Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

16. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

DEFENSE AND SPACE (D&S) NEGOTIATIONS

In contrast to START, where substantial convergence of U.S. and Soviet approaches is recorded in a Joint Draft Text (JDT) of several hundred pages, there is no JDT in the D&S talks and agreement on only a handful of issues, reflecting continuing differences on broad objectives as well as specific positions. Yet at Soviet insistence (at least so far) the two negotiations remain linked. This paper reviews U.S. and Soviet goals in D&S, discusses key negotiating issues, looks at the impact of our internal defense review, and describes possible outcomes of the START/D&S dilemma.

Soviet Goals in D&S

The Soviets have traditionally devoted more effort than the U.S. to defending themselves against nuclear attack (e.g., extensive air defenses, operational Moscow ABM complex, active research on advanced ABM technologies). But they have opposed SDI ever since President Reagan’s 1983 speech because they:

— wish to avoid an expensive competition that could be disruptive of their economic reforms plans;

— fear our lead in advanced technologies could give us a military advantage in defensive systems (as well as in other military applications that might spin off from SDI); and

— believe SDI could lead to termination of the ABM Treaty, which the Soviets see as the foundation of a stable and predictable strategic environment.

The main Soviet objective in D&S has therefore been to block or at least inhibit SDI, both directly (through treaty provisions that legally constrain the program) and indirectly (by seeking to undermine U.S. public and Congressional support for it). A key element of their strategy has been to link conclusion of START to agreement on D&S. Their rationale for linkage is that, unless defenses are severely constrained, START’s reductions would be destabilizing because the combination of fewer forces and widespread defenses capable of blunting retaliation would increase first strike incentives.

U.S. Goals in D&S

The U.S. goal in D&S, at least at the outset in March 1985, was largely damage limitation—to avoid constraints on SDI beyond those already contained in the ABM Treaty that would prevent us from determining the feasibility of advanced defenses and making an informed decision on whether to deploy.

We saw little need for a new agreement on defenses. For the time being, the ABM Treaty met our needs. It enabled us to conduct the SDI feasibility testing we required (especially when we moved to the Treaty’s “broad” interpretation in October 1985); it permitted us to withdraw with six months’ notice should we later decide to deploy; and in the meantime, it served as a barrier to sudden Soviet ABM deployments.

For these reasons, we had not been interested in 1985 in a D&S negotiation and had only acquiesced as the price for Soviet acceptance of START negotiations. But while agreeing to set up a D&S forum, we rejected Soviet linkage of START to D&S—as well as the Soviet rationale that, in the absence of severe constraints on defenses, deep reductions in offensive forces would undermine stability. We argued instead that strategic defenses and deep reductions in offensive forces could work together to promote a more stable world less reliant on the threat of retaliation by offensive forces. Indeed, one of our main objectives in D&S has been to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on how, should defenses prove feasible, a “cooperative transition” to such a world could be managed.

As negotiations proceeded—and particularly as Congress began cutting SDI spending, opposing the broad interpretation, and legislating restrictions on testing to enforce its preference for the narrow interpretation—our approach to D&S shifted subtly. D&S became not just a damage limitation exercise but potentially a device for facilitating SDI. For example, instead of simply rejecting testing limits that would prevent us from fully exploiting the broad interpretation, we would insist on provisions that clearly acknowledged our right to proceed under that interpretation. Such provisions would later help protect the program from Soviet efforts to persuade the Congress that planned SDI testing was inconsistent with U.S. ABM and D&S obligations.

This shift late in the Reagan Administration toward using D&S to facilitate SDI did not, however, involve a change in our position on START-D&S linkage. We still maintained that START should go forward even in the absence of agreement on D&S. What we were saying is that, if a D&S agreement is reached, it must be helpful to the program, not just harmless.

The Major Issues in the D&S Negotiations

After an 18-month stalemate in D&S, agreement was reached at the Reykjavik summit on a framework for meeting the Soviet concern that defenses be constrained while START reductions are proceeding. The two sides would negotiate a new agreement (separate from START but commencing simultaneously with it) that would commit each party to abide by the ABM Treaty and not exercise its right of withdrawal from that Treaty for an agreed length of time. In the two years following Reykjavik, however, minimal progress was made on the terms of such an agreement. Following are brief discussions of the key issues.

Permitted Activities. The most important and contentious issue has concerned what ABM activities, particularly space-based testing, would be permitted during the ABM nonwithdrawal period. The Soviets, who originally proposed a ban on all SDI scientific research (which would be far more restrictive than any interpretation of the ABM Treaty), later offered two alternatives, both of which they claim are based on the “narrow” interpretation (as they put it, the ABM Treaty “as signed and ratified in 1972”):

— Arguing (with justification) that the ABM Treaty’s applicability to advanced technologies requires clarification, they proposed a package of technical parameters that would limit the characteristics of ABM devices that could be tested in space. Some of their parameters seemed reasonable; others seemed more restrictive than the narrow interpretation.

