Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Irkutsk, August 1, 1990, 10:30 a.m.–2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US:

  • The Secretary
  • Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

• USSR:

  • Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Sergey Tarasenko, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

Baker: I think that we might think about doing regional issues today and maybe some economic issues, and tomorrow we can focus on arms control.

Shevardnadze: Okay, but I’ve kind of been thinking about doing it the other way around. I have to really answer a couple of the questions that you posed to me before.

Baker: Okay, but I need to hear from Washington on one question that you posed in your letter to me and that’s why I was hoping that we might wait a little longer, especially because I think you did make some proposals on aircraft and ground forces in CFE that I want to be able to respond to. So, maybe we can spend a bit of time on the schedule first and then sort out how we want to proceed for today.

Shevardnadze: Yes, I think that’s a good way to do it.

Baker: I do want to talk about Cambodia, Kashmir, Angola, and Central America. Those are some of the regions I want to get into to.

Shevardnadze: That’s fine. But first, let’s take a look at our work schedules. And also, I think we should address the question of whether or not as a result of this meeting we should try to have a communique or some document. We can, of course, report separately to the press. We certainly wouldn’t have to prepare anything big. We’ve prepared a draft that could be useful.

Baker: We’ve done well in the past by reporting separately to the press. But let’s take a look at your draft, and we’ll see what we want to do.

Shevardnadze: Okay. That’s fine. Also, with regard to the press, maybe we should discuss whether we should have a full-fledged press conference. If so, we could do it jointly, or we could do it here and we could do it in a separate room—maybe we could decide that by the end of the day.

Baker: Okay, let’s get into the schedule. I would like us as we come out of this meeting to say that we have discussed the possibility of a Bush-Gorbachev meeting, but that we haven’t locked into a definite date. There is no change in our view that it is desirable to have such a meeting and that it is important to have the meeting to push our common agenda. But I think President Bush is a little reluctant at this point to be committed to a December meeting, particularly, because our two leaders will meet at a CSCE Summit in late November. But even beyond that, there is the question and indeed the problem that any summit meeting that our two Presidents are going to have is going to have to include the successful conclusion of the START agreement. We’ll have to be in the position where they can sign it. So, I’d like to be able to tell the press that we’ve discussed the possibility of future meetings and that we will be considering such a summit in light of the progress that we’ve made on a number of outstanding issues. Anyway, that was in my thoughts and I would like to do that, if it’s okay with you.

One other point that I’d like to just raise. Is there any possibility that the President is going to attend the Children’s Summit at the UN in late September? That, too, might be another possibility for an early meeting between our two Presidents.

Shevardnadze: With regard to your question of President Gorbachev’s participation in the Children’s Summit in New York, that has not been something that we’ve decided yet, but I do think that it’s probably doubtful.

Baker: Well, there’s some consideration for President Bush to be there in New York and he would probably go up there for a short visit.

Shevardnadze: As you know, this is a very busy time for us and we have very many important problems to discuss in the Supreme Soviet, particularly with regard to our transition to a market economy. The government still has to decide its positions and also to find them. And there is also the very tricky question of putting together a new union treaty. Both are fundamental and critical questions, and they would require a good deal of time and attention by the President. I know he’d like to go to New York for that Children’s Summit, but it would be difficult, given these questions and these problems. I can say this that our agreement in Washington about having a next summit remains in effect. As for the date of it, that depends, of course, on the preparations for and specifically the readiness for a START Treaty for signature.

Baker: Yes, that’s right. The agreement at Washington was that the next summit would be in Moscow, but that we did not fix a date.

Shevardnadze: That’s right.

Baker: We’re not prepared to say when the next summit should be, whether it should be in December, November or January—that’s the only point I would like to make. That is consistent with your understanding, isn’t it?

Shevardnadze: In Washington, we didn’t decide the date. So it’s okay that we can say that we have an agreement regarding a summit, but that the date depends upon the readiness of issues like START for conclusion.

Baker: We’ll check with the President. I want to see if that language would be consistent with what he wants us to say. I’d like to say to the press that we’ve had a discussion of a summit meeting between our two leaders, that its timing will depend upon progress being made on agreements, but that our two leaders look forward very much to getting together at some time that will be agreed upon. It will be a time that is both mutually-convenient but also one that allows us to complete the work we have to get done on START and other issues. I want to be able to say something that satisfies both your position and ours.

Shevardnadze: Well, it will be difficult now to speak of a precise date. And that, I think it is appropriate for us therefore to say that we talked about this, but we haven’t fixed a date.

Baker: At an appropriate time, which will be determined by the progress that we’re making on agreements, there’ll be a summit. And that could be in December of 1990, or could conceivably be in January or February of 1991. In any case, it will be in the Soviet Union, that’s our understanding. If that’s your understanding as well, then we can proceed on that basis.

Shevardnadze: If we could say something more definite on it in terms of a date, that would be desirable. People will be watching this and it would help drive the conclusion of the documents.

