Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

177. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

December 8, 1990

START

○ Need to resolve some big issues soon if we are to be in a position to complete START.

Data Denial

○ We have agreed to ban practices that deny full access to telemetry.

○ Three major issues remain. One—exemptions—is being handled in Geneva. On the other two—information exchange and power level—Amb. Bartholomew gave you a new proposal.

○ The essential features are:

— The sides would exchange tapes of telemetry broadcast during each flight of an ICBM or SLBM.

— The sides would exchange information sufficient to interpret that data. This is something you have pressed for. Re-entry vehicle data would be excluded from this requirement.

— In the rare event that a side determines that disclosure of an anomaly during a specific flight test would create significant national security concerns, it would be allowed to delete from the information exchange those specific portions necessary to protect data relating to the national security concern. Information on all other portions of the flight would be provided.

— If a side elected to withhold information, it would notify the other side and provide a rationale for the deletions.

— The sides would undertake to use this exemption rarely, only in cases of genuine risk to security. To prevent abuses, such withholding would be subject to a small annual quota.

— On power level, we propose that transmission practices for future types of missiles be negotiated in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to ensure that each side can receive the telemetry transmissions of the other side.

— Since it would be extremely costly to reconfigure current missiles that have already been designed and built, we propose that for existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs, each side use its existing practices to transmit telemetry

— The provisions for telemetry transmission for existing types of ICBMs would apply to the US Small ICBM.

○ This compromise would mean that for future missile types, there would be equal burdens and obligations. For current missile types, current practices would continue.

○ As you see, we have tried hard in this proposal to meet both side’s concerns. Can we resolve this important issue on this basis?

ALCMs and Bombers

US position:

Inspection of weapons storage areas at bases for heavy bombers other than long-range nuclear ALCM heavy bombers, once long-range non-nuclear ALCMs are deployed there, to confirm long-range ALCMs there are non-nuclear. No inspection of B–2 (unless it is tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs). Count B–1s not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs as 1 (except only for two test B-ls that are so equipped).

Sov position:

Inspect all heavy bomber bases and all heavy bombers. Don’t accept distinguishability between ALCM and non-ALCM B–1s.

Talking points:

○ We have addressed ALCMs all year, ever since the February ministerial in Moscow. While many major ALCM issues have been settled, the draft text in Geneva still contains a large number of unresolved ALCM issues.

○ If we are going to complete a treaty, we need to settle all of these issues once and for all.

○ During the long history of our discussions, the US has agreed to an extensive set of measures to control long-range nuclear ALCMs:

— Despite the formidable Soviet air defense network in which billions of rubles have been invested, the US agreed to a range threshold of 600 km.

— We agreed to ban ALCMs with multiple nuclear warheads.

— We agreed to make non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. If they are not, they will be considered nuclear.

— We agreed to exchange data on long-range nuclear ALCMs, and on the distinguishing characteristics of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, and on heavy bombers.

— While non-nuclear ALCMs are not constrained by the treaty, we agreed to exhibit any long-range non-nuclear ALCM we deploy, to confirm the distinguishing features.

— [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

— We agreed to on-site inspection of heavy bombers of types tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs to verify their distinguishing features, and confirm they are equipped within treaty limitations.

— We agreed that US heavy bombers will be equipped for no more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

○ The US has come a long way to meet your needs and concerns. All of these constraints on long-range nuclear ALCMs, and in particular our agreement to the 600 km range threshold, were accepted by the US on the understanding that non-nuclear ALCMs would not be constrained. This was the explicit understanding of the US.

○ More than once, we have left a ministerial meeting with agreed elements of common ground that we thought resolved the ALCM issues. Then new issues are raised.

○ The US has made a package proposal in Geneva to settle all of the ALCM issues. The US would accept a number of Soviet positions, and the Soviet Union would accept a number of ours.

○ If we are to meet our Presidents’ objective of concluding a START treaty soon, I suggest you join us now to make a concerted effort to close all the ALCM issues, once and for all.

(If he raises B–2 inspection:)

○ The B–2 has never been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs.

○ The purpose of inspections is to determine whether a heavy bomber of a type that has been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs is in fact equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Therefore, we accept inspection of B–1 and B–52, both of which have been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs.

○ If at some point in the future we should test the B–2 with long-range nuclear ALCMs, then this aircraft type would become subject to inspection.

○ The absence of testing should provide confidence that long-range nuclear ALCMs are not deployed on bombers of that type. This is the fundamental point.

(If he says all B–1s should counted as ALCM heavy bombers:)

○ The US is prepared to take steps to assure you that the B–1 is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

○ Amb. Bartholomew and Gen. Graves can give your people the details on this.

(If he proposes to limit nuclear weapons and nuclear ALCMs to [number not declassified] on US bombers and to 16 on Soviet bombers:)

○ The nuclear weapon limit would reopen the Reykjavik counting rule, and the new ALCM numbers would reopen the ALCM counting rule. These are central limits, agreed to at the highest levels, after protracted negotiations.

○ At this point we should not be reopening issues, we should be closing them.

PPCM

US position:

PPCM at solid rocket motor plants producing the first stage motor of MIRVed ICBMs with mobile variants (SS–24, M–X). PPCM at final assembly facilities for single-warhead ICBMs with mobile variants (SS–25, Small ICBM). Reciprocity in the number of PPCM sites when START enters into force. SSI (or periodic scheduled tours) at all solid rocket motor plants not subject to PPCM.

