Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

6093.

Washington, January 8, 1991, 2108Z

SUBJECT

• Bartholomew-Bessmertnykh Meeting 1/4: START

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Undersecretary for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew called in Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Bessmertnykh on 1/4 to deliver a paper detailing concerns on CFE (reported Septel)² and to discuss START. Also present at the meeting were Soviet Counselor Aleksandr Churilin, EUR DAS Avis Bohlen, Chris Dell and James Timbie (T Staff) and EUR/SOV Anne Herr (notetaker).

3. On START, Bartholomew noted that recent meetings in Houston and Washington had been hard but good. He said that his own meetings with Obukhov had helped, and emphasized that he thought his work with Obukhov was very important.

4. Bartholomew said Secretary Baker had received Shevardnadze’s response³ to his letter. Although there were a few points we would take issue with, in the main, the letter was good in that it confirmed the package agreed on in Houston.

5. Bartholomew voiced concern that what has been tabled in Geneva walks back in some very important respects from what had been agreed upon at Houston. He singled out bombers as an example, along with PPCM and definition of new types.

6. Bartholomew observed that this leaves us in a situation where we are 5 weeks away from the summit and the package agreed upon in Houston seems to be coming apart as a result of Soviet positions tabled in Geneva. If we don’t correct this situation we will not be able to get START in time for a summit. Priority should be to put START back together again by getting a Soviet position in Geneva that confirms Shevardnadze’s letter.

7. Bartholomew informed Bessmertnykh that Baker would be sending Shevardnadze a letter⁴ which Moscow could expect tonight or tomorrow. He wanted Bessmertnykh to stress the importance of responding promptly—so as to get START back on track for a summit package.

8. Additionally, Bartholomew noted that Ambassador Matlock had gone in to speak to Shevardnadze that morning.⁵ (Shevardnadze’s letter proposed that Obukhov and Bartholomew meet. This morning Shevardnadze had proposed that they meet in Geneva the 10th and 11th, next week, to try to finish things up. Bartholomew had received word from Ambassador Burt that Nazarkin et al. were planning to go back to Moscow next week to prepare for such a meeting.

9. Bartholomew emphasized that the first order of business should be responding to Baker’s letter and getting Houston START package back on track. He said that the U.S. did not see how—in these circumstances—we could have a meeting on the 10th and 11th. Additionally Bartholomew said that his own sense, and that of Secretary Baker, was that we do better when these meetings are held in conjunction with a ministerial. He also emphasized that it was very important that Moscow not pull Nazarkin and the other key people out of Geneva—they have work to do. At the same time, he stressed that he personally recognized the value of the productive work he had done with Obukhov.

10. Bessmertnykh said that they would be waiting for the letter. He suggested that Bartholomew nonetheless consider a meeting with Obukhov, which could be considered independent or as connected with the past ministerial or a future one. Since the timeframe is compressed it could be looked at either way. He pointed out that the issues involved are technical and specific. And when a meeting is planned it energizes the bureaucracy. If these dates were not acceptable they could think of others—maybe later in January. He very strongly recommended such a meeting, saying it would help.

11. Bartholomew responded that he understood what Bessmertnykh was saying and in his own view could see the potential value. It was not for him to say whether there would be another ministerial. He was not taking the position that no such meeting could take place unless there was a ministerial, but with START in pieces on the ground, the U.S. did not see how it could be useful. The issue must be looked at at a politically authoritative level in Moscow.

12. Bartholomew said his hope was that the Soviets would receive Baker’s letter and reply positively and quickly, opening the way to think about how to proceed. An Obukhov–Bartholomew meeting was not conditional on a signed and delivered agreement, but we were not going anywhere with the Houston package up in the air. The U.S. wanted to do business.

13. Bessmertnykh remarked that the Houston package was not in as bad shape as Bartholomew suggested, that the issues in dispute were small ones. Now that they knew a letter was coming they would keep it in mind. Bartholomew said that the problems in Geneva were big political, and neuralgic.

14. Bartholomew said Bessmertnykh should note that he believed he and Obukhov had done good work before, but under pressure of having to go before the ministers. The Obukhov-Bartholomew meetings have their greatest value in this context. He could see some benefit to having such a meeting, particularly if a ministerial was not going to happen. (Bessmertnykh added that such a meeting would also be beneficial in the case of a nonprofessional Soviet Minister without a grasp of the issues.) Bartholomew acknowledged Bessmertnykh’s arguments but said that the 10th and 11th was too early in any case.

Bessmertnykh said that he understood and would convey the message to Moscow.

Eagleburger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N910001–0087. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent to NST Geneva. Drafted by Herr; cleared by Bohlen, Ordway, and Timbie, and in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Bartholomew.
2. Reference is to telegram 6158 to Moscow, January 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D910024–0563)
3. See Document 183.
4. See Document 184.
5. In telegram 323 from Moscow, January 4, the Embassy reported on Matlock’s meeting with Shevardnadze, in which the ambassador conveyed “how much both Secretary Baker and the President valued and respected his work, and that contributions to the U.S.-Soviet relationship were unique.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N910001–0032)