Baker: I understand that. But, we don’t want to have a debate in the US that we’re negotiating under the deadline of a firm date and that’s the only reason that we’re concluding these agreements. Let’s come up with a formulation that meets both of our needs. And if need be, I’ll go back to the President. But I’m trying to recall what the conversation was in Camp David, and I don’t recall there being an agreement on a date. I do recall that in Paris we discussed December, and I still think that that’s possible. But the President at this point doesn’t want to put a meeting or lay out the timeframe for a meeting before we have progress on the substance that will give us confidence that we can meet that timeframe. Now, if the question of December came up at Camp David, it’s something that I just don’t remember.

Shevardnadze: No, I think that the language was that we would have a meeting and maybe it could take place towards the end of the year.

Baker: That’s what President Gorbachev said and I recall that.

Shevardnadze: Yes, he said it that way and in a more general way at the end of the year at the press conference, I think he said that.

Baker: In one of the private conversations, I know that Gorbachev said that it might take place at the end of the year or the beginning of the next. That’s what the President’s position is and the key is that he just doesn’t want us to be locked into a particular date right now. And I think we do want to say, as I said, that the meeting should be tied to the progress that we’re making on key issues. Anyway, let’s come up with something that we both can be satisfied with.

Shevardnadze: Okay, let’s not complicate this. Let’s just say that our task here was not to set a date. And the time will depend upon the progress of concluding our agreements.

Baker: Yes, that’s right. Now, why don’t we focus on Baker and Shevardnadze meetings.

Shevardnadze: Yeah, that lends itself to better and more immediate solutions.

Baker: We’ll see each other on September 12 in Moscow, that’s certain, that’s a Two-Plus-Four meeting. And I’d be available to meet with you all day on September 13, if you think that would be productive. On September 11, it’s my hope that the businessmen will have fifteen minutes with President Gorbachev and maybe with you and that we can come up with something concrete so that this is not just another meeting. I have some ideas, but they are not firmed up yet, and I think one of them we want to think about is be in a position where people are left behind to be able to work on specific problems.

The next date I have is September 24th. And I thought you’ll be in New York for the UNGA, perhaps you can come down to Washington and we can work on some of the remaining START issues. In any case, we would meet in New York. The next date would be October 1 and 2 which is the CSCE ministerial that we’re hosting. Then I have a question mark in my own mind about when and where our next full blown ministerial ought to be.

Shevardnadze: Well, first regarding the Moscow meeting. We can agree to the dates of September 11 and 13. We welcome the fact that you’ll be accompanied by Mosbacher and a couple of businessmen. But also we feel there ought to be some preparation before that meeting. I know that the President looks very much forward to that meeting and I just hope that it will be well-prepared.

Baker: Well, we will have two separate meetings with the businessmen and between us.

Shevardnadze: Yes, I think with regard to the businessmen, they would meet with the President, you’d be a part of that meeting, and then they’d leave and you’d stay behind for a discussion with the President.

Baker: I think it would be important if during the visit of the businessmen if the regular JCC meet. Could you check and see if the regular JCC meeting is going to be at that time? I think there has been some reluctance on the part of your Commerce Ministry to have the meeting at that time.

Shevardnadze: Yes, their plan was for the JCC to meet in October. But we could check. I do agree that the appropriate time might well be at this point and I’m not sure that all the questions have been considered appropriately by our side. So I’ll look into that.

Baker: It would also give a boost to the JCC.

Shevardnadze: Your presence in Moscow would certainly enhance the important of the JCC.

Baker: And also President Gorbachev’s meeting would also give it a boost.

Shevardnadze: Well, I’ll talk about it and I’ll talk to the President as well and we’ll make sure that JCC takes place in September.

Baker: Good.

Shevardnadze: Will the next meeting be in Washington or New York? In the past, our meetings in September were a part of full-scale ministerials. I don’t know how it will be at this time since we’re meeting in Moscow in September. And I know that we use to have a full-scale ministerial just before the UNGA. But I have some doubts about that because it would come right after our September 11 and 13 meetings here.

Baker: My thinking was that we would have our next full scale ministerial after the CSCE meeting on October 1 and 2. It’s our turn to host. So, I think we should think about that and the timing of it.

Shevardnadze: Well, do you think some time in mid-October?

Baker: Yes, I would say either the third or fourth week of October. It would mean you’d have to come back to America. And if you’re willing to do that it might be better than trying to squeeze a meeting around the UN and the CSCE. But we may also have the Two-Plus-Four, if it’s necessary. But I hope that it will not be necessary.

Shevardnadze: Well, I hope that we will complete the main problems in Moscow. If anything remains, we could do it in New York. In October will be a difficult time, given everything that is going on; but I don’t see how we can wait much longer. In October you know we really should try to complete the work of START. After we complete the work of the fundamentals of START, we’ll still need one or two months to complete the technical drafting. I know that I recall that on the INF Treaty it took six to eight weeks to complete the technical drafting. And on START there are thousands of details that are bound to emerge.

Baker: Okay. Well don’t we look at the second half of October and we’ll look for a date and we can meet in Washington or some place in the United States.

