Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

208. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

4774.

Geneva, April 24, 1991, 1609Z

SUBJECT

• START: Brooks–Nazarkin Lunch, April 22, 1991

1. This is NST/START Memcon-XV-M-005. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting date: April 22, 1991

– Time: 1:00 p.m.–2:30 p.m.

– Place: Mere Royaume Restaurant, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.

• Amb. L.F. Brooks

USSR

• Amb. Yu. K. Nazarkin

4. Nazarkin asked how long Brooks thought it would require to complete the negotiations. Brooks said that the answer depended heavily on when CFE was resolved. Once CFE was resolved, it was Brooks’ personal view that a window would open which would allow the sides to make rapid progress. The task of the delegations now, Brooks continued, was to be ready for that time by having cleared the way on most minor issues. Nazarkin agreed.

5. Nazarkin said the mood in Moscow was generally good. There was widespread determination to finish the treaty. Naturally, this required efforts on both sides, but the Soviet side believed treaty signature this summer was well within reach. As an example, Nazarkin concluded, Wednesday or Thursday² of this week the Soviet side hoped to provide the U.S. side with information which would help resolve PPCM.

6. Brooks, noting a weekend conversation in which Soviet Adviser Kardashev had said that the Soviet delegation was planning to return to Moscow on June first, asked if Nazarkin could shed any light on this somewhat surprising assertion. Nazarkin said flatly that Kardashev was mistaken and that there were no instructions calling for such a return.

7. Nazarkin confirmed previous reports that Colonel Shemyakin would be spending substantial time on the inspection protocol. Nazarkin said that there were two reasons for this new assignment. First, the Soviet delegation had been reduced in size for fiscal reasons. Second, there had been an unusually high turnover in Soviet military advisers. Thus, Shemyakin’s experience would be particularly useful on inspection protocol issues. Brooks noted that the U.S. negotiating group generally had a very high regard for Shemyakin as a negotiator.

8. Brooks and Nazarkin agreed to direct their subordinates to produce an unbracketed definitions annex within a week and to concentrate on resolving differences in the notification protocol. In response to Brooks’ questions, Nazarkin said that the Soviet side would provide language on the notification of new kinds of strategic offensive arms during the first meeting of the notifications protocol working group. Nazarkin said he believed the U.S. side would be pleased with the Soviet language, but did not elaborate. (Comment. In a subsequent telephone call, Nazarkin asserted that the Soviet side had been told that the new kinds notification found in the notifications protocol had been modified by discussion between Brooks and Masterkov. Brooks said he recalled no such conversation and reaffirmed U.S. support for the formulation included in the March 4, 1991 notifications protocol page exchange. End comment.)

9. Nazarkin said that the Soviet side viewed mandatory SSI as an integral part of the PPCM/size criteria complex of issues and suggested that the sides deal with this subject in the context of PPCM. Brooks agreed. Brooks repeated his impression that the Soviet side would accept the U.S. proposal for facilities to be subject to inspection, but that it was attempting to determine what facilities it wished to ask for in return. Nazarkin said he thought this was, indeed, the case.

10. Brooks reminded Nazarkin of the history of right of refusal suspect site inspections (SSI). In February, 1991, the sides had produced virtually identical texts on right of refusal. Subsequently the Soviet side had indicated it had objected to any provisions requiring special sessions of the joint compliance and inspection commission (JCIC). Some Soviets had even suggested that the whole concept of right of refusal SSI be dropped. Brooks said his view was that this subject should be dealt with in the inspection protocol working group; Brooks wondered, however, if Nazarkin could shed any light on the Soviet position.

11. Nazarkin said the Soviet side had received the impression that the U.S. side was willing to drop right of refusal SSI. Brooks said this was not the case. Nazarkin said there was a problem in Moscow with the term “suspect site” inspection. The Soviet side did not rule out such inspections, but thought there might be a less pejorative way to describe them. Brooks said he would think about whether an alternative formulation might meet U.S. needs. The two agreed to return to the subject in the near future and to decide at that time whether it should be dealt with at their level or in the inspection protocol working group.

12. Brooks said that the U.S. side could confirm the agreement reached in March on inspection quotas, whereby the U.S. side dropped its proposal for percentages in return for Soviet acceptance of fifteen data update inspections, ten reentry vehicle inspections, and three formally declared inspections. Brooks noted, however, that he was under instructions to make clear that, if the number of facilities changed drastically in the future, the U.S. side reserved the right to reopen the question of the number of inspections. Thus, Brooks explained, if ten years from now there were only a handful of facilities, the United States might propose in the JCIC that the quota be reduced. If the number of Soviet facilities increased drastically, a larger quota might be appropriate. Nazarkin said he understood. In response to Brooks’ question, Nazarkin said that he could not yet confirm the agreement on inspection quotas, but that he hoped to do so in the future. Brooks urged Nazarkin to make clear to Moscow that the U.S. side had accepted the agreement.

