Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

17. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 10, 1989, 4–6:55 p.m.

The Secretary’s May 10–11 Visit to Moscow: Second Small Group Meeting with Shevardnadze

SUBJECTS

• Regional Issues: Middle East, Lebanon, Libya, Iran; Human Rights; Arms Control: START/Defense & Space, Krasnoyarsk, SLCMs, Depressed Trajectory SLBMs

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
  • Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
  • Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State, T
  • Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State, EUR
  • Dennis B. Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
  • Margaret D. Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State, PA
  • Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State, HA
  • Arnold Kanter, Senior Director, NSC Staff
  • Richard Burt, Head of Delegation, Nuclear and Space Talks
  • Alexander Vershbow, Director EUR/SOV (notetaker)
  • Dmitriy Zarechnak, Galina Tunick, interpreters

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, 1st Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Viktor Karpov, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Yuriy Dubinin, USSR Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Sergey Tarasenko, Special Assistant to the Minister
  • Aleksey Obukhov, Head, USA Administration, MFA
  • Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Director, USA Administration (notetaker)
  • Yevgeniy Gusarev, USA Administration (notetaker)
  • Interpreters

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Arms Control

Shevardnadze said the working group² had considered many political and military subjects related to the talks. We have not made any actual progress recently because of the break in the negotiations and we needed to have an exchange on that issue.

The Secretary asked whether he had in mind the question of when to resume the negotiations.

Shevardnadze replied that he actually had in mind the state of the discussions in the negotiations themselves on nuclear and space arms, chemical weapons, etc. Shevardnadze asked how much longer the Secretary had for discussion this evening.

The Secretary replied that he had to go on an inspection tour of the new office building. He would have to make a decision on this soon and therefore would have to break off the talks at 6:40. They could then resume discussion of arms control in their morning session on May 11.

Overall Arms Control Approach

The Secretary said he wanted to begin by outlining the principles underlying the Administration’s arms control approach. Our goal was stability, not reductions for their own sake. We wanted to pursue stability through several means: reductions, force restructuring, confidence-building measures; and other steps to create greater openness. We saw arms control as serving a number of goals: reducing the risk of war, promoting greater stability and predictability, and constraining or eliminating specific threats. We believed that fundamental improvements in this area would take time and patience.

The Secretary recalled that he had spoken of the U.S. desire to give greater emphasis to regional problems. This did not lessen our desire to move forward on arms control. We were ready and anxious to reengage. We had completed our policy reviews except for our actual negotiating positions. He was therefore prepared to give dates for resuming negotiations even though some specific issues were still under review.

START/Defense and Space

Generally speaking, the Secretary said, the Soviets could expect a considerable degree of continuity in the U.S. position even though, like any new Administration, we had to reserve the right to make some changes and to introduce new ideas. Indeed, this was an ongoing right for both sides. When the START negotiations resumed, we would be prepared to proceed using the Joint Draft Text as the basis for further discussion, reserving the right to make changes and advance new ideas.

As for dates, the Secretary said we were prepared to resume START and Defense and Space the weeks of June 12, 19 or 26—it was the Soviets’ option. We would expect the first NST round to last long enough for the sides to get reestablished, i.e. about six weeks. They could then recess for further analysis and resume in mid-September.

Shevardnadze said he had no fundamental differences with the Secretary’s review of general principles. The Soviets also desired to strengthen stability and assure security, both national and global. They wanted security to rest on progressively lower levels of forces. He also welcomed the Secretary’s remark that the sides should base their approach on the highest statements of their leaders, the Washington Summit Joint Statement (WSJS)³ and the Moscow Summit statement⁴ reaffirming the WSJS. The Soviets subscribed to another of the Secretary’s ideas: it was only natural that, in the course of the talks, changes would be introduced.

As for resumption dates, Shevardnadze recalled that at their Vienna meeting,⁵ he had suggested another date, but the U.S. had not been in a position to agree for obvious reasons. The Soviets were now prepared to resume by the end of May, but in light of the Secretary’s comments he would like to accept June 12.

