Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

211. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

5347.

Geneva, May 10, 1991, 0845Z

SUBJECT

• START: Brooks–Nazarkin Lunch, May 7, 1991

1. This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-063. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting date: May 7, 1991

– Time: 1:00 p.m.–2:45 p.m.

– Place: Lion d’or Restaurant, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

• Amb. L.F. Brooks

USSR

• Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin

4. Summary: Brooks rejected Soviet attempts to lower the annual quota of reentry vehicle inspections, but agreed that the U.S. side would set forth the rationale for its rejection. Nazarkin said the Soviet side wanted notification of flight-testing of new kinds of strategic offensive arms far earlier than the one year the U.S. side proposed. Brooks answered a series of questions on operational dispersals; Nazarkin said the U.S. proposals made substantive sense but might cause bureaucratic problems. Nazarkin provided a list of outstanding issues; Brooks said he would do the same. Nazarkin implied that there was internal confusion over his role on the delegation given the semi-permanent presence of deputy minister Obukhov. End summary.

5. Subject summary: Washington responsiveness; inspection quotas; new kinds; Operational dispersals; issues list; and Nazarkin’s role. End subject summary.

Washington Responsiveness

6. Brooks, who had just come from a meeting with deputy minister Obukhov, reviewed his discussions with Obukhov, including Soviet complaints about the lack of responsiveness in Washington. Nazarkin asked why Washington was so slow. Brooks said that the remaining issues were technical and complex. As had been made clear during the recent visit by Senators Brown and Lugar, verification issues in the United States had major political overtones. Because of this, thorough review of these technical issues was necessary.

Inspection Quotas

7. Brooks reminded Nazarkin of an ad referendum agreement for 15 data update inspections, 10 reentry vehicle inspections, and three formerly declared facility inspections per year. The previous day Colonel Koltunov had argued that, because of the operational burden, the number of reentry vehicle inspections be cut to five per year. Brooks said his delegation had reviewed the Soviet proposal. The U.S. side had already made major concessions by dropping the percentage approach to inspection quotas. Further, ten reentry vehicle inspections per year was a fair compromise between the initial U.S. proposal (five) and the initial Soviet proposal (three). Five inspections per year were too few technically, especially since reentry vehicle inspections were the only method of verifying limits on deployed reentry vehicles. Further, Brooks continued, from the political standpoint five inspections was far too close to the Soviet going-in position. Brooks urged Nazarkin to tell Moscow that the U.S. side insisted on the full implementation of the ad ref agreement.

8. Nazarkin said that in order to convince Moscow, he needed counter-arguments. The U.S. side had listened to Koltunov’s arguments but had not explained in any detail the U.S. objections to a lower annual quota. Brooks said he would arrange for those explanations to be given.

New Kinds

9. Nazarkin raised the notification of the development of a new kind of strategic offensive arm. Although in December the sides had agreed to require such a notification within one year after an initial flight test, the Soviet side believed that period was too long. It was important to have the notification early enough so that the outcome of discussions in the joint compliance and inspection commission was not prejudged.

10. Brooks said that it was equally important to allow the testing side time to evaluate the results of a test prior to giving any notification. No useful purpose would be served by debating the wisdom of a new system which the developing side intended to cancel. Brooks noted that the U.S. side had originally proposed having a mandatory period between the notification and initial deployment. The Soviet side had rejected such a period on the grounds that mentioning deployment prejudged the issue.

11. Nonetheless, Brooks continued, if the issue could be closed out by dropping the notification to a period of several months after the initial test, he would be willing to consider such a solution. Nazarkin said the Soviet side sought a notification a few days after a test; Brooks said this was unworkable. Nazarkin then agreed to consult with his experts and propose a time frame for the notification.

