Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

207. Memorandum for the Record¹

Moscow, March 15–16, 1991

SUBJECT

• Experts’ Meetings in Moscow, March 15–16, 1991

1. This memorandum documents two meetings held in Moscow at the Osobnyak, concerning the structure of U.S. and Soviet forces in the late 1990s. The meeting was spawned from a two-on-two between Burt/Timbie—Obukhov/Moiseyev on March 15, regarding Downloading/SS–N–18.²

2. ATTENDEES: Over the course of the two days, the attendees for the U.S. side included: Brooks (chair), Hadley, Graves, Lehman, MacEachin, Sample, Weiner (Moscow Embassy), and Seymour (Int.). For the Soviet side, the attendees included: Nazarkin (Chair), Ladygin, Katayev, Koltunov, Khromov, Kryuchkov, Peresypin, Dimitryev, Ashunan, and Nickolyev (Int.). (Other Soviets were in attendance.)

3. On Friday³ evening, the sides met to begin discussion of future force structures. Brooks relayed his understanding of what Moiseyev had agreed to—that the U.S. side would provide an example of what it thought both U.S. and Soviet forces would look like in 1998, given the sides’ downloading positions. He passed out four charts (attachments 1–4)⁴ that covered projections for current Soviet forces, Soviet forces under the Soviet downloading scenario, the potential breakout capability for the Soviet side based on that downloading scenario, and for U.S. forces under a downloading scenario.

4. Brooks said that the U.S. side assumed that the Soviet side would retain most of its modern forces; keeping the six Typhoon and seven Delta-class submarines, continuing deployment of the SS–25 in a mobile mode, and counting the SS–N–18 with three warheads. In the downloading scenario, the U.S. side assumed that there would be no downloading of the SS–18 and, thus, the only systems left for downloading were the SS–24 and the SS–N–20, each of which were shown as having five warheads. Brooks explained the U.S. concerns regarding breakout and why RV OSI would not solve the breakout problem. Brooks then briefly discussed the U.S. forces, saying that the U.S. force levels would be the same under either downloading scheme. Therefore, the U.S. side had much less incentive for breakout in either case, whereas the Soviet side’s incentive would be much greater under the Soviet proposal.

5. The next morning, the Soviet side responded to the U.S. side’s presentation. Unfortunately, rather than providing reciprocal data, the Soviet side copied two of the U.S. side’s charts (attachments 5 & 6)⁵, adding both sides’ heavy bomber forces and showing the resulting breakout potential. Nazarkin commented on the fact that the U.S. side had left heavy bombers off the charts and said that the Soviet side saw linkage between the B–1 and B–2 with Downloading—as was agreed in Houston.

6. Ladygin gave the Soviet presentation, saying that, as a representative of the Soviet General Staff, the Soviet side did not go into an agreement with the intention of violating it. He referenced previous remarks by Brooks about the fact that the figures were estimates and emphasized that the charts on both sides were purely hypothetical. From this premise, the Soviet side had preserved the U.S. side’s calculations on ICBMs and SLBMs, including the three warhead attribution for the SS–N–18. He pointed out that, even though the Soviet side was accepting the U.S. side’s totals for the SS–N–18, the Soviet side had, at its peak, only deployed one-quarter of the SS–N–18 force with seven warheads. Furthermore, it had been more than six months since the Soviet side had had any seven RV SS–N–18 SLBMs. Ladygin also questioned the U.S. side’s entry of 488 “new SLBMs.” Brooks responded by saying that this calculation assumed that both sides would want to have as close to 4900 ballistic missile warheads as possible, and that such a difference would not have to be from a new SLBM—it could be from a modification of any existing ballistic missile, for example.

7. Turning to the Soviet chart on Soviet forces, Ladygin said that it should come as no surprise that heavy bombers had been added because the negotiations covered all strategic offensive arms. By adding these 137 platforms, the Soviet side could have 1096 additional warheads available for breakout, given the current ALCM counting rules. Consequently, by adding the breakout potential from ballistic missiles, the Soviet side would have 3052 warheads available for breakout.

8. Regarding U.S. forces, Ladygin said that the same principals were used. He said that the Soviet side fully recognized that the Trident-II SLBM was accountable for eight warheads under START, but the fact remained that it had been tested with 12 warheads and, therefore, when discussing breakout potential these additional warheads would have to be considered. He emphasized that the Soviet side was not saying that the U.S. side would implement such a tactic, but that this must be considered in the hypothetical situation of breakout. As a result, the U.S. side would have 2328 warheads available for breakout on ballistic missiles. When adding in heavy bombers—which amounted to a breakout potential of 4090 warheads—the U.S. side could have 6418 warheads available for breakout.

9. Ladygin then asked the rhetorical question, “Who should be more concerned about breakout under these conditions?” He said that it was clear that the Soviet side should be twice as concerned. He added that both sides could make many inferences from such “scholastic calculations.” However, both sides had real, vice hypothetical, concerns and the U.S. side should refrain from hypothetical arguments and do “real work.” He said that the combination of NTM and OSI would rule out a covert breakout scenario. Ladygin stated the Soviet side’s understanding that, in Houston and Washington, the trade-offs had been made between B–1, B–2, and Downloading/SS–N–18, and asked that the U.S. side work to finalize these agreements.

10. Brooks stated that the U.S. government did not agree with the Soviet side’s interpretation of the Houston agreements and that there were no agreements made on downloading. Regarding Ladygin’s suggestion that a side only signed a treaty in order to comply with it was an assumption. This was not to say that the U.S. side was questioning the motives of the Soviet side, but that there had been cases where treaties had not been followed and that if a nation could get an advantage by not following a treaty, it might not.