The Secretary said that one problem stemmed from the fact that, as he had mentioned earlier, the U.S. had a government of shared power. Ambassador Burt was still in the process of being confirmed by the U.S. Senate. We should shoot for June 12 and, if Ambassador were not confirmed by that date, someone else would be at the table for the U.S.

Shevardnadze said he understood and would keep this arrangement in mind. What was most important was that we come up with new ideas for discussion at future Ministerials that could perhaps be agreed at an eventual Summit. The Soviets hoped that the U.S. strategic review would soon be completed and that NST, once resumed, would proceed at a faster pace and produce concrete results. The key for the Soviets was the attainment of concrete results. As for the U.S. idea of a break after six weeks, this was all right, although the delegations had already had an extended break. He would only add that the Soviets regretted that considerable time had been lost. In the meanwhile, new weapons had been developed and accumulated—a trend which caused concern and alarm, he assumed, on the U.S. side as well. Shevardnadze, to conclude, suggested that the Ministers announce that agreement had been reached to resume NST in the second ten-day period in June.

The Secretary asked whether this meant between June 10 and 20?

Shevardnadze confirmed this, noting that the Secretary had mentioned June 12 as a possibility.

The Secretary said he had mentioned the 19th as well, and agreed that speaking of the second ten-day period would provide needed flexibility.

Shevardnadze commented that one week was not crucial. Turning to specifics, Shevardnadze said these would be taken up by the working group. He did want to offer some overall comments, however. First, he wished to stress the point that the sides should stick with agreements that had already been reached. Through common efforts, a great deal of work had been done to draft the basic elements of a treaty involving 50 percent reductions in strategic weapons, provided that the ABM Treaty were observed. The treaty covered different weapons—ballistic missiles, including heavy ICBMs (which would be cut 50 percent), air-launched cruise missiles, etc. We had made considerable headway on mobile ICBMs in terms of limiting their range of operational activity and methods of verification. We had agreed on numerical limits for certain types of weapons, or at least had defined overall limits. Much progress had been made on verification, building on the experience of the INF Treaty. That was a unique effort, but serious problems did remain, and he did not rule out the possibility that these would be discussed by Gorbachev at his meeting with the Secretary the following morning.

One of the basic issues, Shevardnadze continued, was the preservation of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972—in other words, the narrow interpretation. This was the understanding reached in Washington and Moscow. The Soviet Union intended to stick by this. Shevardnadze added that both sides had concerns about violations of the ABM Treaty. This was a serious issue. The Soviets were prepared to act in a more efficient way to apply existing mechanisms like the SCC. Moreover, if we saw the need, we could send high-ranking military officials and diplomats to participate in the work of the SCC. Shevardnadze noted that he had once suggested that we hold an SCC session at the level of Chief of Staff or Defense Secretary to improve the quality of the organization’s work.

Krasnoyarsk Radar

Shevardnadze said the U.S. had expressed concerns about Soviet ABM Treaty violations, such as the radar station at Krasnoyarsk. A specific explanation had been given by Gorbachev at the United Nations in December to the effect that the Soviets were prepared to hand everything there over to scientists—not only Soviet scientists but those of other countries—so that the facility could be used for the peaceful exploration of outer space.

If there were firm agreement on the observation of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, Shevardnadze continued, the Soviets would be prepared totally to dismantle the facility at Krasnoyarsk. If the U.S. viewed the problem as exceptionally urgent and as an obstacle to progress in other directions, one of the major problems that the Soviets believed need to be clarified was the approach to the ABM Treaty.

The Secretary asked whether Shevardnadze was proposing that the U.S. change its position on the ABM Treaty—on the narrow vs. broad question and on the right to deploy—in exchange for the Soviets’ agreeing to dismantle Krasnoyarsk.