— Alternatively, they are prepared simply to incorporate into the D&S agreement the ambiguous formulation on testing that was adopted at the 1987 Washington summit to paper over differences. Their willingness to settle for ambiguity suggests that, having failed to gain U.S. acceptance of explicit restrictions on SDI, they may intend to pursue a strategy of relying on domestic pressures rather than legal limits to keep SDI in bounds. Under such a strategy, a D&S agreement containing an ambiguous testing provision would be concluded, together with a START Treaty. Then, hoping to stimulate public and Congressional opposition to any future SDI tests that even approached the ambiguous area, the Soviets would threaten to terminate START if the U.S. violated the limits on testing.

The U.S. has sought, without success, to gain formal acceptance of the “broad” interpretation (which would allow realistic testing in space of fully integrated, advanced ABM systems and fully capable components of such systems—not just tests of reduced-capability sub-components of such systems which would be allowed under the “narrow” interpretation).

We have rejected the Soviet idea of negotiating technical thresholds that would divide permitted from prohibited tests. Although State supported this idea (and believed thresholds could be worked out that would meet SDI requirements and resolve the interpretation controversy with Congress), the President ruled against it on the grounds that it would be hard to verify and that we should not compromise any of our testing rights under the broad interpretation.

We also rejected the Soviet alternative of adopting the ambiguous formula, fearing that the Soviets—as suggested above—might seek to exploit the ambiguity to bring domestic pressure to bear on U.S. SDI activities. We instead insisted that any D&S agreement clearly provide for “broad” testing rights. Unable to get the Soviets to agree explicitly to the broad interpretation, we took initiatives in 1988 aimed at obtaining at least their tacit approval:

— We proposed to free all space-based sensors capable of performing ABM functions from the ABM Treaty’s restrictions.

— To reassure the Soviets that U.S. testing in space would not be so extensive as to constitute deployment, we provided a unilateral assurance that we would test space-based ABM weapons only from a limited number (15) of ABM test satellites.

The Soviets reacted negatively to both initiatives, arguing that they were designed to implement the broad interpretation.

Length of nonwithdrawal period. An issue never considered to be insurmountable is the length of the commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The Soviets propose a 10-year period that would begin whenever the D&S agreement enters into force. Our most recent position is “ten years from Reykjavik” or 1996, but we have made clear that this question could more usefully be handled when the two sides are closer to agreement.

Duration/right to deploy. An issue that has assumed substantial political and symbolic importance is the question of applicable rights and obligations once the nonwithdrawal period has ended. The Soviets propose that the D&S agreement simply expire at the end of that period, restoring the right of either side to withdraw from the ABM Treaty by giving six months’ notice and declaring why it believes continued adherence would jeopardize its “supreme national interests.”

The U.S. has believed that, under an approach requiring formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the decision to proceed with deployment after the nonwithdrawal period would entail substantial political costs. It has therefore favored a D&S agreement of unlimited duration under which each side, at the end of the nonwithdrawal period, would have an explicit “right to deploy” defenses beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty. To exercise that right, it would have to give six months’ notice, but would not have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty or provide any justification based on jeopardy to its supreme interests. To guard against sudden Soviet deployment at the end of the nonwithdrawal period, both sides would remain bound by the ABM Treaty until either one decided to exercise the right to deploy. The Soviets strongly oppose a “right to deploy,” arguing that it would create too strong a presumption in favor of deployment and termination of the ABM Treaty.

Verification and predictability measures. In response to Soviet concerns about the uncertainties and instabilities associated with movement toward defenses, we have proposed a package of predictability measures aimed at giving each side greater confidence about the pace and direction of the other’s defense program. But the Soviets say they want to block the path to reliance on defenses, not make it more predictable. Accordingly, they argue that such measures should serve the narrow purpose of verifying compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Despite this difference of philosophy, the Soviets have begun working with us on a Predictability Protocol and have accepted U.S. concepts on annual exchanges of data, meetings of experts, and observation of field tests. They also proposed mandatory consultations and inspections that we have rejected.

Linkage between D&S and START. From the outset of the talks, the Soviets have never wavered in making completion of START conditional upon conclusion of a D&S agreement. They later reinforced their linkage by including in their START treaty draft a provision that would automatically terminate START if either side violated the ABM Treaty or D&S agreement.

We have opposed these linkages, arguing that neither side’s security would be jeopardized by completing START and bringing it into force even in the absence of agreement on D&S. However, we introduced a linkage of our own: a provision enabling the D&S agreement to enter into force only if there is a START agreement. Subsequently we offered to withdraw our linkage if the Soviets withdrew theirs, but they refused.

Implications of our Defense Review

From what has been made known so far, the President’s recent SDI decision will not involve major changes in the goals or direction of the program (although spending will clearly be cut). The President seems to have decided against near-term deployment of ground-based systems with limited objectives (e.g., thin protection against accidental or third-party launches) and in favor of continuing to explore a layered approach with both ground- and space-based elements that would be designed to meet the JCS’s fairly ambitious Phase I effectiveness goals. Special attention would apparently be given to determining the feasibility of promising technologies such as Brilliant Pebbles. Until program restructuring decisions are taken and a budget figure is approved by Congress, it will not be clear what effect the inevitable spending cut will have on the program’s estimated schedule.

