Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

182. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

13920.

Geneva, December 27, 1990, 1437Z

SUBJECT

• START: Possible Problems with the Houston Package. Ref: NST Geneva 13894.²

1. This is Blackbird-No. 29. Secret—Entire Text.

2. In conversations today and yesterday, Nazarkin has revealed that there are some new problems concerning the Houston package that he did not mention in our meeting earlier in the week (Reftel).

3. Nazarkin told me that he has not yet received the formal Soviet reply to the Baker letter on the Houston package. However, he reports that he has spoken to Obukhov in Moscow and has been told that some issues are still under debate.

4. For example, while he told me last Monday³ that the Soviets might be prepared to accept ten percent for length in new types definition, he now tells me that they are likely to stick to five percent. As before, they are also likely to add ten percent change in throw weight as a criterion for a new type.

5. Nazarkin also reported that on the ALCM and heavy bomber part of the Houston package, the Soviet will propose some additional measures to assure that the B–1 could not covertly be equipped with ALCIs. I told him that this could cause serious problems for the Houston package as a whole and asked him to be more specific. Clearly worried by my response, Nazarkin begged off and said I should wait for the formal response to the Baker letter. I told him that I hoped the Soviets had not walked back the B–1 agreement; if they had, the Houston package would come apart.

6. The Soviets also have some questions concerning PPCM. Nazarkin reported that the Soviets were “confused” by the PPCM section of the Baker letter and still seek clarification on some points, including on the number of facilities in the United States that would be subject to PPCM and whether this would include the Midgetman facilities.

7. Nazarkin also raised downloading: He said that he wanted to confirm that the sides had reached agreement on downloading in Houston, involving two types, five warheads per missile, 1250 aggregate warheads and base-by-base downloading. I told him that I thought we had made progress on downloading, but the Baker letter clearly indicated we would resolve the issue in Geneva. He said that changing this [garble] agreement, especially two types, five warheads per type and 1250 warheads altogether, would create a “real problem.”

8. On the question of whether the Soviets would go ahead with a JCIC role for relocating heavy ICBM silos, Nazarkin drew a blank. He said he was aware this had been discussed between Baker and Shevardnadze but he had no idea what the Soviet response would be. He did assume, however, that it would be included in the formal Soviet response to the Baker letter.

9. I asked Nazarkin why the Soviets seamed to be reopening some of the Houston issues and thus why their response had been delayed. His answer was uncharacteristically bitter: “A lot of people in Moscow do not want to see this treaty signed.” Nazarkin seems very frustrated by what he sees as Moscow’s indecisiveness on the Houston package.

10. Nazarkin expects to finally receive the formal Soviet response later today and promised to contact me—if it came in—prior to my departure tomorrow for a four-day vacation.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Lot 02D360, Edward M. Ifft Files, Houston Ministerial Dec., 1990. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent via the Blackbird channel. Drafted and approved by Burt. All brackets are in the original.
2. See Document 181.
3. December 24.