Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

152. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva (Burt) to Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council Staff¹

Geneva, August 28, 1990

SUBJECT

• Thoughts on Resolving START issues

Here are my ideas on the list of unresolved START issues for your meetings with Karpov in Moscow and Washington. Because I believe the time for closure on these issues has come, I am ignoring negotiating tactics in this message and focusing on realistic bottom lines. If possible, it would be useful to get your feedback on these ideas before we get together in Moscow. One possibility would be for you to relay your comments to Lint Brooks who is planning to see you at the end of the week.

Here are my comments:

— Heavy ICBMs: As you know I think we should have closed this out last spring. If we had, the hullabaloo from the right would by now have been forgotten. Our objective should be to drop this sooner rather than later—we don’t want it to be portrayed as a last-minute cave. I don’t think it matters much if this is done in Washington rather than in Moscow. But when we do inform the Soviets, we must repeat must tell them that we can only do this if they are prepared to accede to us on the variety of smaller heavy issues that are still unresolved, like whether their commitment to reduce 22 SS–18s per year is legally binding. In an annex to this paper, I am including a short-list of these “dangling” heavy issues.

— START/ABM Relationship and Conversion of Missiles for Space Launch Vehicles: Like you, we are a little mystified by this Soviet topic. We’ve recently received good and bad news concerning START/ABM linkage. The good news is that the Soviets have followed through on Shevardnadze’s promise last February and told us that they intend to make a unilateral statement saying that if one side violates the ABM Treaty, the other, under the “supreme national interests” clause, can choose to leave START. This is basically harmless and means they have dropped their push for a joint statement on START/ABM linkage.

The bad news is that in the course of discussions on missile elimination and conversion, the Soviets have told us they are very serious about their proposed ban on using converted missiles for deploying weapons in space. My thoughts on this are below, under the heading of missile elimination.

Finally, the only other linkage-type issue is the START preamble, where Nazarkin has agreed to refer only to Article II of the ABM Treaty, which refers only to offensive arms. I hope Washington accepts this ad ref deal, because it will also mean that Moscow will drop its proposal for Article XIV—on follow-on negotiations—that could also pose the troublesome linkage question.

— Backfire: I think this is an easy one, because we have what we need. The existing Soviet language on no refueling is fine and if we can get the Soviets down to a combined total of 550 Backfires (350 Air Force and 200 Naval), that should let us finally put this issue to rest.

— Noncircumvention: This is a big, politically-sensitive issue. I know that Washington is prepared to fall on its sword on this one, and expects Moscow to give. At the same time, we don’t want this to be the final end-game issue: It would put Mrs. T in a very difficult, exposed position. Thus, one compromise you should consider is defining the “existing pattern of cooperation” a little more narrowly than we do now; that is, permitting the open-ended continuation of SLBM cooperation, but ruling out the future transfer of ICBMs, heavy bombers and ALCMs. Obviously, we need to talk to the British on this, but to avoid a last-minute donnybrook, we should do it fairly soon.

— PPCM: This one is becoming more difficult. We are pushing a very elaborate scheme, involving PPCM for about four solid-rocket motor plants and final assembly facilities as well as inspections and tours of other motor plants. The Soviets, who originally wanted to PPCM final assembly plants, have decided to drop PPCM altogether. On the one hand, we can’t afford to abandon PPCM: It would be a political disaster for START ratification. On the other hand, the Soviets will never accept our existing approach. The solution probably lies in establishing PPCM at final assembly facilities only—since we already have one at Votkinsk (for the SS–25), the Soviets would only have to agree to establish one new facility, at Pavlograd (for the SS–24).

However, for such an approach to pass muster with the Senate, it may be necessary to complement PPCM of final assembly facilities with (1) a regime for tagging missile launch cannisters and (2) a ban on the presence of individual missile stages at any location other than rocket motor plants, motor test facilities, and final assembly facilities. While more work needs to be done on this approach, I believe that it would meet our needs and would also be negotiable. Because it would also treat launch cannisters as the “accountable item” for missiles (that use cannisters) vice first stage motors, this approach would also have the virtue of resolving the stage vs. cannister issue: For missiles with cannisters, the cannisters would count; for missiles that do not use cannisters, the accountable item would be the first stage.