Sov position:

PPCM at 2 Soviet final assembly facilities—for the SS–25 at Votkinsk and the SS–24 at Pavlograd. PPCM at 2 US facilities—for the accountable stages of the MX and Small ICBM or such assembled missiles. Limit solid fuel rocket motors for the first stages of the SS–24, SS–25, MX, and Small ICBM to production, storage, assembly of stages or missiles, and test sites, and transit. These locations would not be subject to inspection. Other facilities could be listed and subject to SSI without right of refusal.

Talking points:

○ The mobile ICBM verification regime is extremely important to the US. Our agreement to drop our proposed ban on mobile ICBMs was based in large part on reaching agreement to an effective verification regime for these systems.

○ Counting the number of deployed mobile ICBMs is an extremely difficult verification problem, one we will have to solve if the treaty is to be ratified by the Senate.

○ We have concluded that the most effective means for doing so is to count the production of first-stage solid rocket motors—the first and most identifiable choke point in the production cycle for mobile ICBMs.

○ Monitoring only mobile missile final assembly facilities does not provide for effective verification. As you know, final assembly facilities have no unique signatures and missile assembly can be done virtually anywhere.

○ On November 6, prior to our meeting in Moscow, I sent you a letter which outlined a compromise proposal. That compromise incorporated ideas from your position and from our position.

○ For single-warhead missiles with mobile variants, PPCM would be established at final assembly facilities, as you propose.

○ For MIRV missiles with mobile variants, PPCM would be established at the solid rocket motor plants, as we propose.

— Since each MIRVed missile carries up to 10 warheads, it is necessary to count the number of MIRV missiles with higher confidence. Hence the difference in the method of PPCM.

○ There would be reciprocity in the number of facilities subject to PPCM, and that number could be very small, if production of first stages for MIRV missiles with mobile variants were consolidated or ended.

○ Facilities not subject to PPCM would be subject to inspection, to confirm that solid rocket motors are not being covertly produced and missiles are not being covertly assembled.

○ We also proposed a much simpler way to implement the concept of tagging.

○ We have received your response, and considered it carefully. Frankly, it does not reflect the same spirit of compromise that underlies our proposal. Your response simply repeats previous positions.

○ Throughout our discussions of this issue, the US has made proposals designed to address the concerns the Soviet side has raised. For example:

— We have agreed to allow a substantial number of mobile ICBMs in START, despite the fact that we may not deploy any.

— We have agreed to reciprocity in the number of facilities subject to PPCM, despite the fact that we have no mobile ICBMs.

— We have even agreed to put Peacekeeper in the mobile ICBM verification regime from the beginning, even though it is not now a mobile ICBM.

○ To meet your concerns with our proposal, Amb. Bartholomew in Washington offered a number of steps that would:

— Resolve your concern that on the Soviet side there will be more solid rocket motors than assembled missiles.

— Simplify inspection of solid rocket motor plants.

— Drop our proposal on periodic scheduled tours of certain solid rocket motor plants, which you have objected to.

○ With these steps can you agree to establish PPCM at the solid rocket motor plants where the SS–24 and Peacekeeper first stage motors are produced?

Heavy ICBM silos

○ As you know, the heavy ICBM issue continues to be a concern to the US, particularly as a political issue.

○ We have made many concessions that will allow you to maintain a viable heavy ICBM force through the duration of START.

○ Allowing the construction of new heavy ICBM silos would be a significant additional concession which would need to be justified in detail to the Senate in the ratification process.

— Until early this year the Soviet position also banned the construction of new heavy ICBM silos.

— Nothing has changed that now makes the construction of such silos imperative.

○ There have been no new silos since 1972, yet the Soviet heavy ICBM force has been extensively modernized, with several generations of new missiles.

○ Both SALT I and SALT II banned the construction of new ICBM silos.

○ The exchanges between Secretary Cheney and Minister Yazov left us confused why you want the right to construct new silos for heavy ICBMs.

○ I have studied the letter you and Minister Yazov sent to Secretary Cheney and me. It suggests two reasons for constructing new heavy ICBM silos—accidental destruction and relocation for “non-military” reasons.

○ You say you have no plans to do either, and rightfully so because such occurrences are quite unlikely. It would be better to construct the treaty around the most likely case—that neither of these contingencies arise—and include special provisions to handle them if the unlikely happens.

— This would solve your problem in a way that does not create one for us.

○ To do this we would ban the construction of new heavy ICBM silos, and include:

— A provision that would allow the replacement of a silo accidently destroyed after notification in the Joint Commission and confirmation that the silo is inoperable.

— A commitment that we would consider sympathetically a request in the Joint Commission to replace silos at bases closed for, as you say in your letter, non-military reasons due to internal political processes.

○ Can we agree on this as a way to deal with these unlikely contingencies in a way that does not cause us a problem?

1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, US/USSR Ministerial, Houston, Texas, December 9–12, 1990. Secret. No drafting information was found. Shevardnadze met with Baker in Houston December 9–11 to discuss the situation in the Persian Gulf and other matters. Memoranda of conversations pertaining to START were not found.