Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

151. Memorandum From Richard Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, August 3, 1990

SUBJECT

• Rick Burt’s Memorandum On The Prospects of Completing START This Year

Rick Burt has written you a 7-page memorandum (attached) which details his concern that we will not be able to complete START in 1990. He has compiled a list of over 100 issues to be resolved in the 150 days that remain this year. In addition, the process of resolving many of these issues will reveal other differences that must be added to the list. Although his bottom line is very pessimistic from our perspective, his main point is valid: both we and the Soviets must change our approach to the negotiations if we are to finish the treaty this year.

Rick singles out the following problems:

– The Soviets are taking excessively long to respond to U.S. proposals and are often putting forward unhelpful positions.

– Closing out existing ministerial issues will require further ministerial-level discussion and additional ministerial issues are being uncovered.

– Washington is taking too long to establish positions and respond to the Negotiator’s ad ref agreements.

– As we approach the end of negotiations, Geneva will have increasing difficulty in translating agreed positions into detailed, sound treaty text.

– The working level in Washington does not believe the U.S. is committed to finish the Treaty this year and is not energized to devote the hours needed to work toward that goal.

What do we need to do?

Rick’s proposals range from the unexceptional to the draconian. He believes almost all of his suggestions need to be implemented to get a Treaty by the end of the year. We have been developing a START work program for the next several months and will consider Rick’s suggestions in our recommendations to you. His specific proposals include the following:

1. Make more effective use of the ministerial process. We should:

— Schedule a Ministerial every month until START is signed with prearranged agendas;

— Organize internally so that we can make real-time decisions at Ministerials;

— Where possible, record Ministerial decisions in treaty text form at the Ministerial itself to speed up the implementation process;

— Give Shevardnadze lists of technical issues being worked in Moscow so he can lean on his technical experts and the Moscow bureaucracy;

2. Make more effective use of our assets in Washington. We should:

— Expedite reaching U.S. positions on all outstanding issues so that no U.S. position remains untabled by September 15;

— Establish a policy now that, on September 20, the Negotiating Group should accept Soviet positions in all areas in which there is no U.S. position. Allow exceptions only with the personal approval of a Cabinet Officer.

3. Make more effective use of our assets in Geneva. We should:

— Assign two additional State advisors to the Negotiating Group as soon as possible;

— Reorganize the Negotiating Group to address the problem that the Inspection Protocol and Memorandum of Inspection Procedures are as large, and contain as many issues, as all other treaty documents combined.

4. Improve Washington turn around time. We should:

— Discontinue the use of Blackbird cables except for rare sensitive topics not intended to be disseminated beyond PCC principals (this was the original intended purpose of the Blackbird channel but Rick has never used it that way);

— Formally establish a new procedure for ad referendum agreements that would automatically approve them after eight working days unless Washington directs otherwise;

— Schedule a standing meeting of PCC principals every Wednesday evening and Saturday morning; at this meeting the basic rule would be: If a PCC principal doesn’t know enough to discuss the subject without an interagency study, defer to the Negotiator;

— Forbid backstopping from delaying sending cables forward to the NSC beyond a Negotiating Group requested due date;

— Direct evening and Saturday meetings of backstopping, PCC Subcommittee, or PCC when needed to meet a Negotiating Group requested due date.

5. Convince the bureaucracy that we’re serious. We should:

— Convene a meeting in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building of all START players down through the backstopping staff level;

— Have the President make a five minute drop-by;

— After the President’s departure, announce the new procedures set forth above. Stress that they have been agreed to at the cabinet level.

6. Convince the Soviet bureaucracy that we’re serious. We should schedule a summit for late this year. Probably nothing less will do the trick. The sooner a summit is scheduled, the better—it will enable us to begin disciplining the bureaucracy now and leave us less vulnerable to charges of a last minute rush to completion.

Tab I

Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Burt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)²

Geneva, August 2, 1990

Cotting START Done

What is the problem? The President has directed, both publicly and privately, that we complete START in 1990. The President and his senior team seem to believe this goal can be attained. In fact, it cannot, without a drastic change in our current approach. Indeed, without such a change, it is probable that START will not be completed until spring 1991 or later, casting doubt on our ability to complete ratification before the middle of a Presidential election year. Failure to complete START in the next few months could also mean that the window for ever completing the Treaty will disappear, either due to accelerating changes in the Soviet Union or to the growing (but erroneous) perception that a START Treaty has been overtaken by events and is no longer important.