Operational Dispersals

12. Drawing on the U.S. non-paper of April 25, Nazarkin asked a series of questions on operational dispersals:

• Q: Why did the U.S. side list specific requirements for road-mobile ICBM to return within deployment areas and for rail-mobile ICBMs to return to their garrisons when these provisions were already in the treaty?
• A: Operational dispersals authorized a side to ignore treaty restrictions on mobile ICBM locations. It was important that there be an obligation to resume these locational restrictions. Brooks was prepared to have the text of the treaty simply refer in general terms to the obligations of Article VI, rather than listing specific restrictions on mobile ICBMs.
• Q: Why did the U.S. side propose two different provisions concerning post-dispersal notification?
• A: The initial U.S. proposal had been for all notifications which should have been given during a dispersal to be given after the fact. On reflection, Brooks agreed with the Soviet concern that this would require sharing information on, for example, where rail-mobile ICBMs were located during crises. Brooks would be prepared to recommend that the treaty include only the second U.S. alternative; i.e., a consolidated status notification at the end of a dispersal.
• Q: Why had the U.S. side introduced a new proposal for two additional inspections following dispersals?
• A: Following a dispersal, it was important that the sides understand the status of the strategic forces of the other side. Otherwise they would lose the stability benefits of the entire notification regime. Inspections were one way of insuring confidence that the sides understood the status of forces. In addition, dispersals should not be undertaken lightly. The knowledge that a side declaring a dispersal would have to accept additional inspections, along with already agreed language stating that dispersals were intended to be rare events, would insure that a dispersal would not be declared for trivial reasons.
• Q: Why did the U.S. propose two additional inspections rather than some other number?
• A: The U.S. side sought a number as low as possible consistent with the objectives discussed earlier. Brooks would consider a different number if Nazarkin recommended one.
• Q: What was the purpose behind the so-called ‘‘reciprocity” provisions?
• A: If the U.S. side were to declare a dispersal, the Soviet side would be faced with a dilemma. It might not wish to declare a dispersal itself, since it might wish to defuse the situation. If no Soviet dispersal were declared, the Soviet side might wish to forbid U.S. inspections on the grounds of reciprocity. On the other hand, the Soviet side might wish to encourage such inspections to demonstrate that no abnormal events were occurring. No one could predict which course was best; thus the treaty should make both options available.

13. Nazarkin said Brooks’ explanations had been helpful. Referring specifically to additional inspections after dispersals he said he thought the U.S. case was sound. The only problems were bureaucratic, since the idea was new. Brooks agreed that the U.S. approach was new, but pointed out it had replaced an older approach of post dispersal inspections which would have applied only to mobile ICBMs. The new U.S. approach allowed each side to concentrate on the strategic offensive arms of greatest concern to it.

Issues List

14. Nazarkin then handed over a list of outstanding issues.² The two-part list included a summary of major issues and a more detailed list of issues grouped by treaty document. After a brief review Brooks raised the following questions:

• Q: The Soviet side listed submarine tenders and storage cranes as an issue. Why?
• A: This was a new issue the Soviet side intended to raise in the near future. (Nazarkin provided no other details.)
• Q: The Soviet side listed the size of deployment areas and restricted areas as an issue. Why?
• A: The Soviet side understood this was a U.S. problem associated with the memorandum of understanding. Brooks said he was unfamiliar with any such problem and would look into it.
• Q: The Soviet side listed the specification of deployed SLBMs at submarine production facilities as an issue. Why?
• A: The Soviet side understood that this, too, was a U.S. issue. Brooks responded that the only issue of which he was aware was U.S. concerns over Soviet failure to list any submarine production facilities.

15. Brooks then proposed the U.S. side review the list, and generate a list of its own. He suggested that following his return from London and Washington he and Nazarkin review the list in detail. Nazarkin agreed.

Nazarkin ‘s Role

16. Nazarkin said the internal situation in the Soviet delegation was somewhat confused. He was not always privy to Minister Obukhov’s plans. As a result, Nazarkin was simply trying to find areas in which he could be constructive. Brooks said that he did not wish to stop his practice of dealing with Nazarkin, since Obukhov was not familiar with many details of the treaty. Nazarkin urged Brooks to contact him at any time, saying that it was easy for Nazarkin to accept an invitation to meet with Brooks, but difficult for Nazarkin to initiate a meeting. Brooks said he would bear this in mind.

17. Documents exchanged: Soviet list of issues (English only).

Kangas

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Baker-Nazarkin Memcons 1991. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Brooks; cleared and approved by Kangas.
2. Not found.