Shevardnadze: You mean it might not be in Washington.

Baker: Well, I don’t know, it could be. But I’d prefer something like Houston or San Antonio.

Shevardnadze: Well, alright. The second half of October, we’ll meet. We’ll have a full-scale ministerial. As for the other meetings, we’ll meet in Europe, possibly in Paris, in November and that’s a part of the CSCE.

Baker: Yes, I think that will be November 19.

Shevardnadze: Yes, the 19th through the 21st. But that’s just a tentative date.

Baker: Does that take care of the scheduling?

Shevardnadze: I think so. I think to make the October productive and to complete the work of the START treaty, I would suggest that we discuss some of these issues here—today or tomorrow. The situation in the talks in Geneva is a difficult one, it’s not simple. We’ve got to think about how we can intensify the negotiating process. Maybe one way to do so on a temporary basis is to set up a small working group—one led by Bartholomew and Karpov. They can be looking on continuous basis at all the problems in order to prepare for an October meeting and they could begin meeting in either Moscow or maybe Washington now and maybe alternate. We can also keep ourselves involved by having such a working group, because we can each meet with them when they are in our respective capitals. It would also allow us to engage with the military and other people. Now this is not a substitute for talks in Geneva, but it might be an authoritative working mechanism that might make it possible for the two of us to stay involved. And that is more likely to ensure that our subsequent meetings, certainly the one in October, will be productive.

Baker: I don’t have any problem with that, but let me suggest an amendment. When you come to New York for the UNGA you might bring some of the right people with you, some people you would need, and you and I could then engage with our experts to give this thing a push. After that, Bartholomew and Karpov could begin working with the people in Geneva to pursue matters until the October ministerial. I am afraid if it’s just a working group of Bartholomew and Karpov, that that will quickly bog down. So if we want to give it a special impetus, why don’t you send me a list of issues that you think can be resolved and I’ll send you my list. We can agree to engage on those issues, we can engage on them in New York and/or Washington, around the UNGA. That way I believe that we’ll be able to concentrate our efforts on these questions and begin to move them. Following our meeting we can set up a Bartholomew-Karpov mechanism for preparing for the October ministerial. It’s a little different approach then you were suggesting, but not much. And I think it really is inspired by the same kind of concern. In any case, I think we ought to exchange letters on the respective problems that you and we both ought to be focused upon and then we could meet in September to discuss these and the priorities and how to resolve the outstanding issues that we’re each concerned about. And then we could commission Bartholomew and Karpov to prepare for October.

Shevardnadze: Why not combine the two approaches? Let’s exchange the lists now. We’ll inform you of the problems we see, you’ll inform us of yours. Let’s have Bartholomew and Karpov then get together and then we can meet in New York and try to crack some these political issues.

Baker: That’s good. Because I think it’s true that without the two of us we won’t crack them.

Shevardnadze: That’s why I’d like to have our deputies in on this so that we’re not just dealing with cables, but that the deputies can report directly to us.

Baker: I agree.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Shevardnadze: Well, let me say a few words about START then. We have some complaints about the way things have been going in START and undoubtedly you have some as well. The main issue that concerns us is non-circumvention. In order to have real clarity we had hoped, and we have had some talks with the British, and we hope to find a formula to satisfy both your needs and ours. The formula or form or language of that statement can [be] worked out by our delegations—they can come up with it. But the critical thing from our standpoint is that there has to be some limitation in this sphere. We can’t be in a position where you can give any kind of strategic arms you want to your alliance partner. We also have this problem on continuous monitoring of ICBM production facilities. Here I’d like to say there are some new elements.

Baker: You’re talking about Perimeter Portal of Monitoring?

Shevardnadze: Yes. What we want is to make sure the system of verification is effective and as simple as possible and not too expensive. Let me inform you as regards rail-mobile ICBMs, we decided to cease production on January 1. This, we believe, would make it possible to approach verification and information on mobile missile production differently. We had talked about a separate agreement on mutual information on this issue, and I think what we’re doing now may open up some new possibilities. Similarly, on monitoring, we have new ideas on a system of monitoring that is linked to our decision to stop production on rail and mobile missiles. We’re doing this because we don’t see you deploying any such missiles. If you were to start deploying any such missiles, we might change our position.

Baker: What would you do about the ones you’ve have already deployed?

Shevardnadze: On those, we’ll negotiate. For the time being we’re not discussing their destruction. But in the framework of the talks, we’ll have to discuss mobile missiles. And I’d like you to look at our new proposals, because I think we have some interesting ideas.

We’ll hold our discussion on CFE for when you’d want to discuss it.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Lot 96D277, Baker Subject Files 1990–1994, No Folder Title. Secret; Nodis. The complete memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts. Baker arrived in Irkutsk in the early hours of August 1, after spending July 29–31 in Singapore for the Second Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Meeting. On August 2, he flew to Ulaanbaatar, and then to Moscow on August 3, where he and Shevardnadze issued a joint statement on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.