Even with a dramatic change in approach, completion in 1990 is far from certain. This paper documents the problem and offers a comprehensive set of possible changes. It does not repeat the well known arguments on why we should finish in 1990, but simply sets forth some of the reasons why we probably won’t finish and what we need to do to get the job done.

How much is left? An internal Negotiating Group review reveals a simple, but stark fact: There are well over a hundred significant issues left to resolve before a Treaty can be signed. A list is attached. Many single items actually reflect several contested issues. For example, there are 22 disputed notifications treated as a single issue. Similarly ALCM inspections are treated as a single issue, although they consume several pages of treaty text. Thus the list of remaining issues can probably be expanded to include several hundred individual decisions of the type that traditionally rate a paragraph in a guidance cable. With 153 days (including Sundays and holidays) to resolve over a hundred issues and record the results in the treaty by December 31, it is clear that the chances of finishing START in 1990 are slim. Our problems, however, run far deeper than this.

Why are we in trouble? It is important to recognize that there is no single solution because there is no single problem. We have a series of problems, any one of which, could preclude completion. Some are beyond our control; the Soviets are distracted at home and the Soviet military is reasserting itself. As a result, the Soviets are taking excessively long to respond and are often putting forth unhelpful positions. In addition, the Soviet delegation often appears slow to implement agreements and sometimes seeks to walk them back. These problems can only be solved in Moscow. Thus, no matter what we do it may not be enough.

But the problems are not only in Moscow. In my view there are a number of problems on our side, problems we can and must do something about. Indeed, if we do not solve some of them soon, the problem will not be completing a treaty in 1990, it will be completing a treaty in 1991.

Our most significant problems include:

1. We aren’t closing out ministerial level issues. Meetings between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have been effective in resolving issues. Unfortunately, we are identifying ministerial issues faster than we are solving them. At a minimum, we probably need a ministerial push to solve the following:

— Backfire

— Heavy ICBMs

— Non-circumvention

— Whether to destroy missiles/warheads/ALCMs

— Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM)

— Third country basing and inspections

— Inspection and notification regime for ALCMs

Other issues will doubtless emerge as we move toward the end. The INF experience shows minor and arcane issues can sometimes become sticking points requiring high-level political resolution. An additional problems is that, when decisions are taken, the Soviet negotiating group sometimes must wait weeks for instructions on implementing them.

2. Washington is taking far too long to determine U.S. positions or to respond to ad ref agreements reached in Geneva. Some examples:

— It took over a year to establish our PPCM position.

— It has been more than a year and we still don’t have a firm position on suspect site inspection.

— Our position on new types and RV counting for future types has been under review since November. We are weeks away from having an initial position on this major hole in the Treaty. When we do, we will have less than four months to sell a position it took us nine months to establish.

— New tagging procedures were drafted early this year but took over four months for Washington review. It is unclear that they are any better for this effort.

— Basic issues on tagging, supposedly resolved earlier, are being reopened and reexamined. The schedule for some of them runs into next year.

— The average time to respond to routine guidance requests is going up. Of the last 20 Round XIII requests for guidance where the Negotiating Group requested a response by a specific date, only four were answered by the date requested; the remainder averaged over two weeks late.

— A review of what data the United States will require in the Memorandum of Understanding has been underway intermittently for over two years, with most difficult issues yet to be faced.

— An ad ref agreement on launch control facilities was sent for Washington approval on June 29. Five weeks later, it is still under review. There are well over 100 issues left of comparable scope.

3. Geneva is in danger of becoming a bottleneck. Reaching general agreement can be done quickly. Turning that agreement into treaty language is inherently a slow process. Reaching agreement with the Soviets on the text is even slower. A recent treaty scrub reveals dozens of minor problems requiring fixes to agreed language. Thus the longer it is until we have agreed positions, the more risk there is that either (a) we won’t finish, or (b) we’ll have INF-type problems because of obscure or ambiguous drafting.

