198. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
US:
- The Secretary
- Dennis B. Ross (Notetaker)
USSR:
- Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
- P. Palazhenko (Notetaker)
[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]
Baker: Should I go on to START now and outline the issues that need to be resolved before we can wrap it up? In summary, it seems to me the key issues are bombers, downloading on the SS–18 missile, new types, PPCM, and data denial. What’s the best way to approach this so that the next time we can really move to wrap these things up or at least reduce the issues?
Bessmertnykh: Well since these things were discussed last week, I think quite a job has been done in terms of identifying the unsolved issues. In order to reach a solution, we need to do so in the framework of the entire package. We’re prepared to propose the following comprehensive approach. We are ready at this point to agree, subject to your agreement on all the other elements at Houston, to settle the B–2 bomber and here we would include a unilateral US statement that the US has no intention to equip the B–2 with a long-range nuclear ALCM prior to flight testing the plane with a nuclear ALCM. As of the time of the flight testing of long-range ALCMs on a B–2, they would then be subject to inspection and verification. This is consistent with Article 3, paragraph 6 and Article 14, paragraph 12 on types and inspection. This should be recorded in a mutually-acceptable form.
Baker: That’s acceptable.
Bessmertnykh: Regarding the B–1 bomber, we are ready to accept the explanation for the bombers—particularly, the explanation given by Reggie Bartholomew. We understand the essence of that explanation as being the following. The US has no plans to make the B–1 the carrier of bomber long-range nuclear ALCMs. However, if a decision to make it such a carrier is taken, the kind of work needed to do so would [Page 993] require a modification of the bulkhead of the bomb bay and will take at least six days. It can be conducted at an airbase, but it will be a long process, requiring a lot of work, including the replacing of the bomb bay doors. The work on the ALCM attachment points take at least two days, and that procedure can also only be done at a special location. And that means it would take at a minimum eleven to thirteen days to convert one B–1 bomber. If a decision was taken to convert a unit of twenty B–1s, it would take at least a year and a half.
Bartholomew: Well, it would take over a year to a year and a half in addition to reconfigure the additional time is required to reconfigure the aircraft to train the crews. You know it takes that long to get them fully operational.
Baker: Well, we’d better get a little more precise. Thirteen days per aircraft and it doesn’t seem like a year and a half if you are talking about twenty aircraft.
Bessmertnykh: Well, we’ll use the phrase of well over a year.
Baker: We should probably say for the entire process it will take well over a year to a year and a half.
Burt: Yes, it’s the entire process including procuring new equipment and the training of crews. This would be a whole new mission, and that’s why it will take so much time.
Bartholomew: The first unit of twenty plans will take about a year and a half. The second obviously will take less time.
Burt: Our position is that if we decide to convert, we will have to count this against the ALCM numbers overall. We certainly couldn’t do that quietly and we certainly couldn’t do it over night.
Bartholomew: The important point is that we have no plan to do this.
Baker: We need to be very precise on this point.
Bartholomew: Now it is our assumption that it’s the B–1 that’s reconfigured to carry ALCMs. Notification will have to be given. This is an understanding that would be recorded and read into the negotiating record of my meeting with the deputy minister. With this, the US would return the Houston agreement on the B–1. With regard to this, there are to be no more than two types of missiles on each side—no more than five warheads, no more than a total of 1,250. Now, there are to be no prohibitions on mobile ICBMs and its supplies to base-by-base and with regard to ICBMs and with regard to SLCMs, it’s ocean by ocean. We’ve also given the explanation provided by Eduard Shevardnadze on December 30th and January 12th, that the B–1 was done prior to the treaty and is not included in the types and the limit of 1,250. So, subject to this [Page 994] agreement one could increase the verification quota to verify the number on SLBMs. Now in addition to this, your side is prepared to agree to the criterion throwweight on the new type of missiles. The Soviet side has already accommodated the US position on the 10% criteria. It’s also ready to take certain steps on the following—taking into account the US position. We accept the PPCM problem for mobile ICBM production facilities and with regard to the Soviet Union, there are two production facilities as regard to the SS–24 and one for the SS–25. And here the INF verification range would apply. On the US side the rule applied to where the MX is produced—even if in the future we decide to use the Midgetman, it could be produced and the relevant production facility would be governed by the PPCM requirement. We regard this as a major step and we expect some reciprocation from the Soviets.
Obukhov: Okay, we will look at that. We do have another question on the expert discussion that was held today on a compromise on throwweight.2
Nazarkin: The main result was that to meet the US concern without affecting our position in what we’re trying to do. We did agree, but we did discuss the possibility of including a throwweight criterion in the new type definition.
Burt: I understand that there may be a compromise.
Obukhov: We are in favor of including throwweight as a criterion in this definition of the new type, but the concerns of the US side were discussed and we’ve tried to satisfy your concerns in this framework.
Bartholomew: I think you’ve established a hypothetical case.
Baker: I like to try to bring us back into focus. I want to know, I want us to respond in general, but I also want us to summarize where we are—Rick could you do that?
