212. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
5637.
Geneva, May 17, 1991,
1638Z
SUBJECT
- START: Brooks-Obukhov Dinner, May 15, 1991
- 1.
- This is NST/START MEMCON-XV-M-094. Secret—Entire Text.
- 2.
- Meeting Date: May 15, 1991
- –
- Time: 7:00 p.m.–9:00 p.m.
- –
- Place: Obukhov’s Apartment, Soviet Mission, Geneva
- 3.
- Participants:
U.S.
- Amb. L.E. Brooks
USSR
- Min. A. A. Obukhov
- 4.
- Summary: Brooks reviewed the results of his recent trip to Washington, stressing U.S. interest in prompt START completion once CFE was resolved. Obukhov said these political reassurances were welcome but should be matched with practical steps. Obukhov was negative on either using throw-weight plus volume in a new types definition or attempting to deal with specific missiles separately. Obukhov claimed U.S. attempts to get dates on which the maximum throw-weight of existing types was demonstrated were an attempt to “calibrate U.S. NTM.” End summary.
- 5.
- Subject summary: U.S. attitude toward START; Stage dimensions; new types; PPCM/SSI; throw-weight information; CFE meetings in Washington; final complaints; and follow-up phone call. End subject summary.
U.S. Attitude Toward START
- 6.
- Obukhov invited Brooks to dinner following the latter’s return from a brief trip to Washington. Obukhov said he was anxious to learn the results of the trip.
- 7.
- Brooks said that he had seen Secretary Baker while in Washington.2 Brooks had told the Secretary that the Soviet side had shown renewed interest in making progress since the resumption of negotiations. As evidence, Brooks had cited Obukhov’s presence in Geneva, Soviet proposals (generally helpful) on three major issues, and the rapid turn around time in responding to proposals in Moscow. Brooks had acknowledged [Page 1039] to the Secretary that, at the moment, Moscow was responding more rapidly than Washington. Brooks had also noted, however, that the Soviet side had made it clear that in early June a reassessment would be conducted. If the Soviet side concluded that the U.S. side was not serious, the Soviet side, for both political and financial reasons, would reconsider whether continued negotiations were desirable.
- 8.
- In response, Brooks continued, Secretary Baker had said that both he and the president were committed to completing START this summer. The removal of the obstacles now blocking CFE implementation, was, however, a prerequisite. The U.S. side could not be expected to sign START while there was still a question as to whether signing treaties with the Soviet Union meant anything. Clearly, the Soviet side needed to understand that it could not retroactively alter the plain meaning of a signed treaty. Once CFE was resolved, however, Secretary Baker seemed confident that START would move rapidly.
- 9.
- Obukhov said that he was heartened by what Brooks said, but that the Soviet side needed not just political rhetoric but practical results. The Soviet initiative had been aimed at closing issues. The U.S. side, however, seemed intent on reopening issues and raising complex problems. For example, the U.S. side had reintroduced characteristic length, though not using the term. The U.S. approach would require disassembling of Soviet missiles at great cost. Obukhov was worried about the amount of technical detail included in U.S. proposals.
Stage Dimensions
- 10.
- Brooks said that the U.S. side had responded constructively to Soviet proposals on stage dimensions. The U.S. side had, in essence, accepted the Soviet approach. The only extra thing the U.S. side had asked for was data on the diameter of upper stages for missiles where upper stages have different diameters than first stages. Obukhov might not be aware, Brooks said, but the Soviet side had provided such data on the SS–13 and SS–25 as part of the MOU data exchange in November. This suggested that the data was not sensitive. Brooks urged Obukhov to look at the U.S. response.
- 11.
- Obukhov repeated his concern with characteristic length. Brooks said that if length were to be used to determine whether something was or was not a new type of missile, it was necessary to be precise about how it was measured. Under the earlier characteristic length approach, the U.S. side proposed using prints and drawings to agree on appropriate measurement points for each type of missile. Now, the U.S. side had drastically simplified the approach by specifying end dome to end dome measurements. The Soviet side said it was interested in measurements from end dome to nozzle. Thus, Brooks concluded, the [Page 1040] sides agreed that the points between which length was measured must be specified; they simply disagreed on what those points should be.
- 12.
- Obukhov said that he could not understand the problems with the Soviet approach. Brooks noted that a stage could be as short as four meters. Five percent of that would be only 20 centimeters. It was not technically difficult to redesign nozzles so that they were 20 centimeters longer. Thus a side could create a “new” ICBM simply through a nozzle change. This would undermine the treaty.
New Types
- 13.
- Brooks suggested that the two sides were working at cross purposes. The U.S. side was trying to craft a sound general new types definition. In contrast, Brooks believed that the Soviet side was trying to protect a specific missile or missiles now under development. Perhaps the sides could craft a good general rule and then deal separately with certain systems which were under development. Obukhov said that he did not believe it would be useful to look at such an approach. He would not specify why.
- 14.
