Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

15. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

START

Decisions we take on START issues over the next six weeks will affect public perceptions of the Bush Administration’s approach to arms control, prospects for reinvigorating START when NST resumes, and the outlook for ratification. This paper reviews key elements already agreed, major unresolved issues, preparations for resumption, and the ratification dimension.

Elements Already Agreed with Soviets

The main U.S. objectives in START have been:

— to reduce ballistic missile forces which, given their short flight and warning times, pose the greatest first-strike threat and in which the USSR has a comparative advantage, and

— to enable each side to retain adequate retaliatory capabilities by adopting more permissive limits on bombers and cruise missiles which, given their longer warning times, are less destabilizing and in which the U.S. has the lead.

Embedded in the heavily bracketed U.S.-Soviet Joint Draft Text are agreed elements that fully reflect these objectives:

○ 4900 ballistic missile warheads. Key limit because it caps all fast-flying weapons and because all ICBMs and SLBMs will eventually be accurate enough to threaten hard targets.

○ 1540 warheads on 154 “heavy” ICBMs. Cuts in half Soviet SS–18s which currently are the principal threat to U.S. silos.

○ 50% cut in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight. Sharply reduces huge Soviet lead in total rocket boosting power.

○ 6000 warheads (ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons). If parties used full quota of 4900 missile warheads, would leave 1100 for bomber weapons. But bomber “discount” (see below) allows far more than 1100 actual bombers weapons and, therefore, far more than 6000 total strategic weapons.

○ 1600 delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles and bombers). Can affect concentration of forces by constraining number of platforms on which warheads can be distributed.

○ bomber weapon counting rule that treats bombers without ALCMs as one unit against the 6000 limit regardless of how many non-ALCM nuclear weapons (gravity bombs, short-range missiles) they actually carry. Creates big incentive for “penetrating” bombers (B–1, B–2) which may carry more than 16 such weapons.

○ missile warhead counting rules that limit existing missile types to agreed numbers of warheads even if some had previously been tested with more. Avoids counting our D–5 SLBM with more warheads than it will carry, but credits some Soviet missiles with fewer than they are probably capable of carrying.

○ broad outlines of verification regime, including permanent portal monitoring of selected production facilities, baseline and short-notice inspections of declared facilities, observation of elimination procedures, and data exchanges.

Key Areas of U.S.-Soviet Disagreement

— Mobile ICBMs. We proposed a ban due to difficulty of verifying a limit (but also because support for a U.S. mobile program seemed questionable). Soviets have already deployed two mobile ICBMs (one-warhead SS–25, 10-warhead rail-mobile SS–24) and reject a ban. Without committing to permit mobiles, we’ve worked with Soviets on possible verification measures.

— Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Soviets proposed limits of 400 nuclear and 600 conventional SLCMs. We’ve rejected limits on conventional, agreed to explore limits on nuclear, but argued we haven’t found effective verification measures that would not harm ship security, operations, or our “neither confirm nor deny” policy for shipboard nuclear deployments. Instead of binding numerical limits, we’ve called for periodic declarations of nuclear SLCM deployment plans. This issue will be difficult to resolve.

— Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). While agreeing to exempt conventional ALCMs, Soviets propose that ALCM-carrying bombers be counted with maximum number of nuclear ALCMs for which they’re equipped (e.g., 20 for B–52s). Because that would severely limit number of ALCM bombers we could deploy under 6000 ceiling (and because U.S. bombers usually carry fewer than equipped number), we proposed that each bomber be credited with an agreed number (10 for U.S.) regardless of number actually deployed, arguing this simplified monitoring.

— ICBM warhead sublimit. Soviets have said they’d accept our proposal for 3300 limit on ICBM warheads only if it were also applied to SLBM warheads. Given our heavy reliance on SLBM warheads, we rejected the idea.

— Linkage with ABM. Arguing that deep cuts in offensive forces would be destabilizing if large-scale ABM deployments are permitted, Soviets condition START on agreement not to withdraw from ABM treaty for agreed period. We’ve been willing to negotiate such a “defense and space” (D&S) agreement, but said completion of START treaty should not be linked to it.

Criticism of Emerging START Treaty

Although polls show over 75% of Americans support START, some influential figures such as Kissinger, Nixon, and Scowcroft have argued that START reductions could make our deterrent more vulnerable by concentrating U.S. forces on too few ICBMs and submarines. In one key respect, the critics are right—our proposed ban on mobile ICBMs does conflict with survivability. But in general they incorrectly hold START responsible for potential problems in our strategic posture that would exist even without START, problems that could, in fact, be dealt with more effectively under a START agreement.

— Critics say START would make our silo-based ICBMs more vulnerable than today because, under the treaty, we would deploy mostly MIRVed ICBMs in a reduced number of silos, thus increasing the ratio of Soviet warheads to U.S. “targets.” But START would let us deploy many one- or two-warhead ICBMs in a much larger number of silos, thus reducing the ratio. Still, our silo-based ICBMs will be targetable with or without START (even if START can marginally reduce Soviet incentives for attacking them). If START permits mobile ICBMs, it can contribute substantially to survivability by severely limiting Soviet capabilities to threaten our mobile deployments.

— It is true, as critics assert, that our missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) will decrease from 35 to 18–20. But this results not from START but from our decision to replace 16-missile POSEIDONs with quieter, less detectable 24-missile TRIDENTs. With or without START we’d deploy only about 20. Fortunately, we expect TRIDENTs at sea to remain invulnerable for the foreseeable future. But if we became concerned about reduced numbers, START would allow us to pursue a variety of options for dispersing our warheads over additional boats.

