Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

160. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Burt) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, October 1, 1990

SUBJECT

• START: Update for Wednesday’s² Meeting with Shevardnadze

I have spent several hours with Nazarkin,³ my Soviet counterpart, on various START issues, and have the following to report:

First, we have made good progress on putting together a so-called missile elimination package which would allow us to resolve several important issues. The package includes the following elements:

— No requirement under START to destroy ICBMs or SLBMs. (Soviets previously sought such destruction).

— A limit of 250 non-deployed mobile ICBMs, which will apply to both silo-based and mobile variants of the SS–24 (Soviets previously sought to exclude silo-based SS–24s).

— Some form of Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) for all mobile ICBMs, with details to be agreed.

— A ban on using START ballistic missiles to deploy weapons in space. (Our major concession.)

— A reference in the START Preamble to Article XI of the ABM Treaty, which refers only to an undertaking to continue active negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

— Dropping the Soviet-proposed Agreed Statements claiming a right to withdraw from START if we violate the ABM Treaty.

There is one big problem, however. We sought to ban only “operational deployment” of weapons in space. The Soviets object, arguing (correctly) that this allows testing ABM weapons in orbit and thus requires them to accept the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Nazarkin suggested instead that we refer only to “deployment”, thus kicking the broad versus narrow issue down the road, as we have done on overall ABM issues. The arms control group here accepted this approach, but experts in OSD object Thus, for now, we are dead in the water.

Second, Nazarkin suggested a possible package deal involving heavy missiles and Backfire. He suggested that if we drop restrictions on heavy ICBM flight testing, Shevardnadze could accept 325 Soviet Air Force Backfires (525 overall, which is within our guidance). Without commenting on the trade, I told Nazarkin that any package must include a positive outcome on remaining heavy ICBM issues, specifically Soviet acceptance of a ban on new SS-18 silos and on SS-18 downloading.

Third, Nazarkin says Shevardnadze wants to close out noncircumvention. While the Soviets prefer a U.S. or U.S./U.K. statement, they appear willing to make a unilateral statement saying that if we were to expand cooperation with the British beyond SLBMs, the Soviets would consider such an expansion grounds for withdrawing from START. As part of settling the non-circumvention issue, Nazarkin believes the related issues of third country basing an inspections [less than 1 line not declassified] could also be resolved.

Fourth, Nazarkin says that if we make progress on other issues, such as non-circumvention, the Soviets will be willing to solve the issue of conventional ALCMs with multiple warheads on the basis of a letter from you making clear that we would not use development of such weapons as a means to circumvent the ban on nuclear ALCMs with multiple warheads. The text of a proposed letter, which has been cleared by the arms control group, is attached.⁴

In sum, I think we are well-positioned to get a lot done this week. That said, I am very worried about the space deployment and testing problem. If we end up asking the Soviets to agree—in explicit language—that we can test weapons in orbit, it would be tantamount to “reverse linkage”: Making their acceptance of the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty a precondition to our agreeing to START.

1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, New York October 5, 1990. Secret. Copied to Bartholomew.
2. October 3.
3. No memorandum of conversation was found.
4. Not attached. See Document 162.