Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

1.

Secret—Entire Text.

2.

With a Bartholomew-Obukhov meeting now scheduled for next week, perhaps a message from Geneva would be timely. However, it is difficult to know what to say that would be helpful, given the great uncertainties surrounding the summit and the Gulf and how these bear upon START.

3.

People are working furiously here, but progress since the break has been disappointingly slow. Soviet backtracking from the Houston agreements was a major contributor to our problems, of course. We seem to have gotten that part of our work back on track, but it cost us valuable time. Another problem is that we still are spending a lot of time inventing new material, which diverts us from resolving existing brackets. For example, brand new notifications keep appearing and the ACDA lawyers have just invented a whole new protocol, similar to that for the CFE treaty, on the early implementation of certain provisions. Finally, as someone here commented, the backstoppers continue to act as though it were 1988, sending unexpected new material and reopening agreed language in unhelpful ways. Nevertheless brackets are disappearing and several major packages (rapid reload, prototypes, space issues, etc.) will, if implemented, clean up large portions of text. The memorandum on inspection procedures is probably the only piece of the treaty still far from resolution.

4.

As a result of the Houston deal on PPCM, a solid rocket motor is no longer a unit of account. Thus the long-standing equation, motor-stage-missile, is no longer valid. However, locational restrictions remain on solid rocket motors. We have made a major effort here in the past week to reach agreement on the size criteria to be used at PPCM portals and in inspections of declared facilities. This has involved much discussion of solid rocket motors, stages and launch canisters. A closely related issue is weights, measures and unique identifiers. We are pursuing this vigorously in several groups and may have some ad ref agreements soon. I will not attempt to describe the deal in detail, since it is likely to change tomorrow, but I can outline the elements as they [Page 969] emerged yesterday. The Soviets seem to have agreed to list lengths, diameters and weights in the MOU. The size criterion at Votkinsk and Pavlograd would be an arbitrary size bearing a remarkable resemblance to an SS–25 canister. The size criterion for OSI would be an arbitrary reference cylinder bearing a remarkable resemblance to a solid rocket motor. This is premised on our allowing PPCM of the small ICBM. This is a crucial piece of the solution and should be in our interest, since it would preserve our option to base it in a mobile mode later.

5.

Establishing initial verification of the technical characteristics of the various missiles will be complicated. We can see two uninteresting missiles—the SS–13 and SS–N–17—up close and personal right after entry into force. The others will have to be dealt with by some combination of inspection as missiles are presented for elimination, inspection of training models and other creative but as yet unagreed procedures. The future of Cargoscan is unclear.

6.

—You may see references to the “real Geneva package.” This is a moveable feast of 8 or 9 issues the Ambassadors are trying to resolve which keeps changing. The further we go, the more the remaining issues will be packaged in pairs or larger groupings and settled ad ref here. I strongly support this approach as the only way to get to the end of the road.

–: The Soviets say they want both silos and mobile launchers at space launch facilities. This is addressed in a larger ad ref package on space issues. You will soon receive our RFG on this.
–: Work on the MOU has focused on site diagrams. The Soviets recently showed us a vastly improved site diagram of a heavy bomber base that came close to what we want in terms of detail and coverage. The delegation was also pleased by the last guidance cable on site diagrams that outlined Washington’s preferred approach and left it to us to negotiate details. (Similar guidance on other issues when possible would save a lot of time here and in backstopping.) If and when the exchange of site diagrams takes place the delegation is not planning to send the package home officially, so as not to give OSD and others another chance at micromanaging the negotiations. We, however, will unofficially fax the Soviet site diagrams to PM. Assuming Soviet cooperation, finishing the MOU by early February should not be a problem.
–: We have made good progress on the technical issues in Article X (telemetry). Roslyakov told me January 14 that Obukhov will be prepared to settle the tape exchange issue in next week’s meeting. It is not clear whether other data denial issues can also be resolved at this meeting.
–: We are hoping to make what is left of tagging as credible as possible, using actual factory markings where these are accessible or, where not, requiring that they be reproduced in accessible locations. [3½ lines not declassified]
–: We understand that you are trying to resolve the downloading issue and OSD-JCS differences are holding things up. We need a definitive answer soon on this, since some crucial portions of treaty text are involved. The best solution would be to ban downloading, especially if we are not going to allow the SS–N–18 problem to be settled via downloading.
–: We had tentatively decided to drop the idea of a specific list of facilities subject to mandatory suspect-site inspection, while retaining the concept in the treaty. I gather, however, that there is renewed interest in the subject in Washington and there finally exist lists of which Soviet facilities we want and which U.S. facilities we can offer. Agreement on this will not be easy.
–: We were also about to drop the exemption for dry deck shelter submarines, which seemed a bad idea from the beginning. Now the Soviets seem willing to allow this in exchange for a one-time exemption for two Soviet subs in overhaul. This still seems like a bad idea to me and an unnecessary complication in the treaty.
–: Global Positioning Satellite—the Soviets refuse to allow use of GPS during RV inspections. Our latest idea is to require very good maps plus numbers on silos visible to both NTM and inspectors.
–: The deal on sub tunnels is just about completed.
–: I think the B–2 issue is back to where we were in Houston. However, the Soviets are not satisfied with our explanations regarding the B–1 bulkhead. Be prepared to deal with this next week.
–: There is some progress on ALCM distinguishability, but it is far from settled. JCS is still hung up on their theological position that non-nuclear ALCMs are not limited by the treaty, and therefore all references to such systems must be done with mirrors. Logic favors the Soviets on this one. If the sides are to distinguish between long-range nuclear ALCMs and long-range non-nuclear ALCM, there should be straightforward exhibitions and listing of relevant characteristics.
–: Agreed statements, letters to be exchanged and issues kicked to the JCIC continue to multiply at what seems to me an alarming rate. I suppose this is inevitable as we approach the end.

7.

My judgment is that it is still barely possible to finish the treaty in time for a February summit. You know the prospects for a summit better than we, but they seem from here to be fading fast. If it is indeed postponed, the proper course will be to press on and complete as much work as we can on the treaty in an orderly way and have it ready when conditions permit it to be signed. This may sound naive, but, if we have a good meeting in Washington next week, we are close enough and the remaining issues technical enough that much could be done quietly here without a lot of attention from high levels, if both capitals so directed. A delay of one or two months would not hurt us (and would probably be secretly welcomed by the delegations). A longer delay, however, could have unpredictable consequences.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

191. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1

SUBJECT