194. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Secretary Baker
- Alexander Bessmertnykh
Baker: Thanks for taking my call. I got the message from Chetverikov yesterday that you would be coming to Washington and I am very glad that you decided, notwithstanding the difficulties of your schedule, to come. While I am very glad that you are coming, I do want you to know that we have concluded here that it probably makes sense to postpone the Summit by mutual agreement. In doing so, we would emphasize two points: The President’s preoccupation with the Gulf and the START Treaty is not yet ready to be concluded.
I would be happy to work out an agreed statement with you. You have probably seen what’s going on here on the Baltics. There was a vote yesterday in the House that was 417–0. In any case, I think we should agree mutually to postpone the Summit and cite the Gulf and START as the reasons for the postponement. I think it is better for us to do so sooner rather than later. I don’t want us to be in a position where Congress has passed a resolution urging a postponement of the Summit and then we look like we had to respond to that. So, I would ask you to think about that.
Before you respond, I would also like to make a few other points. My own view is that we have a very important relationship to preserve and to protect. If we postpone the Summit now I think your coming to Washington anyway can only send a positive signal. Indeed, it would show that we are doing business and we have a lot to talk about. The fact is we do have a lot to talk about.
First, I think we need to try to finalize START and resolve the problems on CFE. But, more than this, I would like to propose that we have a serious discussion on the new arms control agenda and that is dealing with the problems of proliferation. And I mean on proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and missile capabilities. We have some ideas and I want to get into that with you. In addition to that, I want to talk to you about how we might gradually work together on the Middle East after the war is over.
[Page 977]Now, we will, to be sure, need to have a talk on the Baltics. You have probably seen the letter the President sent. We don’t want to have to freeze the economic measures we have taken towards you but the Congress could mandate such a freeze. We need to talk and see if there is a way to work out the problem on the Baltics. We had such a discussion last June in my office and there was a commitment to find a positive way to resolve the problem there. We need to see whether there are some positive steps that could be taken like moving the Black Berets from the Baltics and setting up a credible dialogue. You can see that the situation in the West and the attitudes in the West on what is going on in the Baltics are not particularly positive from your point of view. So I think it would be useful for us to have a serious discussion about the Baltics.
Bessmertnykh: Thank you very much for outlining those views about the situation. Actually, we have come to the same conclusion about the timing of the Summit. So we agree with the idea of having a mutually-agreed postponement. But maybe we could say that this is not an indefinite postponement, but rather one that would be tied to a suggestion for a meeting later in the spring. The second point I would like to make is really when do we make this statement. I agree that making it sooner rather than later is a good way to go, but could we do it when I come? Might that not make sense? It would then look as if we had discussed this and our agreement would come out of our discussion.
Baker: That is okay, but I am a little worried about the Congress taking action before you come. I don’t want the Congress to call for the postponement put us in a position looking like we are only responding to their pressure. You know we had Baltic leaders here calling for a postponement and I think it is better for us to take the step and do it on our own and not make it look like it’s in response to pressure.
Let me read to you a possible statement we might make. This is something I need to go over with the President. This is a rough outline of something we might like to say as a joint announcement
“By mutual agreement, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev will be rescheduling their Summit in Moscow originally planned for February to a later date in the first half of this year. The Gulf war makes it inappropriate for President Bush to be away from Washington. In addition, progress on START is not sufficient at this point to finalize the treaty by the mid-February date. Both Presidents look forward to setting an exact Summit date as soon as it becomes feasible to do so.”
Bessmertnykh: Yes, that sounds acceptable in general.
Baker: I think we definitely need to do this sooner rather than later.
[Page 978]Bessmertnykh: Well, we could do it on Saturday.2 And just to facilitate things I could come by and have a short meeting with you on Saturday right after my arrival. That would show that we have been in touch and I think that will be a good outcome.
Baker: Let me talk with the President about this and see what he feels about the best way of handling this and whether he is prepared to go along with referring to a spring or early summer date.
Bessmertnykh: Fine. I will be in my office all day. If you want you can send a copy of the draft statement through our embassy today or directly to me.
Baker: I will get Chetverikov to come in and I will give him the prepared statement once I am sure that’s the way the President wants to proceed.
Bessmertnykh: I will come any way. I would like to see you and maybe have a chance to see the President as well. I do need to come back because my family is still there and I do need to close things up in Washington.
Baker: That’s very good. It will give us a chance to talk about these things and we can plan to meet on Saturday. I don’t want to have a lot of people involved in our Saturday meeting. I want to in that meeting to discuss with you the possibilities in the Baltics.
Bessmertnykh: I will tell you frankly that I have been working on this since I came back from Washington. My own complete conviction on this is that the West is over-reacting. My President is trying to keep to the course he has chartered and now the West is rushing with negative reactions which will not help the President deal with the forces he has to contend with. Indirectly, and objectively speaking, the West’s reaction is helping those forces who oppose the President. I understand how the press and the photos guide public opinion and they are very troubling photos. I agree they are troubling. I know the Baltic people themselves are trying to incite public opinion but President Gorbachev is trying very hard to keep the course and steer it.
Baker: I think you have got to get back to finding a negotiating mechanism for resolving the problem. Last night troops took over a plant in Lithuania. You have gone some time without doing that. Why now?
Bessmertnykh: Well, times are very tense. The situation is very tense. Things just happen in circumstances like that.
Baker: But, when you send in additional troops in, when you have the Black Berets, this creates a situation where things are bound to get out of control. I think you know we want to preserve this relationship [Page 979] and maintain the kind of cooperation that we have had. Both President Bush and I feel that way and I think President Gorbachev understands that. We need to see if we can find a formula that creates a mechanism for working things out and for finding a way out of this problem.
I go back to the very frank discussion that we had in my office in June on the Baltics. You recall that President Gorbachev assured President Bush that force would not be used and that dialogue would be the way that this problem would be handled.
Bessmertnykh: The President does not seek to control the situation with the use of force. He will fight that. He doesn’t want that.
Baker: Well, let’s talk about this when you come and we will work on the draft statement.
Bessmertnykh: I hope there will be no leaks on this before I come.
Baker: We will keep the circle very limited here and I will try to talk with you later today.
End of Conversation