— SSI: I understand that I am about to receive Washington’s views on the ad ref deal on suspect-sight, so I will withhold my comments for now. I only hope that my instructions on right-of-refusal are negotiable. If so, we might be able to close out SSI in Geneva.

— Throw-Weight: This is also one that, much to my surprise, could be resolved here. After much dickering, the Soviets appear ready to buy the concept of “potential” throw-weight—the only key remaining issue on this one is whether we can compromise on the so-called “range standard.”

Pointing out that they have agreed in the treaty to reduce throw-weight by “approximately” 50 percent, the Soviets also want some wiggle room in getting down to this level. Again, I think some kind of compromise is possible.

— Tagging: There are really two problems here. The first is what we tag. We both agree to tag missiles, but then agreement breaks down: We also want to tag mobile launchers, but the Soviets won’t agree to this unless we are also prepared to tag bombers, including the B-2. For the Soviets (who increasingly suspect that we won’t deploy any mobile launchers), this is an issue of reciprocity. Thus, I don’t think they are prepared to budge. In my view, the solution is to limit tagging to mobile missiles.

The second problem is technical: It appears that both Moscow and Washington are having trouble at the expert level in getting their act together on tagging. The Soviets have not yet agreed on a date for experts meetings here in Geneva on tagging. Meanwhile, I understand we are having some problems with our tag reader. The net result is that we may not have a tagging regime ready for treaty signature. While there is little you and Karpov can do to solve these technical problems, you could simplify them by at least agreeing to tag only missiles.

— Elimination of Missiles and Warheads: This is a tough collection of issues which I think should be approached—and solved—as a package.

First, there is the question of missile elimination. While Nazarkin earlier hinted at some flexibility, the Soviet position has hardened—while they are prepared to agree on a small quota of space launch vehicles, they want to eliminate the rest of the missiles reduced under START. Our position, of course, is not to eliminate any.

Second, in a clear reference to SDI, the Soviets want us to sign up to language that would prohibit the use of any retained missiles for putting weapons in space. We have stone-walled them on this.

Third, there is warhead elimination—the Soviets want to follow the INF approach (crushing the aeroshell but saving the physics package), but so far we’ve opposed any regime for warheads. The DOE, as you know, has come up with a concept that is similar to INF and that I think could be sold to the Soviets.

My own personal preference would be to agree to both missile and warhead destruction—this clearly would be popular on the Hill. But because it would be too difficult to get through the bureaucracy, Lint Brooks suggests the following package:

— No missile destruction.

— Warhead destruction along the lines of the DOE proposal.

— No warhead destruction during downloading.

— A ban on using START missiles to place weapons in orbit, but no ban on using these missiles for SDI testing.

I know that this latter point will threaten the “precious bodily fluids” of the SDI community. If these missiles are necessary for SDI (which I don’t think they are), then we can hang tough. But if it’s only a matter of ideological purity, we should try for the compromise outlined above.

— Third Country Basing: The real issue here is Holy Loch and we will be pulling our Poseidon boats out in 1991. Thus, I think it’s possible to solve this issue as long as we are prepared—as a matter of principle—to agree on banning the basing of strategic arms outside national territory. We recently sent Jim Timbie a proposal by classified fax along these lines. As the proposal makes clear, the Soviets might stick to their position concerning third country inspections. In the end, we may have to approach the British (at a very senior level) about on-site inspection at Holy Loch.

— ALCMS: I have saved the best for last. I admit I am worried about this one. Washington will need to examine several problems in short order if you are to make any progress in September:

— ALCM Attribution: After all our to-ing and fro-ing on counting rules, we still appear to disagree on how to count an ALCM bomber which also carries other nukes. Our position, of course, is the bomber still counts as ten and we have told the Soviets that this was nailed down last spring. Nazarkin is being cagey and suggests that Moscow may still cling to its earlier position that an ALCM heavy bomber with other nukes should count as eleven.

