Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

209. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

4870.

Geneva, April 26, 1991, 1349Z

SUBJECT

• START: Brooks–Nazarkin Coffee, April 25, 1991

1. This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-021. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting Date: April 25, 1991

– Time: 4:00 p.m.–4:30 p.m.

– Place: Rflais de Chambfsy Restaurant, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

• Amb. L.F. Brooks

USSR

• Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin

4. Brooks asked to see Nazarkin on short notice after receiving report that Inspection Protocol Working Group Chairman Zaytsev had said that the Soviet side continued to insist on the use of soft covers during reentry vehicle inspections. Brooks reminded Nazarkin that, immediately before the break, Nazarkin had said that he had convinced Moscow to accept hard covers. Based on this, Brooks continued, Washington was prepared, with modest modifications, to accept the agreement the sides had reached on reentry vehicle inspections. Brooks was anxious to know the true Soviet position, since a report of yet another Soviet reversal of position could derail the good impression made in Washington by the many forthcoming Soviet actions since negotiations had resumed.

5. Nazarkin said that it was good that the two were having this discussion in order to avoid misunderstanding. Nazarkin could state categorically that Zaytsev was not instructed to say that the Soviet side insisted on soft covers. Admittedly, Nazarkin continued, Zaytsev was not instructed to accept hard covers at this particular meeting. Nazarkin could assure Brooks, however, that the issue would be resolved as part of an unspecified “package.”

6. Brooks said that he took Nazarkin’s words as confirmation that Nazarkin had been successful in convincing Moscow of the utility of hard covers. Nazarkin said Brooks was correct. Nazarkin then pulled from his briefcase a thick document which he described as his instructions and said that he wished to be absolutely certain of what he had just said. After consulting instructions, Nazarkin confirmed that, as part of a package, hard covers would be accepted. Brooks said he appreciated this insight.

7. Nazarkin apologized for his frequent inability to meet with Brooks during the past few days. The Soviet side was consumed with internal organizational issues, Nazarkin confided. There was significant disagreement over who in the Soviet delegation was responsible for which issues. These organizational matters had consumed a good deal of Nazarkin’s time, especially given the absence of Ambassador Masterkov.

8. Brooks asked if the Soviet side would be prepared to discuss PPCM the following day. Nazarkin said he anticipated such a discussion would occur, but that he was uncertain in what forum Deputy Minister Obukhov would wish to conduct the dialogue. It was clear, Nazarkin continued, that Obukhov wished to keep control of the PPCM issue himself. Brooks said that, while he would work in whatever forum was most effective, it would be helpful if U.S. technical experts could be involved in any discussion of production units. Nazarkin said he understood.

9. Brooks reminded Nazarkin that the two had agreed to determine when and where the issue of right of refusal SSI should be discussed. Nazarkin said, that at least initially, he would prefer to keep discussion on this subject at the Brooks–Nazarkin level, rather than in the working group. Brooks said that he had been considering Nazarkin’s concern with the term “suspect site” inspections. Perhaps, Brooks said, the sides could use the term “challenge” inspection, a term used in other treaties. Nazarkin said that he had planned to make the identical suggestion.

10. Brooks said that he did not understand the Soviet concerns with right of refusal SSI, and thus was at a loss to suggest how to proceed. Nazarkin said that during the break he had failed to convince Moscow that there were no hidden traps in a right of refusal regime. Despite Nazarkin’s insistence that such inspections could only occur if the Soviet government allowed them to occur, Moscow appeared convinced that it would somehow be compelled to accept unwanted inspections which would compromise Soviet security. Brooks said the ability to refuse inspections was central to the U.S. approach. Clearly there were facilities in both countries where the presence of foreigners would be intolerable. Nazarkin said it would be helpful for Brooks to make that point in front of the Moscow experts. Brooks said he would do so.

11. Nazarkin recalled the approach the sides had taken with regard to inspections in third countries. In that case the sides had not used any term for inspections but had acknowledged that the JCIC could resolve concerns in a number of ways, not excluding inspections. Whether inspections were called “right of refusal” or “challenge”, they would be decided by the joint commission. Thus, Nazarkin continued, it might be possible to use the solution reached on third countries as a model for describing right of refusal SSI.

12. Brooks said that he would consider such an approach. Brooks noted, however, that there was a political commitment in the 1987 joint summit statement to SSI. It was important to the United States politically that the START treaty meet the standards established by the previous administration. Thus, while the name was unimportant, something that could be considered to meet the sides’ obligation to include provisions for inspection of suspect sites needed to be included in the treaty. Nazarkin said he understood. The two agreed to return to the issue early in the coming week.

13. Comment. The bound eight by ten folder which Nazarkin characterized as his instructions was quite lengthy. Nazarkin consulted page 43, which was only slightly over half-way through the document. It was not clear from the context whether these were new instructions or a consolidated set; in either case they were extensive. End comment.

14. Documents exchanged: none.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Baker-Nazarkin Memcons 1991. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Brooks; cleared by Kangas; approved by Brooks.