Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva¹

426809.

Washington, December 19, 1990, 0638Z

SUBJECT

• NST/START XIV Guidance 124: Post Ministerial Instructions

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. This cable sets forth instructions based on agreements reached and decisions made during ministerial-level meetings held in Washington and Houston December 7–12, 1990. Negotiating group should implement these agreements, drafting treaty text, where necessary. Negotiating group should note the Presidents announcement of a summit during the period February 11–13, 1990, at which START will be signed.

3. During the ministerial, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed a package approach to PPCM, several heavy bomber issues, heavy ICBM silos, data denial, and throwweight. Additional guidance in these areas has been sent Septel. Pending additional guidance, negotiating group should not engage the Soviets on the subject of heavy ICBM silos. Negotiating group should continue to press U.S. positions on ALCM/heavy bomber issues. Including new B1B guidance set forth below, and should press the Soviets to accept the new U.S. data denial position.

Throwweight Package

4. Negotiating group may renew the offer, made during the ministerial, to settle outstanding throwweight and related issues by modifying the recent ad referendum agreement as follows:

A. Aggregate throw-weight will be limited to 54 percent of the Soviet aggregate at the time of signature.

B. Ballistic missile shrouds will be excluded from accountable throw-weight.

C. U.S. new types definition.

D. Warhead attribution for future will be based on the largest number of re-entry releases and simulated releases tested but will be no less than 40 percent of accountable throw-weight divided by the weight of the lightest re-entry vehicle tested with the quotient rounded down. Provisions will be included in the treaty providing that, in the case of ICBMs or SLBMs with new and unconventional front end designs, different from those in use at the time of treaty signature, the question of whether the 40 percent rule would be waived would be subject to consultation and agreement in the JCIC.

5. During ministerial discussions the Soviets proposed using the SALT II definition for new types (i.e. five percent change in length, diameter, launch weight or throw-weight). Negotiating group should reject inclusion of throw-weight in new types definition. The U.S. opposed adding throw-weight on the grounds that it would lead to ambiguities and compliance concerns similar to those in SALT II. Negotiating group should continue to firmly oppose adding throw-weight to the definition and should continue to urge the Soviets to accept the U.S. definition in its entirety. FYI. The Soviets proposed informally a possible compromise using a five percent change in length. We told the Soviets it is unacceptable and are awaiting a Soviet response. End FYI.

Early Exhibitions

6. The Soviets agreed to a side agreement providing for the conduct of technical exhibitions under Article XI, Paragraphs 11 and 12 prior to entry into force, provided that these early exhibitions were a substitute for (and not a duplication of) exhibitions after entry into force. Negotiating group should confirm that we only intend to conduct a single exhibition.

Data Denial

7. The United States handed over the following paper on a new approach to data denial:
Begin text of U.S. draft elements of common ground on data denial

Information Exchange

1. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the sides will exchange tapes of the telemetry broadcast. The exact procedures will be worked out in Geneva, either in the treaty or by the Joint Compliance Inspection Commission.

2. After each flight test, the sides will exchange:

A. Information sufficient to derive the numerical values and engineering units of the telemetry data recorded on those tapes which were exchanged. This information will include (1) a description of the telemetry frame, including the length of such frame and the length of the words therein, (2) the designation of the technical parameters included in each telemetry frame and the location of each parameter within the frame, and (3) encoding algorithims used. Re-entry vehicle data would be excluded from these requirements. In this connection, the term ‘‘re-entry vehicle data” refers only to measurements made from within a re-entry vehicle.

B. An acceleration profile for that flight test, including all stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, if there is one, having a precision of at least one-tenth of a meter per second squared, with a sample rate of no less than five times each second, with values given relative to an internal frame or reference in a three element Cartesian coordinate system.

3. The obligation to exchange tapes and information shall not apply to those flights where measurements are not required to be made or where failure precludes making or recording such measurements.

4. In the exceptional event that a side determines that disclosure of an anomaly during a specific flight test would create significant national security concerns, it would be allowed to delete from the information exchange those specific portions that, in its judgment, are necessary to protect data relating to the national security concerns. This exemption would be used rarely, and only in cases of genuine risk to security.

A. If a side elected to withhold information, it would notify the other side and provide a rationale for the deletions.

B. To prevent abuses, such withholding would be subject to a small annual quota.

C. If a side elected to withhold information, information on all telemetric channels other than those specifically exempted for security reasons would be exchanged.

D. In no case may information be withheld that is necessary to monitor missile acceleration, boost stage separation, re-entry vehicle separation commands, or re-entry vehicle releases.

Practices for transmitting telemetry including power levels

1. For five years following entry into force of the START treaty, unless they agree otherwise in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, the sides will maintain their current practices with respect to the effective radiated power, broadcast frequency, bandwith, and modulation methods used for transmitting telemetry from existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs. Current practices means those in effect on December 1, 1990.

2. During this five year period, transmission practices would be negotiated in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to ensure that each side can receive the telemetry transmission of the other side. Missile and re-entry vehicle telemetry would be included in this negotiation.

