Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

178. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Baker¹

424164/TOSEC 290026.

Washington, December 17, 1990, 1430Z

SUBJECT

• START Package

1. (Secret)—Entire Text.

2. Embassy should deliver the note in Paras 3 and 4 below from Secretary Baker to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze ASAP. There will be no signed original. This package follows-up on the recent discussions in Houston and Washington.

3. Begin Text:

December 14, 1990

Dear Eduard,

– You and I discussed a package that would resolve several major START issues. At our last meeting I told you that the US can accept the package, provided we receive satisfactory answers to the questions I put to you and assuming that it does not change. To help both of us, the attached paper outlines the elements of the package.

– I think you will agree that with the summit dates now set for February 11–13² it is important that we nail down agreement on the package rapidly and move quickly to wrap up in Geneva the remaining START issues.

– I look forward to hearing from you on the package.

Sincerely,

James A. Baker, III

4. START Package

The following is the package that was discussed during the December 10–12 ministerial.

ALCMs and Heavy Bombers

○ A heavy bomber of a type which has not been flight tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs will not be subject to exhibition or inspection.

– Therefore, the B–2 will not be subject to exhibition or inspection so long as it is not flight tested with a long-range nuclear ALCM.

○ B–1 heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will count as 1 against the 6000 ceiling.

– B–1 heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will have the following distinguishing features:

– The bomb bay bulkhead will not permit long-range nuclear ALCMs to be loaded.

– ALCM pylon attachment joints will be covered except for two attachment joints which also serve as jacking points.

– Equipment for reconfiguring the B–1 bomb bay bulkhead and equipment for loading long-range nuclear ALCM pylons on a B–1 will not be located at airbases for B–1 heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This will not involve any new inspection rights.

– Each B–1 heavy bomber not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be exhibited once to confirm the distinguishing features.

○ US heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will each count as 10 against the 6000 ceiling, and will not be equipped for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs, and may be equipped for additional nuclear weapons other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

○ Soviet heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will each count as 8 against the 6000 limit, and will not be equipped for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs, and may be equipped for additional nuclear weapons other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

○ Up to 180 Soviet heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will each count as 8 against the 6000 limit. Beyond 180, such heavy bombers will count as the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which they are actually equipped. This represents a proportional adjustment down from 210 Soviet heavy bombers, to compensate for the increase in the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs from 12 to 16 per Soviet heavy bomber. The US number (150) is not changed.

○ The parties further agree that, with regard to heavy bombers, the provisions of Paragraph (-----) of article IV of the treaty shall not preclude the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside the territory of a party for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty. If a party stations heavy bombers outside its national territory for a period in excess of 30 days at any one time, it shall advise the other party through diplomatic channels before the end of the 30-day period, except that, if a party stations more than 30 heavy bombers outside its national territory at any one time, it shall advise the other party within 48 hours.

Data Denial

○ After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the sides will exchange:

– Tapes of all the telemetry broadcast from the flight.

– Information sufficient to derive the numerical values and engineering units of the telemetry recorded on those tapes. Re-entry vehicle data would be excluded from these requirements. Re-entry vehicle data are those measurements made from within the re-entry vehicle. These issues will be dealt with in Geneva.

– An acceleration profile for that flight, with the parameters described in the US proposal in Geneva.

○ In the exceptional event that a side determines that disclosure of an anomaly during a specific flight test would create significant national security concerns, it would be allowed to delete from the information exchange those specific portions that, in its judgement, are necessary to protect data relating to the national security concern. This exemption would be used rarely, and only in cases of genuine risk to security.

– If a side elects to withhold information, it will notify the other side and provide a rationale for the deletions.

– To prevent abuses, such withholding will be subject to a small annual quota.

– If a side elects to withhold information, information on all other telemetry channels other than those specifically exempted for security reasons will be exchanged.

– In no case may information be withheld that is necessary to monitor missile acceleration, boost stage separation, re-entry vehicle separation commands, or re-entry vehicle releases.

○ For 3 years following entry into force, each side will maintain its current practices with respect to the effective radiated power, broadcast frequency, bandwidth, and modulation methods used for transmitting telemetry from ICBMs or SLBMs. Current practices means those in effect on December 1, 1990.

– During this 3-year transition period, transmission practices will be negotiated in the JCIC to ensure that each side can receive the telemetry transmissions of the other side.

– These negotiated transmission practices will ensure equal reciprocal rights and obligations.

– If, after 3 years, the sides have not reached agreement on a regime for telemetry transmission, each side will be free to adopt the current practices of the other side in effect on December 1, 1990.

Throw Weight Package

○ All elements of the ad-referendum agreement worked out in Geneva on throw weight are confirmed, with the following observations:

– Aggregate throw weight will be limited to 54 percent of the Soviet aggregate throw weight at the time of signature, and shrouds will be excluded from accountable throw weight. This will be implemented in Geneva.

– One of the technical characteristics used to distinguish a new type of ICBM or SLBM from an existing type will be a difference of 10 percent or more in the length of the missile or the largest stage.

– The number of warheads attributed to a future type of ICBM will be based on the largest number of re-entry vehicles tested, but will be no less than 40 percent of the accountable throw weight divided by the weight of the lightest re-entry vehicle tested. In the case of new and unconventional front-end designs, the question of whether the 40 percent rule would be waived would be subject to consultation and agreement in the JCIC.

Downloading

○ The Soviet Union is drafting a letter of assurances and clarifications on the SS–N–18. The US proposes that the SS–N–18 be dealt with in the context of downloading.

○ The remaining issues with respect to downloading will be dealt with in the Geneva negotiations.

Rapid Reload

○ The remaining issues with respect to rapid reload will be dealt with in the Geneva negotiations.

PPCM

○ In the Soviet Union PPCM will be established at each facility producing mobile ICBMs and their silo-based variants. Currently these are Pavlograd and Votkinsk.

○ In the US PPCM will be established at each facility producing the accountable stages of mobile ICBMs and their silo-based variants, or such assembled missiles. The US currently has no mobile ICBMs. For purposes of reciprocity, the existing PPCM at Magna, Utah will be retained, and PPCM will be established at the facility producing the accountable stage of the peacekeeper ICBM. Currently this is Promontory, Utah.

○ There will be mutually agreed restrictions on where solid rocket motors for mobile ICBMs may be located.

○ There will be mandatory suspect-site inspection (without right of refusal) at an agreed list of locations (other than mobile ICBM solid rocket motor production and test facilities) at which covert assembly of mobile ICBMs might take place.

Heavy ICBM Silos

○ Construction of new silos for heavy ICBMs will be permitted only as replacements for existing heavy ICBM silos that have been eliminated in accordance with agreed procedures, so the number of heavy ICBM silos never exceeds 154.

○ Construction of new silos for heavy ICBMs shall be only for replacement of silos destroyed by accident or in the case of other exceptional circumstances that require relocation of silos. If such relocation is required, the party planning to construct the new silo launcher shall provide the other party with the reasons and plans for such relocation in the JCIC prior to the beginning of any new construction. End Text

Baker

Unquote

Eagleburger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N900009–0229. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information. Drafted by Roy; approved by Roy and in S/S. From December 16 to 18, Baker was in Brussels to attend a NATO ministerial meeting.
2. In a December 12 statement from the Rose Garden following a meeting with Shevardnadze and Baker Bush stated he was “hopeful that we will be ready to sign a treaty at a summit in Moscow on February 11 through 13.” (Public Papers: Bush, 1990, vol. II, p. 1786)