Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

184. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

00023.

Geneva, January 3, 1991, 1148Z

SUBJECT

• START: Formal Soviet Response to the Houston Package

1. This is Blackbird—030. Secret—Entire Text.

Summary

2. On New Year’s Day, Nazarkin called me to say that he had received the formal Soviet response to the Houston package. I have forwarded an unofficial translation by classified fax² and will forward the official translation when completed.

3. Since receiving the document I have met with Nazarkin three times to review the details. As you will have seen, there is a fair amount of bad news in the package. Six key points are in dispute:

— The Soviets insist that the small ICBM must be covered by PPCM, claiming that they have always assumed that reciprocity on PPCM means an equal number of missiles on each side as well as an equal number of facilities.

— The Soviets seek a right to inspect a B2 which has been tested with a long-range non-nuclear ALCM in order to confirm that the B2 is not equipped for long-range, nuclear ALCMs.

— The Soviets have returned to their previous standard that it must be impossible to convert a non-ALCM B1B to carry ALCMs except at a production plant.

— The Soviets insist on including throw-weight in the new types definition.

— The Soviets assert that accepting the position on downloading which they outlined in Houston (1250 warheads, two types, five RVs per missile) must be part of the overall package.

— The Soviets have tied two relatively minor aspects of the rapid reload package to the issue of third country basing.

Additional details and a proposal follow.

The Basic Deal: PPCM for Bombers

4. On both the B1B and the B2, the Soviet paper is a walk-back. On the B2, the Soviets claim that if we test a long-range non-nuclear ALCM, they can’t be certain that what was tested was not a long-range nuclear ALCM. Exhibitions might not help since even if OSI allowed distinguishing between a nuclear and non-nuclear ALCM, their NTM couldn’t tell what had been tested. I told the Soviets that inspecting the B2 was not acceptable. Nazarkin said that they were prepared not to require any B2 exhibitions or inspections but only if we could offer a way to be certain that only non-nuclear ALCMs were tested.³

5. On B1B distinguishing features, the Soviets have made three changes to the language we gave in Houston:

— They require that “attachment joints for moving the bulkhead in the bomb bay” be eliminated. Nazarkin admits this is new. He claims that in Houston they didn’t have time to study our proposed elements of common ground and that these are their proposals.

— They require that ALCM pylon attachment joints (except for the two jacking points) be “drilled or welded or eliminated by other equivalent method excluding their possible out-of-plant reconversion.” Nazarkin says that this is not a rejection of the approach we described in Houston provided that it meets the standard of being equivalent to drilling or welding in terms of not being reversible at an airbase.

— They add “long-range nuclear ALCM suspension pylons” to the list of items we will not locate at air bases for B–1 heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

6. The Soviet language states that locational restrictions on equipment for reconfiguring the B1B bomb bay and for loading ALCM pylons will “be verified during the implementation of the verification regime provided for by the treaty.” The only good B1B news is that Nazarkin confirms that this is intended to mean no new inspection rights. Nazarkin said their language was intended to put a “positive spin” on the provision.

7. I expressed dismay at the Soviet actions. Nazarkin reciprocated with claims of similar dismay with respect to PPCM. He claimed that both Shevardnadze and Obukhov made it clear in Houston was that the central deal was swapping the Soviet PPCM position for the U.S. ALCM position. He also emphasized that Shevardnadze’s letter of November 24⁴ made it clear that the Soviet PPCM position included the small ICBM. He stressed that the Soviet view of PPCM reciprocity means an equal number of missiles on each side as well as an equal number of facilities. Finally he noted that we had never told them the small ICBM would not be included. (To the best of my recollection this last point is true, although our language was carefully crafted to allow us to exclude the small if it was not deployed in a mobile mode.) The end result was that while I accused the Soviets of a walk-back on bombers, Nazarkin accused us of bad faith on PPCM.

The Throw-Weight Package

8. With the exception of the new types definition, Nazarkin confirmed that all other elements of the October ad ref throw-weight package were agreed, including:

— Throw-weight includes all mass except for burned fuel and the shroud which separates after the point where final stage velocity is 1000 meters per second less than the final stage velocity at thrust termination.

— Potential throw-weight using range standards of 11,000 kilometers for ICBMs and 9,500 kilometers for SLBMs.

— Calculations based on a spherical, non-rotating Earth.

— Calculations assume residual fuel in each stage of no more than one percent for solid-propellant and two percent for liquid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs.

