Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

176. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Energy Watkins, Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Jeremiah, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Kerry, and Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Lehman¹

Washington, December 10, 1990

SUBJECT

• Data Denial in START (S)

The attached paper records the consensus of our December 6 meeting as refined by subsequent work by our staffs. This consensus provides the basis for proposing an approach to the Soviets on data denial. (S)

However, our agreement leaves open the important question of how specifically to implement the exclusion of RV data. Let me ask DOD, DOE and the Intelligence Community to analyze, on a priority basis, the options to telemeter U.S. RV data under alternative data denial regimes, and the monitoring implications of such regimes. The alternatives should include the following:

— interpretative information would be provided for all data during the boost phase and could be withheld only for RV data transmitted after RV separation. (S)

— interpretative information would be provided for all missile data; constraints would be placed on what the sides could declare to be “RV data” prior to RV separation for which interpretative information could be withheld. Such constraints could include limits on the aggregate quantity, data rate, or other identifiable characteristics of RV telemetry prior to separation. (S)

Let me also ask DOD, DOE, and DCI to analyze options for the size of the “small annual quota” of test flights that could be excluded from the proposed information exchange. (S)

Please forward the preliminary results of both analyses to Arnie Kanter no later than Wednesday, December 12, for consideration by the Ungroup and, as necessary, at our level. (U)

Brent Scowcroft

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, December 9, 1990

U.S. Data-Denial Approach

DATA EXCHANGE

– For all ICBM and SLBM flight tests, a tape of all telemetry that is transmitted for the entire flight would be provided.

– Also provided would be information regarding the tape and the data recorded on the tape sufficient to derive the numerical values and engineering units of that data. The U.S. would also seek to exchange acceleration profiles. RV data would be excluded from these information exchange requirements.

– The term RV data refers only to measurements made from within the RV. The sides will agree on how to implement the exclusion of RV data.

– In the exceptional event that a side determines that disclosure of an anomaly during a specific flight test would create significant national security concerns, it would be allowed to delete from the information exchange those specific portions that, in its judgment, are necessary to protect data relating to the national security concern. The intent is to prevent disclosure of serious, unanticipated problems that may arise and the effectiveness of measures taken to remedy them. It is not intended to provide an opportunity to conceal tests of new developments or improvements. Information on all other portions of the flight data would be provided. In no case, however, may information be withheld that is necessary to monitor missile acceleration, boost-stage separation, RV-separation commands and RV releases. A tape of all telemetry that is transmitted for the entire flight would be provided.

— A side would be required to provide to the other side an explanation of its rationale for the deletions.

— There would be a small annual quota for the number of flights for which a side could invoke this exception procedure.

POWER LEVELS

– For existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs, each side would use its current practices to transmit telemetry (i.e., power levels, frequencies, bandwidth, type of modulation). Missile and RV telemetry would be included in this requirement.

— The US would seek to have the SICBM considered as an existing type for data denial purposes.

– For future types, transmission practices would be negotiated in the JCIC to ensure that each side can receive the telemetry transmissions of the other side. Missile and RV telemetry would be included in this negotiation.

– If the Soviets will not accept the SICBM as an existing missile only for the purpose of transmission practices, the US could declare the SICBM as an existing type for all purposes in START.

– If the Soviets refuse to accept that each side would use its current practices to transmit telemetry for existing types, and contingent on Soviet agreement to exchange telemetry tapes as described above, the US could agree that either side would be free to use the other side’s practices (i.e., power levels, frequencies, bandwidth, type of modulation) to transmit telemetry for existing types.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01033–006, START—December 1990. Secret.
2. Secret.