Burt: Well, we are very close on the B–1 and the B–2 and also very close on the PPCM. On downloading, the Soviet side is listing the idea that we had heard in Houston from the Soviet side. It seems to have supposed that we agreed to an outline in Houston. We listened, but never agreed to it. On throwweight, they still seek to include that and the new types. They’ve given on the B–1 and B–2, PPCM and they want us to give on downloading and the SS–N–18. There are two types that did not apply to SS–N–18 because they have already downloaded on the SS–N–18, at least that’s their position. But they’ve given us assurances that they have no longer seven warheads on the front end of the SS–N–18. They now only have three warheads on the front end and they will give us a need to go out and inspect and ensure that that’s the case, that there are no SS–N–18s with seven warheads on the front end.
[Page 995]Obukhov: There should be some reciprocation on this; this was what was explained in the Shevardnadze letter. On the B–1 and B–2, we accept the US position as stated here in Washington and this is part of a comprehensive package.
Baker: Well, this is really Houston plus. It gets us back to what we agreed in Houston and we’ve thrown in some goodies as well.
Nazarkin: But we accepted your position on the PPCM. On the SS–N–18, we understand Houston as representing an agreement to our proposal that the SS–N–18 has been redesigned and redesignated to have three as opposed to seven warheads on the condition that we fully explained in the Shevardnadze letter and that was the letter that was requested by you. Two weeks later we increased the issue of a quota on inspections as we discussed in Geneva. These are the feelings that the Soviets hide. In Houston we thought there were not going to be three exceptions for downloading, but there were going to be two types. And the numbers are higher as far as the total number of 1,250. That’s a compromise figure. And the five warheads for each missile. That’s also a compromise figure. Or at least it is a figure that takes into account the exchange of views. So, we accept your proposal on how to count on downloading and also to do it on the basis of base-by-case, and ocean-by-ocean. In this area, we invite the US to return to Houston.
Baker: Let me read you what I wrote in Houston, these are my notes.3 Changing the designation of SS–N–18 from seven to three RVs would raise a real political problem for us. And we need to know what specific assurances you might be able to offer and what form those might take.
Obukhov: When we came back from Moscow, we incorporated this and we acted on them. We believed that if you wanted explanations, and we could provide them, we’d have an agreement.
Burt: Now I know that you believe this, but in Geneva I told Nazarkin that we have a problem on downloading.
Baker: Maybe you felt this way, but my notes are exactly as I’ve just read them. And if you look at my notes, I’m saying this will create a real political problem for us. I’ve been asking what specific assurances you could offer to a allay, our concern and what form might those take.
Obukhov: Well, why do you need the answers if you weren’t going to accept?
Baker: Because what I was saying is that we were prepared to consider it, but before we could consider it we needed to know what assurances you were prepared to provide and what form it would take. I said [Page 996] to Shevardnadze, send a letter on the assurances on the SS–N–18, and we’d be prepared to look at what you send.
Burt: Our current approach is to ban downloading all together, but to give each an exemption for one missile. You would be able to download on the SS–N–18 and we’d download on the Minuteman three.
Bartholomew: This is a real departure from what we have been talking about, but we thought maybe it could be helpful to you.
Burt: Our view was that we try to take account of your approach on the downloading by including the SS–N–18s, and you take a look at ours and this is why we try to lay it out as a compromise.
Obukhov: You know really we waited for more than a month to hear about Houston.
Bessmertnykh: When we discussed this in your office,4 Bartholomew said the bomber issue was very important to you. I told Moscow this. Now we’re accepting this issue. Of course there has to be a balance. At the end of the road there’s got to be a balance and an agreement on this issue, and this is a short-cut way to solve this. Maybe you can look at it this way, maybe this is the way out.
Burt: We understand your point on equity. But before you begin talking of this kind of approach on downloading, there was pretty strong interest on the Soviet side that you were interested in a ban on downloading. I’m curious why are you are no longer interested in that. Having downloading in effect undercuts the meaning of the agreement in some respects because you can reduce the number of warheads, but you can go ahead and increase the number of warheads very rapidly.
Obukhov: Well, it’s more natural to permit downloading since downloading, after all, is not increasing warheads, it’s reducing them.
Burt: Well, why don’t we bracket this one. In any case, there is a helpful position on the PPCMs, the reciprocation with respect to sites being discussed later or maybe that could be discussed in the commission. Why not just say reciprocal risks with respect to sites.
Obukhov: Will the US side be satisfied with this approach?
Burt: Well there may be two solutions on the types question. If we agree on the criterion that separates the new from old, we realize there has to be launch weight, length, diameter—we just don’t agree on throwweight. We think the Soviet Union wants to use throwweight because you have a new missile under development that would not create problems with regard to the other criterion but would with regard to throwweight. If that’s the problem, we could exempt that missile.
[Page 997]Bessmertnykh: Why is the US deciding to remove throwweight from criterion, when you have decided before that you would have it?
Burt: We’re afraid if throwweight is used as a criterion for new types simply because it produce endless debates, whether something is a new type or not, it’s just not a good measure for a new type. It’s good for military capability, but it’s not very good for new versus existing missiles. The alternative to exempting the missile would be for us to sort of look at existing missiles and say the throwweight increases at more than 20% would constitute a new missile. This is something that can be discussed in the commission about whether something is a new missile and whether the increase in throwweight constitute a new missile.5
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Lot 96D277, Baker Subject Files 1990–1994, No Folder Title. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Baker’s office at the Department of State. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.↩
- No memorandum of conversation was found.↩
- Not found.↩
- See Document 196.↩
- Printed from a copy that cuts off at this point.↩