Shevardnadze responded that the Soviets did not consider the Krasnoyarsk radar to be a violation of the ABM Treaty. But if the U.S. did consider it to be a violation, and if the U.S. accepted the narrow interpretation, then the Soviets would agree to dismantle the facility.

The Secretary said that we would probably end up disagreeing on this. The U.S. position was that Krasnoyarsk was a violation regardless of which interpretation of the ABM treaty one used. Thus he did not believe the U.S. would be prepared to accept Shevardnadze’s approach. We would, however, look at the proposal.

The Secretary added that Krasnoyarsk still represented an impediment to the conclusion of a START agreement. Moreover, we still needed to talk about Gomel as well. Compliance was an important principle. We knew that the things at Gomel were no longer deployed, but some of the procedures to which the Soviets had agreed were not fully carried out; this had already been discussed in the working group. When we go to the public and Congress with arms control agreements, we needed to be able to say that we can hold the Soviets to strict adherence. We wanted at all costs to avoid another SALT II experience in which we could not get an agreement ratified. We needed at all costs to convince those who have doubts about arms control by demonstrating that we are serious, scrubbing agreements very carefully, and not rushing things, that we have explored all the issues in a thorough, methodical way.

Shevardnadze replied that the Soviets were not asking for anything that would not appear to be natural. The sides should reaffirm their adherence to the agreements reached in Washington and Moscow. For example, in Moscow, the joint statement declared that the sides had agreed to work out an agreement that would “commit the two sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time.” If we could reach understanding and agreement on the basis of this provision, then Krasnoyarsk would not be an impediment. “We would be prepared to dismantle everything we have there,” Shevardnadze declared. He went on to say that the Soviets understood that the U.S. had problems with Congress. They did not want to be an impediment. But the key was to reaffirm the WSJS and its reaffirmation in Moscow.

The Secretary asked Under Secretary Bartholomew to comment.

Bartholomew stated that the U.S. agreed that the WSJS was an important milestone. But as his colleague Ambassador Burt had explained in the working group, both sides understood that it was not the final word. Each side interpreted that language differently. This lack of agreement was the problem we needed to tackle. This said, the U.S. could confirm that our position remained that we should build on the WSJS language in negotiating a Defense and Space agreement.

The Secretary added that in January 1988, in the first plenary meeting after the Washington summit, the U.S. made clear it intended to exercise its right to deploy advanced defenses if these proved feasible. Secretary Shultz had also said that there must be a clear right to deploy at the end of the non-withdrawal period. Thus there was a clear difference of view: the WSJS language was a conscious effort to bridge the gap by finding a formula whereby the U.S. could observe the narrow interpretation while preserving its right to go to the broad. It was hard to conceive trading this off for Soviet compliance vis-à-vis Krasnoyarsk.

Shevardnadze rejoined that it was not a matter of a trade-off. The U.S. had an equal interest in preserving the ABM Treaty. If the U.S. implemented its SDI-related programs, the Soviets would find an appropriate response. This had been said in the past but now could be said with greater certainty, since Shevardnadze now better understood Soviet capabilities. There was an objective interest on both sides in seeing the ABM Treaty observed. This was what our two countries’ leaders had agreed to. It was not fortuitous that the Secretary had quoted from a statement by his predecessor and Shevardnadze’s good friend George Shultz, whereas he, Shevardnadze, had quoted from a document signed by the two leaders to preserve the ABM Treaty “as signed in 1972.” All the points of emphasis in the WSJS formula had been made in a clear way. If the sides could reaffirm and abide by it, then Krasnoyarsk would not be a problem.

The Secretary reiterated that the WSJS language was subject to different interpretations. We had neither rejected nor renounced our right at a later date to interpret broadly the ABM Treaty. This issue had not been resolved.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to stress the following passage: “not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period.” As regards what would happen afterwards, that would be subject to negotiation. An understanding had been reached on this score.

Bartholomew said the U.S. continued to subscribe . . .

Shevardnadze broke in to say, jokingly, that he felt it was going to be difficult to deal with Bartholomew.

