Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

1.

Dave, the following is a two-on-two report from November 20 submitted for your clearance.

2.

Begin summary. Amb Kuznetsov complained there had been no forward movement to implement the sides’ summit instructions. To achieve movement the Soviet side had taken a number of steps. It had proposed a common understanding on permitted and prohibited ABM activities, but the U.S. side refused to discuss the issue. It had offered a free-standing Predictability Measures (PM) agreement, and moved toward the U.S. position by accepting voluntary laboratory visits and [Page 899] dropping on-site inspection. The U.S. side, however, had not matched these steps. Pilot implementation was not such a step. The U.S. side opposed preparation of a JDT of the PM agreement and even an article-by-article discussion of draft texts. Finally, the Soviet side had proposed discussions on ASAT and space-to-earth weapons, but the U.S. side again was negative. Soviet-proposed PM were oriented mainly at ensuring compliance with the ABM treaty, in accord with the spirit and content of the summit agreements.

3.

Amb Smith said the U.S. side sought in DST a more stable strategic regime for the future, complementing other arms control agreements. Stability would be enhanced by defenses that threatened no one, and by an orderly cooperative transition. Soviet responses were not visions of a different future, but echoes of the past. They reminded one of a Gregorian chant: the ABM treaty was the cornerstone of stability for all time. The Soviet side had hinted that some changes in the ABM treaty might be acceptable, but never provided its views. The U.S. draft D&S treaty, which Kuznetsov had overlooked in his presentation, remained on the table. The U.S. side had left no stone unturned to advance the talks. It had illustrated the data exchange with a concrete project, tabled a draft free-standing PM agreement, hosted last December’s successful laboratory visit, offered SDIO director Monahan’s briefing, and proposed pilot implementation and dual pilot implementation. Only the unwillingness of the USSR to lift the veil of secrecy masking its ABM activities could explain the situation.

4.

Smith added that he was surprised to hear Kuznetsov mention ASAT and space-to-earth arms. In the past the Soviet side had said they would be addressed in the future talks. Gen-Lt Detinov responded that these systems determined strategic stability. A solution would have [to] be found in these talks, sooner or later.

5.

Mr. Courtney noted that at the last working group Col Novosadov had said third countries would view U.S. and Soviet deployment of defenses as a conspiracy against them, and this could bring the world to the brink of global war. Could the Soviet side explain how the latter might occur? Detinov replied that neither he nor Kuznetsov had ever said this, although it was true that third countries could view defenses with grave concern. Kuznetsov claimed any action by a great power was always seen by others with apprehension. End summary.

6.

Begin subject summary. Visit of Supreme Soviet Deputies; Defenses and Third Countries; Soviet Concerns in DST; End Subject Summary.

7.

Smith asked whether there was any news on the expected visit of Supreme Soviet deputies to Geneva. Detinov replied that currently the deputies were involved in discussing the Soviet military budget. Smith [Page 900] asked if the Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee had established a yearly cycle for considering budgetary matters. Detinov said no formal schedule had yet been established.

8.

Courtney referred to the last meeting of the working group at which Novosadov had indicated third countries might regard the deployment of defenses by the USSR and the U.S. as a conspiracy between them. According to Novosadov, this could lead to unpredictable consequences and might bring the situation to a brink of world war. How, Courtney asked, might this scenario occur?

9.

Detinov said such deployment could be regarded by third countries as an attempt by the superpowers to perpetuate their dominance. This, in turn, might stimulate those countries to develop more powerful systems, such as ballistic missiles. Kuznetsov added that any action taken by the superpowers was always perceived with apprehension by the rest of the world. While he could not say that ABM deployments would lead the world to a brink of war, responses by other countries to actions taken by the superpowers ought to be taken into account. Courtney asked again how the deployment of defenses would bring the world to the brink of a global war. Detinov responded that neither he nor Kuznetsov had ever said anything like this.

10.

Kuznetsov expressed concern about the lack of progress in DST. Based on summit joint statements both sides had tabled a number of proposals. The U.S. side had tried to hold the Soviet side responsible for the lack of progress, alleging it had hardened its position. The Soviet side had, however, proposed to implement the 1987 summit instructions by proposing to work out a common understanding on the boundary between permitted and prohibited ABM activities. The U.S. side had refused to discuss the issue. Similarly, the U.S. side had rejected the Soviet proposal concerning a common understanding on the basic terms used by the two sides in their respective draft documents. The obstacle at these negotiations was created by the negative attitude of the U.S. side.

11.

Kuznetsov said the Soviet side was equally constructive on the issue of a free-standing PM agreement. In its draft of March 13, the Soviet side had moved toward the U.S. position, first by agreeing with the U.S. approach to voluntary visits to laboratories and, second, by dropping its previous provision concerning on-site inspections. The Soviet side had the right to expect reciprocal steps from the U.S. side, which unfortunately had not followed. The U.S. proposal on pilot implementation was not sufficient. Pilot implementation would be premature and would not facilitate bringing the positions of the sides closer.