4. The working level in Washington doesn’t think we will or can finish this year. In a number of recent conversations with various Geneva players, no individual below the Assistant Secretary level expected to finish START in 1990 or considered that doing so was important. The delay in Washington responsiveness is one manifestation. On important and time sensitive issues, for example, Saturday meetings in Washington are common; to our knowledge no meeting on Saturday has ever been held in Washington based on a need to get things to Geneva on time. Another manifestation is that reports from meetings (once again below the Assistant Secretary level) never include any discussion of negotiability or timeliness. In a nutshell, the President’s announced decision to complete START this year has had no discernable effect on the working-level in Washington. Neither procedures nor attitudes have changed.

One thing is thus clear: We lack a firm deadline. One reason that the working level is unconvinced that completion in 1990 is a real goal is the lack of a scheduled summit. Past experience suggests that many issues simply won’t be resolved—in Moscow or in Washington—until a summit or some other “action forcing event” is scheduled.

What do we need to do? Just as there is no single cause for our problem, there is also no single solution. If we are serious, however, there are steps we can take, many of them somewhat radical. They include;

1. Make more effective use of the ministerial process. We should:

— Agree with the Soviets now that there will be a Ministerial every month until START is signed (late September, late October, late November).

— Agree that no later than 10 days before each Ministerial each side will send a letter listing the issues it wants to solve at that Ministerial and its proposals for solving them.

— Agree that the traveling team will arrive 24 to 48 hours in advance and begin discussions at once in order to prepare issues for the Ministers decision.

— Organize internally so that we can make real-time decisions at Ministerials to settle issues and insist that the Soviets do the same.

— Where possible, record ministerial decisions in treaty text form at the ministerial itself to speed up the implementation process.

— At each Ministerial, give Shevardnadze a list of technical issues being worked in Moscow which are of special concern to us. Ask Shevardnadze to use this list to lean on his technical experts and the Moscow bureaucracy in order to spring loose specific issues which are hung up in the Soviet bureaucracy. (This is similar to the practice we have used on human rights cases of special interest.)

— At the next opportunity, raise with Shevardnadze the delay in having the Soviet negotiating team aware of decisions taken at ministerials. If necessary, propose that the October and November ministerials be in Geneva so that the Soviets get rapid feedback.

— Have the State Department draft instructions following each ministerial documenting decisions. Do not have these reviewed by the interagency process; have them sent as White House text. Limit such instructions to a record of decisions taken.

2. Make more effective use of our assets in Washington. We should;

— Forbid the drafting of treaty language in Washington. Guidance should come in terms of principles and objectives, with treaty drafting done in Geneva.

— Expedite reaching U.S. positions on all outstanding issues so that no U.S. position remains untabled by September 15. (See attached list for specifics)

— Establish a policy now that, on September 20, the Negotiating Group should accept Soviet positions in all areas in which there is no U.S. position. Allow exceptions only with the personal approval of a Cabinet Officer.

3. Make more effective use of our assets in Geneva. We should:

— Assign two additional State advisors to the Negotiating Group as soon as possible.

— Recognize that the Inspection Protocol and Memorandum of Inspection Procedures are as large, and contain as many issues, as all other Treaty documents combined. Therefore: (a) have three weekly meetings of the Inspection Protocol working group, (b) use subgroups to work the large number of technical issues, and (c) make special arrangements to extend or return experienced advisors (Mr. Schless (OSD), Dr. Scalingi (ACDA), and [name not declassified] (ACIS)). On September 15, reevaluate to see if progress is satisfactory; if not, split the effort into two separate working groups.

— Continue three Burt-Nazarkin meetings weekly on major issues. Add an additional meeting weekly to review the status of subordinate documents, especially the Inspection Protocol and Memorandum of Inspection Procedures.

4. Improve Washington turn around time. We should:

— Discontinue the use or Blackbird cables except for rare sensitive topics not intended to be disseminated beyond PCC principals.

— Formally establish a new procedure for ad referendum agreements:

— All ad ref agreements sent as normal RFGs from the Negotiator, flagged for delivery to PCC principals.

— Ad ref agreements automatically approved after eight working days unless Washington directs otherwise.

— Schedule a standing meeting of PCC principals every Wednesday evening and Saturday morning. At this meeting—and only at this meeting—consider whether to repudiate ad ref agreements. Basic rule: If a PCC principal doesn’t know enough to discuss the subject without an interagency study, defer to the Negotiator.

— On RFGs, mandate that Negotiating Group recommendations are automatically approved on the due date in the request, provided that at least eight working days have elapsed unless Washington directs otherwise.

