Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

149. Memorandum From Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, July 24, 1990

SUBJECT

• Your July 24 Meeting on Arms Control and Defense Topics

We have proposed more than enough topics to fill the time available in your 5:00 PM meeting today.² But since this is the last time that you, Baker, Cheney, and Powell will all be in town for the next several weeks, your counterparts may want to raise additional subjects. The trick will be to get through as much of the agenda as possible in the time available while getting clear enough outcomes so that your loyal staff can follow through.

Ballistic Missile Downloading

At your request, this issue has been put on hold in Geneva pending the outcome of this meeting. We have separately sent you a discussion paper on the downloading issue which we also have circulated to the backbenchers in State, OSD, and JCS. (Copy attached at Tab 1.) We need an agreement at your level so that we can pursue the issue with the Soviets.

Under the proposed U.S. approach, each side could download up to two RVs on one type of existing ICBM (except SS–18s and SS–24s) and one type of existing SLBM. This approach is designed to permit us to download the Minuteman III while providing the maximum constraint on Soviet breakout. Since there is nothing in the ICBM part of our downloading proposal for the Soviets, our fallback position would allow them to download up to two RVs from the SS–24.

We want (some would argue must) be able to download Minuteman III in order to maintain a viable ICBM leg and/or preserve enough silos in which to deploy SICBM later. Retaining Minuteman II would ease the requirement to download, but at what the Pentagon argues would be a much higher cost to retain a much less capable missile. There is no START I requirement to download SLBMs. The main rationale for including SLBMs in the U.S. proposal is to create a helpful precedent for START II in which SLBM downloading probably will be necessary. It also may turn out to be a sweetener to the Soviets who might see some interest in downloading SS–N–20s and/or SS–N–23s.

We probably can withstand any Hill criticism of our downloading proposal (e.g., accusations that it is one more loophole on START reductions, that it enhances Soviet breakout potential). It is likely, however, that the Soviets will reject our proposal and make a counteroffer that gives them more opportunity to take advantage of downloading. Although we do not need to decide now the precise content of our next step until the Soviets respond, your meeting should set some parameters on how we treat this issue.

There are four broad approaches if, as is likely, the Soviets spurn our downloading proposal:

— Propose a ban on downloading (which would be inconsistent with our commitment at the 1987 Washington Summit).

— Permit a larger number of RVs per missile to be downloaded (which would worsen the potential breakout problem).

— Press our proposed approach on downloading (which the Soviets would see as one-sided) and offer an offsetting concession to gain Soviet acceptance. This begs the question of what sort of concession would be necessary to make the deal.

— Propose an approach that would make explicit the total number of RVs that could be downloaded.

DoD has argued in the past that we should propose to ban downloading if the Soviets reject our approach. Given the program and budget pressures he is under, Cheney may now be more flexible. Your meeting needs to decide how to strike the best balance between our own downloading needs, and the ratification and breakout problems posed by Soviet downloading.

Other START Issues

Secretary Baker may want to discuss the status of other outstanding START issues. There are perhaps four dozen lesser issues that we are plowing through this summer. Progress could always be faster but I think we are doing okay. There also remain the three major issues remaining from the Summit: Backfire, limits on heavy ICBMs, and non-circumvention.

Baker has a proposal that would allow the Soviets a maximum of about 500 air force and naval Backfires and would prohibit giving Backfire an intercontinental capability. If the Soviets can be persuaded to take it, we will have a good deal. On SS–18s, Baker wants to exploit the flexibility the NSD gives him (i.e., take what is already agreed with the Soviets and defer further limits to START II) to get Soviet acceptance of our position on non-circumvention (i.e., an unlimited right to cooperate with the British). You said you do not want to move to our bottom line on heavy ICBMs quite yet, trying at least for an explicit Soviet commitment to deMIRVing in START II. You also said you do not like the linkage between heavy ICBMs and non-circumvention.

[Omitted here is material not related to START.]

inspections of the PBV) have been studied.³ These measures, however, have been found either not to increase significantly the cost or difficulty of maintaining a feasible breakout capability, or to require redesign of existing PBVs and an intrusive exchange of design data.

The breakout potential associated with downloading poses a risk of becoming a ratification issue both because of verification problems and because downloading could be perceived as a mechanism to avoid real reductions in START. In this sense, downloading would be an additional item on the following list that treaty critics might use to argue that START will not result in significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons:

— SSBN exclusions (4–5 submarines in the water, but not accountable):

– up to 1000 Typhoon RVs;

– up to 960 Trident D–5 RVs.