3. These negotiated transmission practices will ensure equal reciprocal rights and will apply to future types of ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition, they will apply to future types of telemetry transmission equipment used with existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs.

4. If, after five years, the sides have not reached agreement on a regime for telemetry transmission, either side will be free to adopt the current practices of the other side. Current practices means those in effect on December 1, 1990.

Exemptions (to be provided)

Miscellaneous

1. For purposes of the treaty provisions on data denial, the U.S. small ICBM will be treated as though it were an existing type of ICBM.

2. The sides will conclude a separate agreement, to be signed at the same time as the START treaty, establishing the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission upon START signature.

End text

8. FYI. Washington intends that the proposal to conclude a separate agreement establishing the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission upon START signature recognizes that it may not be feasible to have technical details of the information and tape exchange worked out by early February. Early JCIC creation will allow us to resolve those details prior to entry into force. Early JCIC creation will also speed resolution of the issues associated with creating an agreed regime for telemetry transmission. End FYI.

9. Negotiating group should press the Soviets to accept this new approach. In doing so, negotiating group should be aware that the following issues are still under review:

— Exactly how we will delete national security information.

— Exactly how we would exclude re-entry vehicle data from the requirements for information exchange. (i.e. whether it includes all re-entry vehicle data throughout the flight or only transmitted after re-entry vehicle separation).
Negotiating group should avoid foreclosing U.S options on these matters pending further guidance.

10. Although the paper provided the Soviets spoke of a five year transition regime, the Soviets were told we could accept three years. Negotiating group may renew this offer in the context of overall agreement on the U.S. approach. Following this transition period, the negotiated transmission practices would apply to all existing and new types, as agreed. The sides also discussed an approach where the requirement to maintain current practices applies to all types—existing and new—during the transition period. Under this approach there would be no need for explicit reference to the small ICBM. Negotiating group may accept such an approach.

Non-ALCM B1Bs

11. The United States handed over the following paper proposing elements of common ground on the B1B:

Begin text of U.S. draft elements of common ground on the B1B

1. All B1Bs not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will count as one unit against the 6000 warhead ceiling.

2. The following features will distinguish B1Bs not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs from those so equipped:

A. A bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that without change, would not permit a long range nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally. Unique equipment for reconfiguring a bulkhead would not be present at airbases for B1B bombers.

B. Covering by a process equivalent to welding all but two ALCM pylon attachment joints. The two attachment joints which also serve as jacking points will not be covered. These distinguishing features will be exhibited during the technical exhibitions under Article XI, Paragraph 12.

3. During the baseline inspection period, each B1B not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be subject to inspection in order to allow confirmation that they possess the appropriate distinguishability features.

4. Unique, specialized equipment to remove the movable bulkhead in the B1B and equipment to load B1B nuclear ALCM pylons will be listed as support equipment in the MOU) and will be banned from all airbases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and from all airbases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This ban would not, however, expand existing inspection rights. FYI: Washington notes that the Soviets have objected to including non-TLI in the MOU. Negotiating group should recommend to Washington how best to handle this equipment. End FYI.)

5. Pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and rotary launchers which carry long-range nuclear ALCMs will be banned from all airbases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and from all airbases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This ban would not, however, expand existing inspection rights.

End Text

12. Negotiating group should renew this offer, which was commented upon favorably (but not formally accepted) by the Soviets. Negotiating group should make clear that B–2s are not to be included in any inspection regime. Negotiating group should draft appropriate implementing language, making sure that it does not apply to B–2s or B–2 bases. FYI: We are concerned that this language not implicate the B–2 rotary launcher or be interpreted as banning that launcher from B–2 bases. End FYI. Negotiating group should also make it clear that, on the basis of reciprocity, the U.S. will expect comparable provisions with respect to any Soviet bombers of types some of which are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

13. During discussions, the Soviets also agreed that the two extra attachment joints on the B1B for which no pylons exist shall not be considered in determining the total number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B1B is equipped. Negotiating group should press the Soviets to confirm this interpretation.

Satellite Communications

14. The following text, while not formally accepted by the Soviets, provides a summary of their verbal acceptance of satellite communications. Negotiating group should press the Soviets to implement this agreement:

Begin text of U.S. draft elements of common ground on communications

1. The monitors of the inspecting party shall have the right to use at all times satellite communications via the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) commercial satellite system, or a system of equivalent performance, between each monitored facility in the territory of the inspected party and the telephone communication system of the inspection party.

2. There shall be no requirement for backup high-frequency radio communications systems.

3. The inspected party shall provide the satellite communications equipment. The installation and maintenance of such equipment shall be the responsibility of the inspected party.

End Text

15. In implementing this provision, negotiating group should offer to adopt the language used in the TTBT/PNET protocols which provide, inter alia, for the provision and maintenance of satellite communications equipment by the inspecting party, if the inspected party prefers.

Baker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D901188–0565. Secret. Sent Immediate. Drafted by Riveles; cleared by Timbie, Hadley, Graves, MacEachin, Valessi, Lehman, and Hill, and in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Koch.