Preparing for Resumption of the Geneva START Talks

Defense Review. Several results will influence START:

— ICBM modernization decisions will affect whether we drop our mobile ICBM ban and, if so, what sublimit for mobile ICBM warheads and what mobile verification measures we propose.

— SDI decisions could affect prospects for either reaching a D&S agreement or getting the Soviets to de-link D&S from START, both of which would facilitate START and would be more likely if we opt for vigorous R&D and not early deployment.

Arms Control Review. In the parallel arms control review, priority is being given to having U.S. positions on the central START issues ready by the expected resumption date (mid-June). That means putting many secondary issues (even some important ones where no immediate change of position is deemed necessary, such as SLCMs) on a slower track. The review has so far been conducted at mid-levels. The NSC will eventually need to meet.

— So far, much of the agreed START framework (1600, 4900, and 6000 limits; missile and bomber counting rules) has gone unchallenged and may simply be reaffirmed.

• Some, however, may wish to reopen the agreed limit on heavy ICBMs (which only the Soviets have) and push for a ban (vice 50% cut). This would eliminate the main threat to our silos (only for a while, however, as other Soviet missiles improve). But the Soviets would either say no or demand a huge quid, and the move could be interpreted as throwing a monkey wrench into the talks.

• High-level interest could conceivably develop in raising the 1600 delivery vehicle limit. Scowcroft has said a higher number would encourage desirable de-MIRVing (more single-warhead ICBMs, thus more “aim points” and lower Soviet incentives to strike). But we’d be reluctant to raise the level if only the Soviets would exploit it. Once the ICBM basing decision is taken, we’ll be better able to judge the merits of keeping or raising the 1600.

— There clearly is interest in modifying U.S. proposals on some issues not yet resolved with the Soviets.

• If we can gain a domestic consensus on a U.S. mobile ICBM program (or programs), there will presumably be agreement on dropping our mobile ban.

• State has called for dropping our proposed 3000-3300 sublimit on ICBM warheads (because, with Soviet SLBMs approaching ICBMs in silo-killing capability, it is not worth paying much for). OSD staff has favored lowering it. Probably we’ll keep it for now and Rick Burt will be authorized to explore what we can get for it.

— There’s also interest in putting a distinctly “Bush stamp” on our START position. Prompted by concerns (whether justified or not) that the Reagan approach focused on reductions per se rather than stability and was out of step with our strategic programs, consideration is being given to modifying or supplementing our position in ways that promote stability and the survivability of our deterrent. Given his past statements, Scowcroft may well support such efforts.

• Adopting stability and survivability as themes of the Bush START approach would require that, by the time of resumption, we have the makings of a widely supported plan for mobile ICBM basing and a START posture consistent with that plan (new position on mobiles).

• In addition, Rick Burt has suggested considering some new proposals aimed at reinforcing those themes, such as a sublimit on MIRVed ballistic missile warheads that would encourage greater reliance on single-warhead missiles. These ideas may well be controversial, given internal disagreement on the value and near-term feasibility (given our force structure) of de-MIRVing.

Moscow Ministerial. With the decision-making process largely geared toward a June NST resumption, many of these matters will still be unresolved on May 10-11. Nonetheless, you will probably be in a position:

— to agree on an NST resumption date;

— to outline our conceptual thinking on START;

— to reassure the Soviets that we regard the existing Joint Draft Text as the basis for future work (even though we may later be proposing some changes); and

— to reaffirm specific elements of the agreed framework on which guidance has already been issued and perhaps to preview the direction of some modifications we may later propose.

Looking Ahead toward Ratification

The vast majority of the many unresolved START issues are highly technical. But issues that appear dry and technical at first have a tendency, as the endgame approaches and the stakes and emotions run high, to take on greater political importance.

There’s no way, therefore, to predict when a START treaty will be completed. One year is probably the bare minimum; it could easily take the rest of the first Bush Administration. It will depend largely on how much push there is from the top on both sides. Some considerations affecting ratification:

— So far, an “experts” issue (namely, whether START’s reductions will make our forces more vulnerable) has dominated debate. But if and when a domestic consensus is achieved on ICBM modernization and our START position is adjusted to reinforce our programs, this concern should be minimized.

— Verification will then take over as START’s number one substantive vulnerability. Given unprecedented verification tasks and the need to deny Soviet inspectors access to sensitive places, we can’t ensure foolproof verification of all provisions. This will require persuasive public explanations of tradeoffs we’ll be forced to make between verifiability and security of U.S. facilities.

— If history is any guide, ratification will turn primarily not on treaty issues but on the public’s confidence in the President’s handling of U.S.-Soviet relations. Steady improvement in bilateral ties, with the Administration taking a constructive yet responsibly cautious approach, could cinch ratification. Unforeseen events (Gorbachev’s ouster; crackdown on dissidents, nationalities, or Eastern Europe) could doom it.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-IRM Records, Lot 93D188, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, Baker/Shevardnadze in Moscow Copy of May 6, 1989 S/P-Ross to Baker briefing book for Moscow Ministerial. Secret. Ross sent the paper to Baker under cover of a May 6 memorandum (Ibid.). Baker flew to Helsinki on May 9 and spent the night. The following day, he arrived in Moscow, and met with Shevardnadze at the MFA Guest House from 12:10 to 2 p.m. The full memorandum of conversation is is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.