais de Chambesy Restaurant, Geneva
3.
Participants:

U.S.

  • Amb. L.F. Brooks

USSR

  • Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin
4.
Brooks referred to an informal suggestion Nazarkin had made the previous day on the time to transport inspectors for reentry vehicle inspections. Nazarkin had suggested three hours for submarine bases and rail garrisons, eight hours for ICBM silos, and five hours for restricted areas, with an agreed list of specific restricted areas requiring more time. Stressing that he was speaking personally, Brooks said, he thought this approach had promise. Once Nazarkin was ready to propose it formally, Brooks said, the U.S. side would be ready to react promptly and constructively. Nazarkin said he was still seeking authority to make the proposal.
5.
Brooks noted that Nazarkin had indicated that the Soviet side was working on a package proposal involving inspection quotas, size of inspection teams, mobile ICBM call back provisions, and the frequency of changes to the list of inspectors and monitors. Brooks asked if Nazarkin could preview Soviet thinking. Nazarkin said he could not, and in turn asked for Brooks’ views. Brooks urged that the Soviet side not reopen the issue of inspection quotas. On the other three issues, Brooks continued, U.S. flexibility might be possible.
6.
Nazarkin asked why the U.S. side needed the ability to update lists of inspectors every 15 days. (Comment: The U.S. position is 15 days; the Soviet position 30 days. End comment.) Brooks said he did not know and suggested that the sides look at the INF treaty to see what provisions were included. Nazarkin said that the standard time for issuing visas in the Soviet Union was three weeks, implying that a compromise of three weeks might be possible.
7.
Brooks asked why the Soviet side remained so obdurate about use of the global positioning system (GPS). Nazarkin said he was not completely sure, but the Soviet military appeared to believe that GPS receivers could collect data, not just simply record locations.
8.
Brooks asked Nazarkin when the Soviet side would have information on production units. Nazarkin said he did not know.
9.
Brooks noted that the current work on using throw-weight in the new types definition had led some in Washington to examine new types agreed criteria. In particular, Brooks said, some were concerned that a relatively small change in launch weight would be difficult to verify. The fact that the U.S. side was reconsidering requiring verification of stage and missile weights was, in part, due to the question of launch weight. Stressing, once again, that this was a personal inquiry, Brooks asked if the launch weight criterion was important to the Soviet side. Perhaps, Brooks speculated, it would make sense to drop that criterion. Nazarkin said he would check with his technical experts. Speaking politically, however, he was reluctant to reopen agreed language with respect to new types.
10.
Nazarkin raised the subject of a possible break in negotiations during the summer. Brooks said that it was his personal view that if a summit were scheduled, the sides would need to remain in continuous session until the summit. It was fine to say that the sides should complete their work and then break until the summit, but in real life that was not the way things worked. No matter when the summit was scheduled, the sides would negotiate up to the last minute. Nazarkin agreed.
11.
If, however, there were no summit, Brooks continued, or if the summit came too early to allow completion of START, then a break would make sense. Brooks thought, however, that it would be extremely dangerous for the sides to break without a firm resumption date. Some on the Soviet side had suggested a break “until the U.S. side sent a signal it was ready for serious negotiations.” It would be very dangerous, Brooks said, for the sides to return to capitals and then each wait for the other to send a signal. Nazarkin agreed. Nazarkin said that Soviet problems with hard currency were behind the pressure for a break. Brooks stressed that the best thing would be to finish the treaty and get it signed.
Brooks
  1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Baker-Nazarkin Memcons 1991. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Brooks; cleared by Kangas; approved by Brooks.↩