13. Brooks said that he assumed that Nazarkin’s statement before the working recess that the Soviet side could accept hard covers for reentry vehicle inspections was still valid. If so, the U.S. side would be prepared to resolve the issue largely, though not exclusively, along the lines the sides had discussed in March. The two agreed that this issue could be resolved in the inspection protocol working group.

14. Brooks discussed the impending visits by Senator Lugar and the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. Nazarkin said that the Soviet people’s deputies were anxious to make a visit to Geneva when U.S. Senators were present. Brooks said that he would keep Nazarkin informed of the senators’ schedule, but cautioned that senate travel plans often were changed at the last minute.

15. Brooks recalled that at their March 19 lunch³ he had provided Nazarkin with talking points on why the Soviet side should shift its point of entry in the Asian portion of the Soviet Union from Ulan Ude to Khabarovsk. Nazarkin said his delegation had tried to gain Moscow’s approval of the U.S. request, but had been unable to do so. The problem was money. It would be more costly for the Soviets to transport an inspection team from Khabarovsk than from Ulan Ude. Brooks noted that the problem for the U.S. side was both fiscal and logistic. With a consulate scheduled to open in Khabarovsk and with commercial air service scheduled there, it would be far more equitable for the point of entry to be shifted. Nonetheless, Brooks said, he would report the Soviet response.

16. Nazarkin said that he realized that the U.S. delegation was not in a position to discuss data denial. However, the Soviet side continued to believe that Article X should be drastically simplified, and that the sides should “find another place” outside the treaty for the technical details. Colonel Koltunov was prepared to present the Soviet view, which had some new elements. Brooks said that he was more than willing to have his delegation meet with Koltunov, listen to the Soviet views, and ask questions. The Soviet side should understand, however, that, while the subject remained under review in Washington, Brooks was not prepared to engage in any substantive negotiations.

17. Nazarkin proposed that he and Brooks be in contact daily, but noted that it might not be possible to resume their former practice of daily coffees. “Because of the VIP people present in my mission,” Nazarkin said, “internal meetings are often scheduled on short notice”. The two agreed to consult at 10 a.m. each day to decide on a day-by-day basis whether to meet in person or speak by phone.

18. Nazarkin said that he proposed the two delegations generate and compare a comprehensive list of issues. This list might include those overarching issues, such as PPCM, which affect many treaty documents, but should also include specific issues remaining in each treaty document. Brooks noted that U.S. side had already begun the effort to generate such a list. The two agreed to attempt to be in a position to review the issues by the end of the week with the aim of agreeing on both what level the issue should be worked and which side had the lead.

19. Nazarkin said that Ambassador Lem Masterkov, who had remained in Moscow because of the illness of his mother, would probably arrive in Geneva on Saturday, April 27th. Nazarkin also said that many of the wives of Soviet delegation members, including his own, had remained in Geneva during the break. This was necessary since transportation for wives was paid for by delegation members themselves and Aeroflot had massively increased prices in recent weeks.

20. Nazarkin referred to the discussions between Brooks and Obukhov earlier that day, in which Obukhov had proposed new approaches to the issue of the new types definition and the forty percent rule on warhead attribution. Nazarkin said that it would be important to get responses to these as rapidly as possible, in order to send the signal to Moscow that the U.S. side was in fact ready to work issues. Brooks said that he understood the importance of the issues, but stressed that on these important subjects he wished to give a response that the U.S. side could stand behind.

21. Comment: Nazarkin seemed unusually well prepared and up to speed on the details of all issues, including those for which he had no indication that Brooks would raise. Nazarkin appeared fully informed of discussions between Brooks and Obukhov earlier that day.⁴ This fact, coupled with the apparently large amount of time being devoted to internal Soviet meetings, may suggest some improvement in internal coordination within the Soviet delegation. End comment.

22. Documents exchanged: none.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Baker-Nazarkin Memcons 1991. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Brooks, cleared by Kangas; approved by Brooks.
2. April 24 and 25.
3. In telegram 3439 from NST Geneva, March 20, the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks transmitted an account of the March 19 lunch between Brooks and Nazarkin. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy, Electronic Telegrams, D910272–0435)
4. In telegram 4792 from NST Geneva, April 24, the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks transmitted an account of an 11:30 a.m.–12:45 p.m. meeting between Brooks and Obukhov at the Soviet Mission. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910395–0556)