Given the continuity in the SDI program, no changes in our D&S negotiating positions will be required to make them consistent with the President’s decision. Nonetheless, in the weeks leading up to the expected June resumption of NST, the Arms Control PCC will conduct a review of our D&S approach. Although no issues have yet been singled out for review, several are prime candidates:

— Permitted testing. Although our current position seeks to permit the full range of testing under the broad interpretation, Congress has been unwilling to fund testing that exceeds the narrow interpretation. Therefore, while asserting the legality of the broad, we have had no choice but to conduct our program in accordance with the narrow. This situation is unlikely to change; nor is Soviet opposition to testing under the broad interpretation.
Before the recent decision, the SDIO said that we did not plan to go beyond the narrow interpretation until FY 96. Additional budget cuts could slip that date further. In our review, we should consider the impact on the SDI program of committing to the narrow interpretation for various periods of time. And given the political sensitivity surrounding the broad/narrow distinction, we should consider alternatives that do not clearly opt for one or the other (e.g., negotiation of performance thresholds; allowing sensors to go unconstrained while limiting “kill mechanisms” to the narrow).

— “Other physical principles” (OPP). An esoteric but critical matter that should be resolved soon is the legal issue of whether “hit to kill” weapons such as SDIO’s planned space-based interceptors or Brilliant Pebbles are based on physical principles other than those utilized at the time of the 1972 ABM Treaty. If they are deemed to be based on then-existing principles rather than OPP (which many believe), those weapons could not legally be tested in space as fully capable prototypes even under the broad interpretation. Such a finding would make the broad interpretation less useful to us, and would force us to alter how we plan to test such weapons. The legal decision has so far been ducked as too hot to handle.

— Length of nonwithdrawal period. Former SDIO Director Abrahamson claims that Brilliant Pebbles could be deployed in about five years. Most estimates for initial deployments of Phase I systems range from FY 98 to well into the next century. Given the uncertainties, it is unlikely we will be able to sort out our position on the length of a nonwithdrawal period for quite some time.

— Right to Deploy. We have assumed that exercising an explicit “right to deploy” defenses would be politically much less costly than having to utilize the ABM Treaty’s withdrawal procedure in order to go forward with deployment plans. In practice, the political costs are likely to depend much less on the legal mechanism used than on the public’s perception of the soundness of the decision to deploy. Nonetheless, there is no compelling need to change our position now.

Outlook

Moscow ministerial. With the D&S review not yet even underway, we cannot expect much new guidance on D&S issues for your use in Moscow. We will probably have to confine ourselves to reiterating basic goals, such as finding a solution that permits both sides to explore the feasibility of strategic defenses while providing them with predictability about the evolution of the future strategic relationship.

NST resumption. Looking beyond Moscow to NST resumption, there will be strong support (from OSD, the VP’s office, and perhaps ACDA) for maintaining our current positions. The argument will be made, with justification, that sorting out the impact of the President’s SDI decision on the pace and structure of the program will take time, and changes in our negotiating position would therefore be premature.

Reinforcing that view is the widespread belief that the impasse in D&S is likely to last until START is nearing completion; so there is no need to move now. There is merit in this argument. If budgetary and technological realities force continued delays in the SDI program and if progress in our ICBM modernization programs alleviates at least some of our concerns about vulnerability, the necessary compromises on D&S may become politically easier. However, some issues will always be politically difficult (e.g., “right to deploy”), especially in the endgame, and a case can be made for disposing of them soon.

The START/D&S dilemma. Theoretically, there are three ways the obstacle created by Soviet linkage can be removed:

— De-link. The Soviets would drop their linkage and allow START to enter into force while D&S remained unresolved. While this is not likely, it is possible, especially if the Soviets grew impatient for START and if they calculated that, given Congressional, budgetary, and, technological constraints on SDI, additional legal constraints were unnecessary. For us, the benefit of this approach is that we could achieve START without having to face tough choices in D&S. A downside is that, with SDI testing issues left unresolved, the Soviets might try to manipulate our internal SDI debate by threatening to end START if we exceeded the narrow interpretation.

— D&S agreement on our terms. START could be completed without de-linkage if the Soviets agreed to our D&S proposals. Not only would START go forward, but winning Soviet approval for the broad interpretation could insulate SDI from domestic pressures. But it is hard to imagine the Soviets agreeing to this unless they have a complete change of heart on SDI.

— D&S agreement on compromise terms. This would require finding compromises on tough issues such as testing. But if solutions could be found compatible with a healthy SDI program, this approach would enable us to have START as well as a clear regime on ABM testing that would insulate the program from Soviet pressures. The downside is that any compromise solution short of legalizing full broad interpretation testing rights will be criticized by some as selling out SDI.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Lot 93D188, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, Baker/Shevardnadze in Moscow Copy of May 6, 1989 S/P-Ross to Baker briefing book for Moscow Ministerial. Secret. Ross sent the paper to Baker under cover of a May 6 memorandum. (Ibid.)