Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

210. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

5200.

Geneva, May 6, 1991, 1850Z

SUBJECT

• START: Waiting for CFE

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. The first two weeks of round XV have been mixed. It is clear that the Soviets accomplished much more than we did during the break. As you know, Obukhov arrived with compromise proposals on the new types definition, the 40-percent rule and size criteria. We are eagerly awaiting Washington’s reactions to these. In the working groups, the Soviets have also been active in a constructive way. They have backed up their claim that they worked hard during the break by accepting a number of U.S. proposals outright and offering compromises on others.

3. On the U.S. side, the transition from Burt to Brooks has been smooth and the Brooks-Obhukov-Nazarkin triangle is operating well. I personally have had no contact with Obukhov thus far, so I cannot judge his mood. He has been slowed by a broken leg (tennis, not START). We do not know how long he will stay in Geneva, but I believe his presence here is a rough barometer of Soviet seriousness.

4. We understand, of course, how much CFE has hurt START and that the big START issues are not likely to receive serious consideration until the CFE problems are resolved. However, the failure of Washington to deal in a timely fashion with even quite straightforward RFGs on non-major issues is difficult to understand. As a result, the U.S. del has had very little to offer—an unfortunate fact which has been duly noted by the Soviets. In some case, (launcher type rule, cooperative measures), we have not even been able to accept Soviet acceptance of U.S. positions. It is our understanding—and we got a report to the effect that Baker and Bessmertnykh agreed on this at Kislovodsk—that there would be a push on START as soon as CFE is settled. It is important that we not allow this scenario to be undermined by a failure to keep moving forward on the second-and third-order issues as we wait for CFE. I continue to believe we can finish here in 4–6 weeks after the “go” button is pushed, but only if there are no major retrograde developments in the meantime.

5. There have been a number of indications that the Soviets continue to take seriously the joint commitment to sign the treaty at a summit “in the first half of this year.” Perhaps more important are the hints that, if this does not happen, financial and political considerations will cause a reevaluation in Moscow of the future of the negotiations. I believe there is an element of tactics and bluff at work here (finishing in July would not pose any problem), but we should by no means ignore these warnings completely. The strongest and most detailed explanation of all this can be found in my April 24 conversation with Roslyakov (Geneva 4958).² The U.S. del’s scenario for quite some time has been that, if we are not in endgame by mid-July, we would break until after Labor day and then try for success in the fall. Of course, this has not been discussed with the Soviets.

Launcher Type Rule

6. You have our RFG on this. The Soviets have accepted the U.S. position almost completely and we should not back away from it now. I admit that our RFG just before the break went a bit too far in questioning that position, but it would never have been drafted if we had thought the Soviets would buy our position completely. The JCS angst over possible challenges to the multiple capabilities of existing U.S. silos should be laid to rest by the agreed statement in which the Soviets agree not to do this.

Suspect-Site Inspections

7. Things seem to be evolving rapidly in the SSI area, and any comments I make could be made OBE quickly. In any case, a reasonable solution seems to be taking shape. Mandatory SSI would be absorbed into data update inspections, for which the quota will be 15 per year. The list of facilities to be included is far from settled, but it looks as though we can get the four Soviet ballistic missile facilities we asked for, but at the price of four U.S. ballistic missile facilities, for which we just today (May 6) received coordinates.

8. Right-of-refusal SSI would be handled by strengthening the JCIC protocol to make clear that the commission must convene within a specified period to deal with an extraordinary situation such as this, and making clear that OSI can be an outcome of the commission’s deliberations.

9. This solution would cause SSI as a separate category of inspections to disappear from the treaty. I doubt that this would bother anyone in Peoria, especially since right-of-refusal SSI is more likely to be the subject of ridicule than of praise. More importantly, we would also not actually be giving up anything of substance in the U.S. position. Nevertheless, because SSI was endorsed by two U.S. presidents and one Soviet president, you may wish to consider the matter further.

10. On another OSI issue, the Soviets have agreed to accept hard covers for inspections of SLBM RVs.

Former and Retired Types of ICBMs and SLBMs

11. The Soviets have begun asking some good questions about the management regime we propose for former and retired types. I thought this had all been worked out in the context of data denial, but was mistaken. We have been fighting internally over this for a week and will need help from Washington on what the U.S. position really is, at least for retired types. There is support here for simplifying things by handling former types outside the formal treaty regime—for example, in an agreed statement.

Production Units

12. The promised new information on the production units coming out of the Votkinsk and Pavlograd facilities has still not appeared. Perhaps we have convinced the Soviets this is very important and they are reviewing the solution they have in mind. Presumably they will try to convince us that “production units” are not “stages.” One helpful note is that Roslyakov told me that the solution they will propose could involve changes in Soviet production practices.

Weights and Measures

13. Progress has been made in this area as well. The Soviets are now willing to provide weights and dimensions for the first stages, and overall lengths, for all their ICBMs and SLBMs. Early exhibitions would be held for the SS–13, SS–24, SS–25 and SS–18. For all these, we would have access to real hardware to verify separate first stage and complete missile length. For all SLBMs (except the retired SS–N–17), we would have access to fully assembled missiles. As part of the deal, there would be no data or measurements on upper stages or self-contained dispensing mechanisms.

Rapid Reload

14. This continues to be a hard issue we would like to settle soon. The remaining problems concern the separations of space launch facilities, test ranges and training facilities. One possible compromise I have suggested would be to allow the Soviets to permit a space launch facility to be created out of an ICBM base, provided that:

— the entire base will be closed out except for an agreed number of launchers that could be retained for use as space launchers.

— the facility would be at least 100 km from other relevant facilities.

Pigs in Space

15. The Soviets, as expected, now say they want to be able to do work, in a third country, on ICBMs or SLBMs to be used for space launch from airplanes. They insist they would not transfer ballistic missile technology in the process. If our concerns are about non-proliferation, and if the Soviets wanted to transfer forbidden technology to Brazil, they could certainly do so more easily in the USSR than in the scenarios being discussed here. On the other hand, if our concerns are primarily commercial, we cannot expect the Soviets to close off commercial possibilities that the U.S. wants to pursue in slightly different guises.

Congress

16. Senators Lugar and Brown were here separately last week and were helpful with the Soviets. The Senate Observers Group is due here Memorial Day weekend.

17. I would like again to call attention to the proliferation of letters and other related undertakings outside the treaty which is going on here. Is Washington sure this will not create a ratification/constitutional problem?

Brooks

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910434–0545. Secret; Priority.
2. In telegram 4958 from NST Geneva, April 30, the Delegation to the Nuclear and Talks transmitted the memorandum of conversation for Ifft’s April 24 meeting with Roslyakov. (Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910415–0056)