- Obukhov said that the Soviet side had been disappointed by the U.S. proposal to use volume as a new types criterion. 15 percent volume change was much too great. It would be much better to continue to explore a solution based on throw-weight plus a length change. The Soviet side could only accept a change that was close to five percent. Brooks asked if the problem was the concept of volume or the value of 15 percent. Would the Soviet side be able to accept volume if a lower number were used, for example, 10 percent? Obukhov said that his instruction only mentioned five percent in length and gave him no flexibility. It was his view that volume approach made no sense. He could not sell such an approach in Moscow. (Comment: Obukhov was not clear on whether the problem was volume or 15 percent. He kept rejecting the concept of volume, but using as his reason that 15 percent was too great. End comment.)
PPCM/SSI
- 15.
- Brooks said that the new Soviet proposals on PPCM and SSI were being reviewed in Washington. It would naturally take some time to determine whether or not the facilities the Soviet side proposed could be made available for mandatory suspect site inspection. Brooks’ discussions in Washington, however, had indicated that Washington was not prepared to evaluate the PPCM portion of the Soviet proposal without more information on production units.
- 16.
- Obukhov said that U.S. interest in production had been reported to Moscow. The best way to get the information the U.S. sought was to give constructive responses to Soviet proposals. In this [Page 1041] regard proposing 15 percent volume changes did not help, and proposing a smaller volume change would not be any better.
Throw-Weight Information
- 17.
- Brooks said he would like to make a personal proposal. The Soviet side objected to saying whether the throw-weight of the SS–N–18 was based on tests with seven or three warheads. The Soviet side had, however, asked a similar question about Poseidon. The Soviet side also objected to giving dates on which maximum throw-weight was demonstrated.
- 18.
- Brooks could agree not to pursue the question on the SS–N–18, if the Soviet side agreed not to pursue the question on the Poseidon. In addition, with respect to the dates on which throw-weight was demonstrated, the U.S. side was principally concerned with three missiles. If the Soviet side agreed to provide dates of flight tests for those three, Brooks would agree, on an ad ref basis, to drop the request for the other dates.
- 19.
- Obukhov said that the Soviet side was not at all happy about exchanging data on past flight tests. Soviet experts believed the U.S. side sought this data to allow “calibration” of U.S. national technical means. Obukhov recalled that Brooks had objected to the Soviet suggestion that the U.S. side be compelled to explain how it used NTM to select sites for mandatory SSI. Obukhov had been sympathetic to U.S. concerns. The Soviet reluctance to provide information was based on similar logic. The Soviet side did not see any reason why it should help improve U.S. national technical means.
- 20.
- Nonetheless, Obukhov continued, he would report Brooks’ proposal to Moscow. It would help if Brooks could tell him the three missiles involved. Brooks said he would consider this question. Obukhov, later in the conversation, stressed his view that calibrating NTM for throw-weight would open a Pandora’s box and would be difficult for the Soviet side to accept.
CFE Meetings in Washington
- 21.
- Brooks said he was not planning to attend upcoming CFE discussions, despite suggestions from Moscow that START would also be discussed. The U.S. side was not planning to discuss START. The best thing that could happen for START would be to get CFE cleared up. Obukhov said he also would not attend, but that Ambassador Kvitsinsky would represent the Soviet foreign ministry. Obukhov had prepared general talking points on START but did not expect the subject to be discussed in detail.
Final Complaints
- 22.
- Obukhov asked if the U.S. side had anything new on telemetry. Brooks said he hoped to have something new during the coming week. Brooks reviewed the history of information exchange as it was related to telemetry. The Soviet side had sought such exchange; the U.S. side had rejected it. Now the U.S. side proposed such an exchange and the Soviet side rejected it. It would help, Brooks said, if Obukhov could try and find out the basis for the recent Soviet concern. (Comment: It is not clear Obukhov grasped this issue. End comment.)
- 23.
- Obukhov asked whether Brooks had a response to the proposed Soviet statement linking the ABM treaty and the START treaty. Brooks said he had not heard from Washington on the subject. Obukhov said that it was distressing that Washington was unable to respond. This called into question Brooks’ assertion that Washington was interested in finishing the treaty. Brooks stressed that Washington was actively engaged in working the various START issues.
- 24.
- Obukhov concluded the discussion stressing again the importance of not letting the opportunity to conclude START slip through the two sides’ fingers. Since the U.S. side was not able to respond on major issues, Obukhov suggested he and Brooks review other outstanding issues to see if progress could be made. Brooks said he would discuss that approach with his delegation and provide his thoughts the next time the two met.
Follow-up Phone Call
- 25.
- The following day Obukhov called Brooks and once again asked whether Washington had reacted to the proposed Soviet statement linking the ABM treaty and the START treaty. Brooks repeated that he had received nothing new on the subject. Obukhov said he was making a report to Moscow and was anxious to have the latest information. Brooks promised to contact Obukhov if he received instructions.
Brooks