— RV counting:

– up to about 1900 Soviet RVs (6 breakout RVs on each SS–N–23, 4 breakout RVs on each SS–18);

– up to about 1820 U.S. RVs (4 breakout RVs on each D–5, 2 breakout RVs on each Peacekeeper).

— ALCM counting:

– up to about 1300 Soviet weapons (4 legal ALCMs on 210 Soviet ALCM carriers; up to 6 additional, illegal ALCMs on each Bear H;

– up to 1500 U.S. weapons (10 legal ALCMs on 150 U.S. ALCM carriers.

— Bomber warheads (up to 10–24 bombs and short-range air-to-surface missiles on each heavy bomber that are not counted in the 6000 aggregate.

It is worth noting that there are reasons why each of the above provisions is in the U.S. interest and that downloading would be defended on a similar basis. The proposed U.S. position on downloading is designed to meet important U.S. programmatic objectives and minimize breakout by limiting the number of missile types that could be downloaded, limiting downloading to two RVs per missile, increasing the frequency of on-site inspection of downloaded missiles, and banning downloading of heavy ICBMs.

U.S. Bottom Line

The U.S. faces three options for the Minuteman force under START:

— retain about 400 older MM II at a cost of $700 million-$4 billion;

— permit downloading, of MM IIIs from 3 to 1 RV at a cost of about $190 million; or

— retain 3-RV MM IIIs and deploy 30–50% as many silos as under either of the above approaches.

Given the emphasis we have placed on strengthening stability, keeping the number of silos as high as possible under START is an important objective. Under current and prospective fiscal constraints, and especially given the uncertain prospects for deployment of mobile ICBMs, downloading is the most attractive, and may be the only realistic, option to achieve this objective.

Nevertheless, there is little in the proposed U.S. position to interest Moscow. Even the U.S. fallback position cannot be utilized as effectively by the Soviets and is thus unlikely to be accepted without modification. It is likely that Washington will soon face the following options in response to a Soviet counterproposal:

— Loosen the restrictions on downloading to permit a greater number of RVs per missile to be downloaded (which would worsen the potential breakout problem);

— Alter the restrictions on downloading to make explicit the total number of RVs that could be downloaded (which could exacerbate the ratification issue by specifically identifying the number of RVs that could be removed from accountability without any launcher destruction);

— Propose a ban on downloading (which would be inconsistent with our commitment at the 1987 Washington Summit);

— Stay with our proposed restrictions on downloading, which the Soviets would likely see as one-sided, and offer an offsetting concession in order to gain Soviet agreement.

We do not need to make a decision now about which option to choose, but we may want to rule out one or more of them at the outset. In addition, an evaluation of our bottom line will affect the way the Negotiator approaches the issue with the Soviets. Our course of action in the future will depend in large measure on the Soviet response.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, July 23, 1990

Downloading

Background

At the December 1987 Washington summit the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on the number of warheads to be attributed to existing ICBMs and SLBMs. The joint statement issued at the summit recorded the numbers for each existing missile type, and added “in the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance.”

While a simple notification suffices for declared increases in warheads attributed to existing missile types, downloading is more complex.

The U.S. has tabled placeholder language on downloading. On the basis of interagency consensus, the following instructions were recently sent to the delegation in Geneva.

U.S. Position

Downloading of RVs from ICBMs and SLBMs would be allowed, subject to the following constraints:

— Downloading would be banned on future types of ICBMs and SLBMs, on heavy ICBMs, on mobile ICBMs, and on silo-based ICBMs of types also deployed in a mobile mode.

— Downloading would be limited to a maximum of 2 RVs per missile.

— Downloading would be limited to one existing type of ICBM and one existing type of SLBM on each side.

— Downloaded missiles must be based separately from missiles of the same type of that are not downloaded.

— All SLBMs on a submarine must be attributed the same number of warheads.

— Downloaded missiles would be subject to a quota of RV inspections in addition to the inspections already provided.

The instructions authorize the delegation, if necessary, to accept downloading of silo-based ICBMs of types also deployed as mobile ICBMs, and downloading of mobile ICBMs. These fallbacks that permit SS–24 downloading would increase the number of RVs the Soviets could download. Without these fallbacks, the Soviets would not be able to download any ICBMs in their anticipated post-START force structure.

