168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
SUBJECT
- Shevardnadze-Baker Letter on PPCM
1. (S—Entire Text)
2. Following is Soviet Embassy’s informal translation of a letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretary Baker delivered in Washington November 28.
3. Begin text
Dear James:
The Soviet side carefully studied the US proposals regarding continuous monitoring at mobile ICBM production facilities, which were set forth in your letter handed during the November 7–8 talks in Moscow.2
These proposals do contain some elements meriting attention. This is, above all, the US readiness not to insist on continuous monitoring at solid fuel rocket engine production facilities with respect to the Soviet SS–25 ICBM program. We have also seen with interest your idea of abandoning such a labor-consuming and costly measure as putting identification tags on mobile ICBMs and using instead other possible agreed-upon identification methods.
At the same time, I must say with all frankness that on the whole the new US proposals continue to retain elements which appear to us as only complicating the matter and not allowing to reach mutually acceptable agreement.
As before, they fail to take into account the sides’ differing practices of ICBM production. Unlike the United States, Soviet missiles get [Page 904] off the plants in a completely assembled form. Moreover, for the entire life of the ICBMs rocket engines are not replaced. By contrast, the US proposal on introducing continuous monitoring at the solid fuel rocket engines facilities making two first stages for the MIRVed mobile ICBMs fails to take this practice into account.
In addition, the introduction of the continuous monitoring system at the solid fuel engines facilities would not resolve the principal task of verification, that of counting mobile ICBMs, or their stages produced by each side. The point is that the number of solid fuel engines produced, as I was told by our experts, always exceeds that of the missiles produced. This is because some of the manufactured engines are used for testing and for technology operation, and reliability improvement. I was also assured that the same practice, in principle, is used in the United States, although the proportion between the number of engines and ICBMs produced, as a rule, differs substantially. Thus, counting the number of rocket engines produced would not make it possible to monitor the number of missiles actually produced and thereby ensure verification of compliance with the ceilings on non-deployed mobile ICBMs provided for by the treaty. These points were taken care of in drafting the INF treaty and they, I believe, fully satisfied both sides.
I understand your desire to find an effective solution to the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs production. However, I propose that we deal with it without losing sight of the fact that continuous monitoring of production facilities is but one element in the by and large virtually agreed-upon detailed system of START verification, including mobile ICBMs.
At the same time, we are prepared to take into account your concern with regard to the solid fuel rocket engines in order to assure the sides’ complete confidence that the treaty-limited missiles, which may have a mobile basing mode, cannot be secretly produced in violation of the treaty.
The main elements of our approach are as follows.
For each side continuous monitoring would be set up at two production facilities: for the USSR, at the SS–25 ICBM producing plant in Votkinsk and SS–24 ICBM plant in Pavlograd; for the US side, at the facilities producing accountable stages of MX and Midgetman ICBMs or such assembled missiles.
There would be limitations on the locations of solid fuel rocket engines for the largest stages of SS–24, SS–25, MX and Midgetman ICBMs. Those would be the facilities for the production and storage, assembly of respective stages or missiles as well as test sites for both solid fuel rocket engines and stages to them. In addition, a provision would be agreed upon to the effect that solid fuel rocket engines may be in transit. Presence of solid fuel rocket engines at all such sites would be permitted and would not be subject to inspection.
[Page 905]Other facilities, beside those listed above, where the presence of solid fuel rocket engines could, in the view of the other side, be used for secret production of these ICBMs or accountable ICBM stages, would be subject to challenge inspections without the right of refusal.
The number of such facilities would be limited, and their list would be agreed upon between the sides.
As you can see these Soviet proposals take into account the US concerns, including those that have to do with solid fuel rocket engines.
We are prepared to consider the US ideas in terms of a possible elaboration on our proposed approach in order to achieve, through joint efforts, an effective system of verification of ICBMs production. For example, we could supplement our proposals with your idea of not introducing identification tagging and jointly explore the possibility of using the existing in-plant ICBM tagging for the purpose of verification or other agreed-upon identification methods.
Finding a solution to the question of continuous monitoring would also help to reach agreement on several other problems which would undoubtedly get us closer to the accomplishment of the task at hand - an earliest completion of the START treaty.
Sincerely,
E. Shevardnadze
End text
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent immediate for information to NST Geneva. Drafted by Ordway; cleared by Timbie, Wilson, and Vershbow, and in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Kamman.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 166.↩