181. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
13894.
Geneva, December 24,
1990, 1453Z
SUBJECT
- Soviet Views on Houston START Package: Burt/Nazarkin Meeting, December 24, 1990
- 1.
- This is NST/START Memcon XIV-number to be assigned later. Secret—Entire Text.
- 2.
- Nazarkin was in a nervous and pessimistic mood as he returned from Moscow from consultations on the Houston package. He told me that while the START portion of his visit was productive, in overall terms the visit was very discouraging. He only heard of Shevardnadze’s resignation from the Foreign Ministry driver on his arrival to Moscow last week.
- 3.
- Nazarkin said that the thinking in the Foreign Ministry was that Shevardnadze would continue to perform his duties and stay thru the February summit. Nazarkin said that Gorbachev was pressuring Shevardnadze to stay on in some capacity in the government and that Shevardnadze had not yet made a final decision.
- 4.
- On START, Nazarkin said that he had brought “not
bad news.” After an extensive meeting in Moscow it was agreed that the
Houston package would be approved as “it was agreed in Houston”:
- —
- The Soviet side would RPT would agree to the 40% rule on RV counting for future types.
- —
- On telemetry, the Soviet side only confirmed what had been agreed in Houston—a three year period of transition from current to common practices. However, progress had been made on other elements of data denial here in Geneva, and Nazarkin in Moscow had been instructed to reach overall agreement on the subject to assist, Khromov would arrive in Geneva next Saturday, December 2.
- —
- On the new types definition, Nazarkin’s presentation was somewhat confusing. Nazarkin said that the Soviets insisted on including throw-weight in the new types definition. I said that the Soviets had dropped this in Washington following the Houston meetings, thus this seemed inconsistent with the Houston package. Nazarkin said that this was true but the Soviets had a new idea—perhaps they could agree to our position on 10% increase in length if we could agree to 10% increase in throw-weight as a “new’’ new-type criteria. (Comment: We [Page 946] will have to think about this: my first impression is that it might work. End comment)
- —
- Nazarkin said that he would provide me with a draft of the letter of SSN-18 on Wednesday.2 He said that it was not ready yet, but that the letter would take into account the various questions that we had given him.
- —
- Finally, Nazarkin reiterated the language including that heavy bomber aspects of third country basing accord which were agreed,
- 5.
- Nazarkin said that he was pleased with this outcome, and said that he and Obuhkov fought hard in Moscow to get the Houston package approved. The key argument which he was able to use was Washington’s willingness to buy Moscow’s approach to PPCM, as laid out in Shevardnadze’s letter. He added that it would be good if Jones and Kryuchkov could begin fleshing out PPCM in the treaty language as soon as possible. This would reassure Moscow. I told him this process was now under way.
- 6.
- Nazarkin said that he hoped to have the formal Soviet response to the Houston package by Wednesday. He said that Shevardnadze will also send a letter this [week?] to Baker confirming the Houston package. Nazarkin added that he had been instructed to implement the package in Geneva; and that it would not be discussed in any other channels. “We will negotiate it here,” Nazarkin said. Nazarkin added that he had also been instructed to negotiate all other remaining issues in time for the summit meeting in February. Although I pointed out there were still a number of remaining issues, Nazarkin said that following his Moscow trip, he was confident a treaty could be ready in time for the summit. He added that this would require both parties to make trade-offs in the list of remaining issues. For example: the Soviet side could drop their demand for banning cruise missiles on water-borne vehicles other than surface ships or submarines if the U.S. side was prepared to drop its ban on liquid fuel mobile missiles.
- 7.
- Shifting gears, Nazarkin talked about the situation in Moscow generally. Nazarkin said he felt very depressed and saw “no way out” for Gorbachev. Gorbachev had made a major mistake: while he had launched broad-based reform programs he had dismantled the only executive element—the Communist Party—which could carry this program out. Thus, even liberals like Nazarkin agreed that the Soviet government required greater executive authority. Nazarkin said it wasn’t clear how Gorbachev was going to achieve this. He thought prospects for violence were growing day by day and this profoundly troubled him. Nazarkin concluded by saying that no one had a solution to the Soviet Union’s problems, including Yeltsin.
Burt