The delegation has been asked not to implement these instructions pending review in Washington.

U.S. Objectives

The U.S. interest in downloading ICBMs is to preserve the option to download MM III to one-RV and two-RV versions. Downloading MM III would allow Minuteman warheads to be spread over a much larger number of silos. Retaining as many silos as possible is desirable both because it would dilute an attack against the Minuteman force and preserve the maximum number of silos for eventual deployment of SICBM in silos. Without downloading, the U.S. ICBM force under START will either require a more costly deployment of single warhead missiles, or will not contribute as significantly to stability.

There is no requirement to download SLBMs to meet START limits. The U.S. interest in downloading SLBMs is to establish a precedent that could be used in START II to achieve warhead reductions below 4900 by reducing the number of warheads on the Trident D–5 missile (e.g. from 8 to 6) rather than reducing the number of Trident submarines. Under a START II agreement that envisions a reduced number of SLBM RVs, downloading could increase the number of submarines in the force and hedge against certain improvements in Soviet ASW capability. A larger submarine force would also address the operational problem of keeping a constant number of submarines on station in a small submarine force. Finally, downloading would reduce or eliminate the need in START II to scrap Trident submarines before the end of their hull life.

Soviet Position

This spring the Soviets tabled a position which permits downloading of ICBMs and SLBMs subject to following provisions:

— prenotification of the intent to download,

— flight testing of the missile with the reduced RV number, and

— destruction of the excess RVs.

The elimination of RVs is currently under review in Washington, but is not part of the U.S. position in Geneva. In other respects, the Soviet approach is less restrictive than the instructions provided to the U.S. delegation.

The Soviets have not indicated which missiles, if any, they want to download in START from the 1987 Washington Summit RV numbers (a downloaded SS–24 could have much improved hard target capability). The Soviets have, however, mentioned downloading as a means of implementing future RV reductions in START II. Highly MIRVed SS–18s, SS–24s, and SS–N–20s would be candidates for Soviet downloading in START II.

Number of RVs Downloaded

As outlined above, the Soviet position would place no numerical restriction on downloading. Thus, in principle the Soviet position would allow all missiles to be downloaded to a single RV, regardless of their capability to carry RVs or the number of RVs demonstrated in flight-testing.

The U.S. position (with fallbacks), however, would restrict downloading to two RVs per missile on one type of non-heavy ICBM and one type of SLBM. These U.S.-proposed restrictions affect the two sides’ forces in quite different ways.

On Soviet forces, a total of about 460–600 RVs could be downloaded on 120 SS–N–20s (or 196 SS–N–23s) and about 110 SS–24s (the U.S. fallback position would permit downloading of mobile ICBMs). If the Soviets chose to download the SS–N–23 (from 4 to 2 RVs) instead of the SS–N–20 they could double the number of SS–N–23 submarines in the force, from 12 to 24, but at a very high cost because downloaded SS–N–23s would have only 32 RVs per submarine.

On U.S. forces, a total of 1768–1960 RVs could be downloaded on 384–480 Trident D–5s (16–20 submarines) and 500 Minuteman IIIs. Minuteman III downloading would permit the U.S. to double or triple the number of silos that could be deployed under START, up to the current 1000 silos. Another option to maintain the existing number of silos is to retain Minuteman II instead of downloading MM III. MM II is planned to be phased out over this period. Retaining it instead of downloading MM III would be more expensive ($.7–$4 billion versus $190 million for downloading) because of the need to refurbish MM II. MM II also would be less capable than a downloaded MM III because of its lower accuracy.

Verification/Ratification Issues

The benefits of downloading for the U.S. need to be weighed against the verification problems associated with counting Soviet missiles at fewer warheads than they have been tested and deployed with. The Soviet potential for day-to-day cheating is addressed by the special quota of RV inspections.

However, a breakout potential will exist. Breakout would be proportional to the total number of downloaded RVs and would be additive to the breakout that already exists under the RV numbers agreed at the Washington summit. (The uncounted RV capability on the SS–N–23 is up to 6 warheads and on the SS–18 up to 4 warheads; on the D–5 up to 4 warheads and on the Peacekeeper up to 2 warheads.) More intrusive inspections (for example,⁵

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01646–003, START—July 1990. Secret. Sent for information. Gordon initialed for Kanter. A stamped notation indicates Scowcroft saw the memorandum.
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