11. Brooks then stated that what the U.S. side had thought was to happen was that it would present an understanding as to what Soviet and U.S. forces could do under downloading and explain why it was worried. Then, the Soviet side would present its understanding and explain why the U.S. side need not be worried. The U.S. side had presented its numbers, which it thought was reasonable for both sides. The Soviet side had now presented its views of U.S. forces. Brooks added that he would be happy if Ladygin could guarantee that the U.S. side would have 75 B–2 bombers. Brooks said that, for the Soviet forces, however, the Soviet side had merely given him his numbers back. He told Ladygin that the Chief of the Soviet General Staff had agreed to present the Soviet side’s “reasonable plans.” Therefore, Brooks would take back to Washington that the Soviet side intended to download those specific missile systems shown and maintain the SS–N–18, and, by luck, Brooks had gotten all the figures right.

12. Specifically referring to downloading, Brooks said that he had heard three reasons in Ladygin’s presentation as to the justification of the Soviet downloading position. First, political—the sides don’t sign treaties with the intention of breaking them. Second, technical—the SS–N–18 could not be uploaded because of the design of the current front end section. Third, military—even if the Soviet side had some breakout potential, so did the U.S. side (Trident II and heavy bombers). Brooks stated that he did not think that Washington’s reaction would be good. First, Washington would not believe that Brooks was so brilliant that he had gotten all of the Soviet side’s plans right. What Washington would understand was the Moiseyev changed his mind or that someone didn’t follow his orders and, thus, the Soviet side didn’t come through with their numbers. In terms of the Soviet side’s explanation of why there should be no concern about breakout, the U.S. side had heard these arguments before and Washington would be unimpressed.

13. Nazarkin said that the sides were working under the premise that all numbers were hypothetical and that if the Soviet side had presented its views, the sides would have been working from different “planes.” He noted that this was obviously not to the U.S. side’s liking but that breakout potential—which hypothetically favored the U.S. side—would be better discussed in this fashion. Ladygin said that Brooks had mentioned the U.S. side’s view of Houston. He said that he had thought that Baker represented the U.S. government. The Soviet side believed that Houston had been agreed by Baker. The Soviet side had confirmed its part by implementing B–1 accountability.

14. Regarding the presentation, Ladygin said that if Brooks were to tell Washington that Moiseyev had changed his mind or that an officer hadn’t followed orders, he would mislead them. The Soviet General Staff had very disciplined officers that followed orders. In addition, if Brooks were to say that these numbers represented a realistic view of Soviet forces, he would mislead Washington further. Ladygin said that he was not in a position to tell the U.S. Congress to fund 75 B–2 bombers. Likewise, Brooks was in no position to influence the Supreme Soviet into funding the hypothetical Soviet force that Brooks had developed.

15. Ladygin emphasized that the land-based strategic missile force was the backbone of Soviet strategic nuclear potential. The SLBM forces would remain much smaller and Moiseyev had confirmed this. Ladygin said that he believed that the treaty would be signed and that both sides would be in full compliance. He said that neither he, nor anyone else in the room, would ever see 10 submarines with SS–N–23 SLBMs, however. He then opined that the sides should stick to real problems of getting the treaty done rather than creating “roadblocks” with hypothetical breakout scenarios.

16. Brooks said that, based on Ladygin’s comments it was clear that showing flexibility in Soviet SLBM forces was wrong. He had heard Ladygin say that an emphasis on land-based forces would continue in the future. He asked Ladygin whether it was correct to say that downloading was important to the Soviet side because of a desire to assure flexibility to maintain certain force levels.

17. Ladygin said that he had repeated what Moiseyev had said the previous day. The Soviet Union had made the decision to go back to a basic force that they were familiar with—a heavy reliance on land-based ICBMs. This decision had been made in the late 1980’s as part of a change in doctrine and future Soviet force structure would be based on such decisions. He repeated that the U.S. concern about the SS–N–18 was “groundless” and shouldn’t exist. All reentry vehicles, warheads, and “other parts” had been eliminated. Therefore, the number of warheads available for breakout could be reduced by 896, leaving only 1060 warheads available, hypothetically, from ballistic missiles. Comparing these totals to U.S. totals, the Soviet side should be twice as concerned and, when adding in heavy bombers, the Soviet side should be four times as concerned.

18. Brooks said that he had two final comments. First, it was up to each side as to what it showed for breakout potential, but the Soviet side should note that in 1987, the sides had agreed to attribute a certain number of warheads to each ballistic missile system, even though these attributions counted some systems with fewer numbers of warheads than they were capable of having. The U.S. side had not shown a breakout potential for the Trident-II, just as it hadn’t shown such potential for the SS–N–23. It was not prudent to go back to issues already decided.

19. Brooks’ second point was that the U.S. side had shown a reasonable assessment of where the Soviet side would get flexibility through downloading and how this would be used. Ladygin had said that the U.S. side should listen to the Chief of the General Staff because flexibility in naval forces was not the direction that the Soviet side was heading. Such comments were helpful. Brooks said that the sides were trying to solve the difficult issues of downloading and new types. It was very important that the Soviet side let the U.S. side know its plans and assumptions. At this point, the Soviet side was the only one that knew the U.S. side’s concerns and Soviet intentions. Now, the U.S. side was looking for solutions with “one eye closed.” Brooks said that he had hoped that the Soviet side would be more forthcoming in the future and would work hard to alleviate U.S. concerns and reduce fears.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Richard A. Davis Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01589–022, START Sub-Ministerial Experts—Washington, January 21, 1991 [2]. Secret. Drafted on March 22 by Timothy Sample, Special Advisor for Policy, NST Delegation.
2. No memorandum of conversation was found.
3. March 15.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. Attached but not printed.