— Forbid backstopping from delaying sending cables forward to the NSC beyond a Negotiating Group requested due date. If agencies are unable to provide positions, forward a cable with the notation that “agency x provided no views.”

— Direct evening and Saturday meetings of backstopping, PCC subcommittee, or PCC when needed to meet a Negotiating Group requested due date.

5. Convince the bureaucracy that we’re serious. We should:

— Convene a meeting in Room 450 of the Old EOB of all START players down through the backstopping level.

— As I suggested in the Oval Office some months ago, have the President make a 5 minute drop-by at which he makes the following points:

— Want a treaty this year, but want a good treaty.

— Job of people in this room is to support the Negotiator so that he can get that treaty.

— Your job is to find solutions.

— Not looking to abandon our principles but expect you to find solutions we and the Soviets can both accept.

NOTE: There are precedents. President Reagan met with the Senior Arms Control Group (sub-cabinet level) in 1983. As Vice President, President Bush made an appearance in OEOB Room 450 before a government wide audience down through action officers to stress the importance of a special access program. The National Security Advisor discussed START before a similar audience after one summit. My idea attempts to combine the features of these past sessions.

— After the President’s departure, announce the new procedures set forth above. Stress that they have been agreed to at the cabinet level.

6. Convince the Soviet bureaucracy that we’re serious. We should schedule a summit for late this year. Probably nothing less will do the trick. The sooner a summit is scheduled, the better—it will enable us to begin disciplining the bureaucracy now and leave us less vulnerable to charges of a last minute rush to completion.

There is no question that the measures above are draconian. They are also the only way to finish this year—and even then the outcome is not certain. But the issue is not whether we finish this year; the issue is whether we finish at all. We can probably complete a treaty by the spring of 1991 if we adopt some of these measures. We certainly cannot complete a treaty by December without adopting almost all of them. If we do none of them, we will probably see START slip through our fingers.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Delegation³

Geneva, August 2, 1990

MASTER LIST OF START ISSUES

(NOTE: Items marked “***” not shared with the Soviets.)

General Issues and Issues Relating to the Treaty Itself

1. Non-circumvention of the treaty

2. Strategic offensive arms beyond the national territory and verification thereof

3. Suspect-site inspections

— Specification of facilities subject to SSI

— Tours of solid rocket motor production facilities

— Exchange of data on solid rocket motor production facilities

— Right of refusal suspect site inspection

4. Perimeter and portal continuous monitoring

— Procedure for establishment

— What facilities are to be monitored

— PPCM of heavy bomber production

— PPCM of mobile launcher production

— Adding new facilities to the PPCM list

— Conversion and elimination criteria for facilities subject to PPCM

5. Phasing of reductions of strategic offensive arms

6. Physical elimination of ballistic missiles and components

— Elimination of missies not subject to numerical non-deployed missile limits

— Elimination of re-entry vehicles

7. Strategic R & D boosters

8. Vehicles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere of space/accountable space launch stages.

9. Telemetry issues

— data exchange

— exemptions from the encapsulation ban

— strength of transmitted signals

10. Complex of ALCM-related issues:

— Whether to establish a management regime for ALCMs and, if so, how the regime would work;

— Elimination of ALCMs and other heavy bomber armaments during elimination of heavy bombers;

— ALCM distinguishibility;

— Ban on non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons;

— Definition issues including flight test and deployment descriptions;

— ALCM-associated inspection regime.

11. Bomber issues

— Limits on former heavy bomber and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments;

— Definitions of various bomber types and restrictions on what armament those types can carry;

— How to handle existing reconnaissance, jamming and tanker airplanes.

12. Limitations on training and test heavy bombers.

13. Whether to include Bison as an existing type and, if not, what restrictions to place on it.

14. Whether to include Backfire as an existing type and, if not, what restrictions to place on it.

15. Questions related to mobile ICBMs:

— Restricted areas/deployment areas, including size

— Categories of movement and rules on movements

— Dispersal provisions

— Road-mobile ICBM verification

— Restrictions on locations of non-deployed missies and launchers

— Ban on liquid propellant mobile ICBMs

16. Aggregate numerical limits on non-deployed mobile ICBMs and on non-deployed launchers of mobile ICBMs.

17. Definition of new types of strategic offensive arms.

18. Provisions regarding initial accountability of systems under the treaty.

19. Procedure for warhead accountability on future types of ballistic missiles.

20. Procedures for downloading.

21. Use of the term “warhead” versus “reentry vehicle”. Whether to have a definition of re-entry vehicle, and if so what it should be.