The Secretary rejoined that it was, in fact, easy to deal with him.

Shevardnadze said: “maybe for you, but not for us.”

Bartholomew, resuming, said his point was that the U.S. stood by the Washington statement. As we had moved forward to apply that statement in the Defense and Space talks, however, we had found that we each interpreted the WSJS formula to mean different things. Thus we proposed to tackle these differences in the context of building upon the WSJS.

Shevardnadze said he believed he had found a way to break the deadlock: hand the problem over to the working group.

The Secretary said he had no problem with this suggestion, but the Ministers would have to face up to this problem later.

Shevardnadze repeated his view that on these fundamental issues, it was very important to stick to principles of continuity. If we wanted to speak seriously about a warming of the political climate and the contribution that the U.S. and USSR were making to the historical changes in the world, one had to acknowledge that these changes have been due to progress on arms control. Without progress on INF, there would not have been any basis for serious discussion of overcoming confrontation. Therefore, in the area of arms control and disarmament, we should abide by continuity and by agreements reached in the past.

SLCMs

Shevardnadze added that, of course, other problems remained. While he didn’t want to concentrate on these now, he did want to mention sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). On ALCMs, the prospects were good for reaching an understanding. But on SLCMs (or, better, on naval nuclear weapons), the position that the U.S. had taken in the past represented a dead end. It did not allow a continued discussion. Nuclear weapons were nuclear weapons, whether air-, ground- or sea-launched. With the introduction of extensive and bold verification measures, we should be able to proceed with limitations on SLCMs just as we had been able to do in the case of limiting and verifying other types of cruise missiles. There were instruments that could be used, as well as the possibility of on-site inspection at depots, storage facilities and the like.

It was important, Shevardnadze stressed, that the Administration take a fundamental position in limiting and effectively verifying SLCMs. If this problem were not resolved, it would be highly unlikely that the Soviets could make any substantive movement on 50 percent reductions. He went on to say that, if the U.S. were counting on the fact that it enjoyed an edge in SLCMs, this was an illusory hope. Bitter experience in the past had shown that one side could hold an edge for only a while; capabilities on both sides were sufficient to enable the other side to even the balance, and SLCMs would be no exception. Shevardnadze remarked that he knew this was not one of the favorite subjects of his U.S. colleagues, but it was a reality with which the U.S. would have to deal.

The Secretary said that Shevardnadze had highlighted one of the major problems remaining in START. We recognized the problem, but we had a fundamental disagreement. He suggested kicking the issue to the working group so that he could depart the meeting and inspect the Embassy’s new office building.

Shevardnadze suggested that the U.S. consider the same means for inspecting SLCMs.

The Secretary suggested that he and the Minister try to solve the problem over supper. He reiterated that the U.S. was anxious to reengage in the negotiations. We were ready to set dates and to proceed on the basis of the JDT. But he did not want to mislead Shevardnadze: there may be changes in the U.S. position (what kind of changes he could not yet say), even though there would still be a considerable degree of continuity.

Shevardnadze said he understood. There would be continuity from the point of view of improving upon existing positions in ways that would help us as we moved along.

Depressed Trajectory SLBMs

Shevardnadze said he had one final request: that the Secretary direct his experts to discuss the possibility of an agreement to ban launches of ballistic missiles in a flat trajectory.

The Secretary agreed this was a subject we would be prepared to discuss.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Lot 93D187, Secretary James A. Baker III’s Classified Papers, JAB Papers May 1989. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Ridgway, Schifter, Bartholomew, Ross, Zoellick, and Burt. The meeting took place at the MFA Guest House. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
2. No minutes were found.
3. Reference is to the Joint Statement on the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting, December 10, 1987 (Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book II, pp. 1491–1497)
4. Reference is to the Joint Statement Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Moscow, June 1, 1988 (Public Papers: Reagan, 1988, Book I, pp. 698–706)
5. See Document 7.