— Exclusion of the first seven flight tests, provided that for such tests demonstrated throw-weight does not exceed the maximum throw-weight capability to the range standard by more than 20 percent or 250 kilograms, whichever is less.

— Use of the forty percent rule for warhead attribution for future types. (Note that the Soviet text refers to “MRVs”; Nazarkin confirms that this is an error and that the text should refer to missiles with multiple warheads, i.e. both MRVs and MIRVs.)

— No destruction of reentry vehicles.

9. On new types, the Soviet paper accepts ten percent change in launch weight, but calls for five percent change in length and adds a throw-weight criterion. Privately Nazarkin told me they could accept ten percent change in length if we would accept a fifteen percent change in throw-weight. I was non-committal but said I would report his ideas.

10. In other aspects:

— Nazarkin says that the Soviets will accept a commitment not to produce the seven RV SS–N–18 front end, although he was not quick enough to get that commitment into the letter to Baker after I suggested it.

— I suggested we be allowed to inspect all SS–N–18s in order to “certify” (along the lines of the Soviet B1B language) that none can carry more than three RVs. Nazarkin says it would take two years and is impractical.

— Nazarkin continued to claim that downloading was part of the Houston package.

— Nazarkin says the ad ref agreement on rapid reload (my RFG XIV–067)⁵ is still under evaluation in Moscow and that the Soviet provision limiting the number of non-deployed missiles at each ICBM base for silo launchers to four per ICBM type is not intended to be a rejection of that agreement.

What to Do Next

11. Of course, the Soviet walk-back (and what it says about the internal political situation in the Soviet Union), along with the problems which already exist with CFE, may lead us to reconsider whether START signature in February should still be our goal. If, however, we are still going to try to sign START then, we need to salvage the central elements of the Houston agreement right now, without waiting for a possible ministerial later in the month. A number of other issues depend on this package; if it isn’t settled by mid-January at the latest our chances of getting done by the summit will be nonexistent.

12. The central deal in Houston was the PPCM/B1B/B2 package. That’s what we have to salvage. I recommend a letter, within the next seventy-two hours, which:

— Objects to Soviet walkbacks on the B1B and B2 and insists on the deal we cut in Houston, and

— In return, accepts the Soviet PPCM position as given in the November 24 Shevardnadze letter, including applying PPCM to the small ICBM.

In addition, I see no reason why we cannot accept—here in Geneva—the Soviet proposal to add pylons to the list of items we will exclude from air bases for non-ALCM B1Bs.⁶

13. Given Shevardnadze’s status as a lame duck and the fact that his letter to Baker refers to these positions as approved by Gorbachev, I believe this letter should be sent from the President to Gorbachev. Doing so will also reinforce our commitment to overcome these problems and complete START in February.

14. If we can get the central Houston package settled, we should be able to work the other elements in Geneva. To do so, I need the following as soon as possible:

— A decision on whether we can accept adding a throw-weight criterion (fifteen percent change in throw-weight) to our new types definition.⁷

— Details on our proposal on external attachment points for the B1B. The delegation has conflicting information on what we mean and understands informally that we are reconsidering the approach we set forth in Houston. I need to know what our position is.⁸

— A U.S. position on downloading and its relationship to the SS–N–18.⁹

— Approval of the ad ref agreement on rapid reload (my RFG XIV–067).¹⁰

Burt

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01034–033, START/Blackbird—January 1991. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent via the Blackbird channel.
2. The December 31, 1990, unofficial translation of the Soviet response to the Houston package is ibid.
3. Gordon drew a short vertical line to the right of this sentence and wrote: “any ideas.”
4. See Document 168.
5. Reference is to telegram 13804 from NST Geneva, December 21, 1990 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D90199–0027)
6. Gordon drew a short vertical line to the right of this sentence and wrote: “which pylons?”
7. Gordon drew a short vertical line to right of this paragraph and wrote: “Action.”
8. Gordon drew a short vertical line to right of this paragraph and wrote: “Action.”
9. Gordon drew a short vertical line to right of this paragraph and wrote: “Action.”
10. In telegram 4588 to NST Geneva, January 7, the Department transmitted approval of the ad referendum agreement on rapid reload, with the addition of “an exclusion zone separating any production, storage or repair facility for road-mobile ICBMs located within a deployment area and deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles,” that “should be as large as possible, but not less than a twenty kilometer radius surrounding relevant facilities.” Moreover, “test ranges should be located a minimum of 100 km from any DA boundary.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D910016–0799)