22. Dealing with ballistic missiles with MRVs.

23. Treating the question of releases or simulated releases.

24. Issues relating to throw-weight.

— Approach to demonstrated throw-weight.

— Approach to potential throw-weight.

— Use of range capability concept.

— How to record the 50 percent throw-weight reduction.

— Whether the pre-announced flight tests should be required to demonstrate any particular characteristics.

— Whether the accountable throw-weight values, once established, can be increased and, if so, by how much.

25. Issues relating to heavy ICBMs:

— Production and flight test restrictions.

— Phasing of reductions.

— Conversion of heavy ICBM launchers.

— Definition of heavy ICBMs and SLBMs.

— Elimination of heavy test launchers.

— Jackson amendment issues. (***)

26. Residual linkage issues (preamble, agreed statements, restrictions on the use of converted ICBMs/SLBMs and strategic R & D boosters).

27. Operational dispersals for SSBNs and heavy bombers.

28. Numerical limits on silos under construction or under conversion, launchers on newly constructed submarines that have not begun sea trials, and launchers on submarines undergoing overhaul and conversion.

29. Cooperative measures to assist NTM.

30. Limitations on test and training launchers.

31. New kinds of strategic offensive arms, including the issue of whether to ban ASBMs.

32. Support equipment.

— What is to be included.

— What restrictions apply.

— Mobile missile transporters.

33. Use of the term “stage in its final assembly form/solid rocket motor.”

34. Type rule for ballistic and cruise missiles tested as weapon delivery vehicles.

35. Unique identifiers.

— Selection of specific unique identifier technology.

— Which systems should have unique identifiers.

— When and where these unique identifiers should be applied.

— Technical procedures for applying and reading unique identifiers.

— Whether to require reading tags before flight or static tests; if required, what procedures to use. (***)

— Rights to read tags during inspections; number to be read during any inspection.

36. Treatment of missiles that are temporarily removed from their launchers, and of heavy bombers from which ALCMs are temporarily removed.

37. Inspection regime in the absence of limitations on the aggregate numbers of non-deployed systems.

38. Ban on cruise missiles on waterborne vehicles other than ships or submarines.

39. Ban on converting airplanes into heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

40. Submarine tunnels, including procedures for making these tunnels impassable to ballistic missile submarines.

41. Restrictions on production facility locations.

42. Silos used as launch control facilities.

43. What facilities are subject to the various forms of inspection under Article XI.

44. Procedures for dealing with delays during inspections.

45. Follow-on negotiations.

46. Whether to treat silo-based and rail-mobile SS-24s as one missile type or two.

47. How long to have the baseline period run and how to regulate elimination during that period.

48. Whether to have an Attribution Annex or to record agreed attributed values in the MOU. Procedures for updating agreed attributed values, regardless of where they are located.

49. How to treat the Small ICBM (existing or future type). ( * * *)

Issues Relating to Definitions

1. Whether to have a definition of re-entry vehicle and, if so, what it should be.

2. Heavy bomber definition.

3. Reconciling differences on facility definitions (most reflect other differences in the Treaty).

4. Reconciling differences on the definitions of ballistic missile/boost stage, driver training vehicles, ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, launch weight, missile transfer device, missile transporter, portal, and self-contained dispensing mechanism.

NOTE: In addition, fifty-six definitions are in dispute, but all are related to issues listed elsewhere.

Issues Related to Notifications

1. What specific notifications should be required (22 instances of disagreement, most where the U.S. side seeks a notification the Soviets reject).

2. When should notifications be given (12 instances where the sides agree on a notification but disagree on when it is to be given).

3. What specific data should be included (7 instances where the sides agree on a notification but disagree on the specific content of the notification).