12.

Kuznetsov said that in April the Soviet side had proposed elaborating a JDT of a PM agreement. Such an approach would be conducive to organizing work and making it more substantive. Regrettably, this approach had also been rejected by the U.S. side, which had posed a number of preliminary conditions. In view of this, the Soviet side had proposed discussing the sides’ drafts article-by-article. This would allow the sides to reevaluate their approaches and expand the areas of common ground. This proposal also had been rejected. ASAT and space-to-earth arms issues were directly related to the objective of enhancing strategic stability and security, and were within the mandate of the two delegations. The Soviet side offered during the last two rounds to begin discussing these issues. This, too, met with a negative response by the U.S. side.

13.

Kuznetsov said the U.S. side recently began resorting more often to blaming the Soviet side for secrecy in the ABM area. This accusation was contrived. The U.S. side was attempting to place priority on openness as a precondition to reaching a PM agreement; this was a reversal of the mandate for the talks. The Soviet side had demonstrated openness by proposing to exchange data on all ABM activities, and by agreeing to meetings of experts and observations of tests. Soviet acceptance of voluntary invitations to a number of facilities, as a predictability measure, also constituted proof of readiness to display openness. Openness per se was good in terms of enhancing stability, but for the U.S. side the objective of CBMS was to facilitate a cooperative transition to future deployment of strategic ballistic missile defenses.

14.

Kuznetsov said anything other than ABM treaty constraints would run counter to the 1987 summit agreement to commit the sides to comply with the ABM treaty as signed in 1972. In fact, the PM proposals tabled by the Soviet side corresponded to the letter and the spirit of this agreement.

15.

In conclusion, Kuznetsov said, Soviet proposals gave evidence of the consistent efforts of the Soviet side to achieve progress. As for U.S. proposals—such as the invitation of Soviet experts to two U.S. laboratories, providing an illustration of the data exchange based on specific projects, the briefing by Gen Monahan, and the proposal of pilot implementation—the Soviet side appreciated them, but did not think they brought the two positions closer together. What was absent was an adjustment in the U.S. position of the kind that would contribute to progress and invigorate these talks.

16.

Smith said the U.S. his side was trying to construct a regime that would make the future strategic relationship more stable, while capitalizing on the improvements in relations. In DST the two sides had an opportunity to design the force structure of the future in such a way that would create a much more stable situation. This task required creativity and new thinking. The U.S. side believed stability would [Page 902] be enhanced by adding strategic defenses, which threatened no one. Moreover, the U.S. side aspired to an orderly, cooperative [garble] and wanted to discuss with the Soviet side the specific ways of implementing it.

17.

Smith said Soviet proposals constituted an echo from the past—a Gregorian chant—the ABM treaty, as signed in 1972, was the cornerstone of stability for all time. Smith said he doubted whether this document, born in the strategic thought of the 1960s, could be immutable in the changing strategic environment. Even such paradigms of political forethought as the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the U.S. Constitution had undergone amendments. The only document that had survived the ages without change was the Bible.

18.

Smith said that, with regard to possible amendments of the ABM treaty, the Soviet side had never gone beyond vague hints. Curiously, Kuznetsov had failed to note that the U.S. draft DST treaty was on the negotiating table. The U.S. side was still interested in negotiating the measures contained in it. Considering the lack of a positive response from the Soviet side to numerous U.S. proposals advanced over the last two years, the sides had not been able to move forward even on peripheral issues.

19.

As for Kuznetsov’s reaction to the U.S. accusation of Soviet secrecy in the ABM area, Smith said he thought this showed that U.S. statements had hit a raw nerve. Secrecy was the only explanation the U.S. side could find for Soviet intransigence.

20.

Regarding Kuznetsov’s reference to the need to turn attention to ASAT and space-to-earth arms, Smith said this was new. Previously, the Soviet side had stated that these issues ought to be for the future talks. The U.S. had concluded that a comprehensive ASAT agreement would not be in its interest. It had considered a number of possible arms control regimes for ASAT, and not yet found one that would increase U.S. security. As for space-to-earth weapons, Smith said he had never known what those were. Each time he asked the Soviet side about them, he received vague statements about forest fires.

21.

In conclusion, Smith said Kuznetsov’s statement was comprehensive but negative. What was its purpose? Detinov responded that the objective was, first, to refute U.S. accusations concerning the unwillingness of the Soviet side to achieve progress, and, second, to urge the U.S. side to take similar steps as the Soviet side had taken to fulfill the mandate for these talks. As for ASAT and space-to-earth arms, the 1985 mandate called for an agreement to prevent an arms race in space. The Soviet side had been saying these two issues ought to be considered at the current talks. Unlike the question of the ABM treaty, however, ASAT and space-to-earth arms issues had not been linked by the Soviet side to a START agreement. However, the Soviet side proceeded on the [Page 903] understanding that related issues had an impact on strategic stability and, therefore, solutions to those issues should be worked out.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

167. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1

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