— The B–1 Problem: The Soviets have tabled language that suggests that because the B–1 has been tested with an ALCM, all 97 of the B–1s must be counted as ALCM carriers. This clearly is unacceptable and should be presented to the Soviets as a potential treaty-buster. We should tell them that B–1s will be counted as ALCM carriers only if and when they are deployed as such.

— The B–2 Problem: The Joint Staff is said to have no flexibility on inspecting the B–2. But I don’t know how we’re going to sell this to the Soviets. It should be noted that the B–2 is also an obstacle to a solution to the issue of cooperative measures to enhance NTM and, as outlined above, to solving tagging. I agree that we shouldn’t tag the B–2, but I don’t see any harm in rolling the planes outside their hangars for six hours six times a year.

— ALCM Inspection Regime: Right now, we would only let the Soviets inspect certain storage facilities for ALCMs at air bases, and only at bases for non-ALCM bombers and conventional bombers. Moreover, we are only prepared to let them inspect those missiles that we identify as being non-nuclear ALCMs. I think there is a clear need to extend inspections, on a random basis, to all storage areas and to all bases. I think the Joint Staff has flexibility here.

— ALCM Distinguishability: The problem here is that the Soviets want to include technical differences between nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs in the treaty that would prevent the conversion of one to the other. We have a less demanding concept of distinguishability, but so far we haven’t been very specific. If we are to solve this, we need to be.

I don’t think we can tie the ALCM/Heavy Bomber complex into a neat package—each issue will probably have to be addressed on its own merits. That said, if the Soviets are prepared to give in on ALCM attribution and B–1 counting, then I think we should be more flexible on an ALCM inspection regime and inspecting the B–2.

— Other Issues: Finally, Reg, I haven’t addressed either Data Denial or RV counting/New Types because Washington has yet to flesh out its position on those two issues. I would only say on Data Denial that the Senate, especially the Intelligence Committee, will not understand an outcome that gives both sides all kinds of latitude to continue encryption. On RV Counting/New Types, my only plea at this stage is: Keep it simple.

Annex

Paper Prepared in the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva²

Geneva, undated

ANNEX: UNRESOLVED HEAVY ICBM ISSUES

Assuming that the production and testing of existing heavy ICBMs is allowed as the NSD authorizes, the following issues will remain outstanding:

1. The phasing of heavy reductions. We have agreed on a number—22—and the form of the agreement, an exchange of letters. The Soviets, however, have yet to decide whether this commitment would be legally-binding.

2. Ban on new silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. The United States seeks such a ban; the Soviets resist.

3. Ban on altering existing silos in any way. Probably should be dropped if we are allowing limited missile modernization.

4. Ban on converting existing launchers. The Soviets have agreed that heavy ICBMs to be reduced will be destroyed, not converted. They have not agreed to a ban on conversion thereafter. The evasion scenario is where they “convert” all heavy ICBM silos to launch another missile, replacing them with new silos. The Soviets would have a breakout capability by reconverting the initial silos. Thus if the ban on new silos is accepted, this provision could be dropped.

5. Ban on downloading heavy ICBMs.

6. Launch control facilities. These are effectively heavy missile silos. Soviets won’t agree to ban conversion to silo launchers and OSI, unless we are prepared to accept reciprocal constraints.

In addition, the Soviets have agreed to no new types of heavy ICBMs. There is, however, no agreement on what constitutes a new type. The most probable U.S. position will allow substantial variations before a missile is counted as a new type. Washington needs to evaluate whether we can accept such a loose definition for heavy ICBMs. If we cannot, we might have to resolve the definition of heavy ICBM modernization before settling the heavy ICBM issue.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF00953–029, Backchannel [Cables]—August 1990. Secret. Burt sent the memorandum via classified fax under cover of a memorandum: “Arnie—This is what I’ve sent to Reg and represents the START ‘bottom line.’ Please keep a close hold on this. Cheers, Rick.”
2. Secret.