4. Should the Ballistic Missile Launch Agreement be included in the Treaty?

Issues Relating to the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination

1. Procedures and restrictions for removing propellant during destruction.

2. Verification of missile type before elimination of missiles in canisters.

3. Whether and under what conditions to allow launch canister reuse, both as a launch canister and otherwise.

4. Procedures for removal of silos from accountability during conversion.

5. Procedures for removal of SLBM launchers from accountability during conversion.

6. SLBM launcher elimination procedures.

7. How to deal with silos without headworks.

8. OSI of heavy bomber elimination.

9. Procedures for facility elimination. Criteria to consider a facility as eliminated.

10. Rail line removal during rail-garrison elimination.

11. Reconciliation of heavy bomber terminology.

12. Various values for excavation depths, display times, removal distances.

Issues Relating to the Memorandum of Understanding

1. What specific data is required and when that data should be exchanged.

2. What MOU data should remain confidential.

3. How MOU updates are conducted.

4. Criteria for site diagrams, photographs and precision of coordinates.

5. List of technical characteristic of strategic offensive arms which would be specified in the MOU

— Provision of data on variants.

— Technical characteristics to be provided.

— Production data to be provided.

6. List of technical characteristics to be demonstrated during exhibitions of strategic offensive arms.

7. Provision of new annexes listing facilities subject to PPCM and suspect site inspection.

Issues Relating to the Inspection Protocol and the Memorandum on Inspection Procedures

1. Pre-inspection movement restrictions.

2. Definition of the term “inspection site”.

3. Sequential inspections

— For short notice inspections.

— Of different types requiring different sets of equipment.

4. Provisions for payment to the other Party for costs of inspections and continuous monitoring.

5. Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber inspection procedures and treatment of nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs.

6. Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring Procedures

— Monitoring items entering

— Procedures for continuous monitoring (complete)

— Modified procedures for continuous monitoring prior to completion of PPCMS

— Procedures for engineering survey

— Report for engineering survey

— Early conduct of engineering survey

— Establishment of the PPCMS

— Number of monitors on the list

— Backup high frequency communications

— Satellite communications

— Use of data confirmation devices

7. Inspection quotas for all inspection types.

8. Frequency of replacement of monitors.

9. Modality for informing in-country escort of intentions.

10. Size criteria for inspections.

11. Procedures for operational dispersals of submarines and heavy bombers.

12. Pre-inspection restrictions at submarine bases for RV OSI.

13. Suspect-site inspection procedures.

14. Procedures for RV OSI, including for mobile ICBMs.

15. Missile verification

— Content of pre-inspection briefing for mobile ICBM bases.

— Pre-inspection restrictions, callback provisions.

— Procedures.

16. Post-Dispersal inspections

— Procedures

— Size threshold

— Relationship to enhanced verification

— Which Restricted Areas and Rail Garrisons are inspectable

17. Conversion or Elimination inspections

— Limitations on eliminations requiring OSI during Baseline

— Need for procedures in addition to those provided in C or E

18. Procedures for closeout inspections, including confirmation of facility elimination criteria.

19. Procedures for Formerly-Declared Facility inspections.

20. MOU Technical Characteristics Exhibitions

— Procedures

— Provisions for exhibitions of variants which are not new types

— Size of team

21. Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Exhibitions

— Procedures

— Size of teams

22. Recourse for violation of conditions of inspections.

23. Procedures for inspection of containers, canisters, vehicles, etc.

24. Use of names of inspections as appropriate.

25. Equipment annexes.

26. Agreed types of airplanes for delivering equipment.

27. Navigation equipment and airplane routes.

28. Inspection sites and associated points of entry.

29. Insertion of appropriate provision for INF MOA (forty plus items).

30. Additional inspection protocol blanks (numbers on lists, time, etc.).

Issues Relating to Separate Agreements

1. Early agreement on data denial.

2. Early agreement on exhibitions, including what exhibitions will be included.

— MOU technical exhibitions

— Heavy Bomber exhibitions

— Former heavy bomber exhibitions

3. Separate agreement on annual exchange of information on strategic offensive arms.

4. Modifying the SLCM declarations with respect to SLCMs with multiple warheads in order to be consistent with the ALCM provisions.

5. Agreement on data exchange and tours of solid rocket motor plants prior to treaty signature.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, USSR Chronological Files, START Files, OA/ID 91122–007, Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe—Strategic Arms Control (August 1990). Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Gordon. A stamped notation indicates Scowcroft saw the memorandum. Scowcroft initialed the top of the memorandum.
2. Secret.
3. Secret.