14. Letter From Secretary of Defense Cheney to Secretary of State Baker1
We had a very good discussion2 to prepare for your meeting next week with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. I am sure that the first ministerial meeting with the Soviets in this Administration will be both important and very successful. I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm the understandings we reached on your approach to key arms control issues in the Moscow discussions.
On START, Shevardnadze will undoubtedly press you to be as specific as possible on individual issues. We should keep our options open, and make clear that we reserve the right to modify our positions in the future. We should not imply that major changes will soon be forthcoming regarding our proposed ban on mobile ICBMs or other key elements of our START position.
We must also make clear to the Soviets that this Administration demands scrupulous compliance with all arms control agreements. They should understand that their failure to complete the agreed procedures for destruction of the ABM radars at Gomel and Moscow [Page 47] is particularly regrettable in this regard. It will also be important to continue to press the Soviets strongly to dismantle and destroy the Krasnoyarsk radar.
Shevardnadze will also undoubtedly be looking for signs of change in the U.S. position on SDI. You will, I know, impress upon him that the goals of the SDI are unchanged, and that we remain firmly committed to the future deployment of effective strategic defenses.
The U.S. side will not discuss ASAT at the Ministerial. We will not prejudice the results of the ongoing review of ASAT arms control by implying any change in the U.S. commitment to acquire an ASAT capability or in our position on ASAT arms control.
We remain committed to a vigorous effort in missile non-proliferation, but will not offer any proposals until we have thoroughly reviewed our objectives and preferred approaches in this area. The impact of any missile non-proliferation initiatives on key U.S. Allies requires particularly close consideration.
Before you leave for Moscow, the President will decide how to approach any further negotiations on nuclear testing. We differ on the best path to take, but we all agree that the U.S. must avoid any further limits on nuclear testing which would compromise our security requirements.
Overall, I urge caution in the arms control discussions at the Moscow Ministerial. We have not completed our review of a number of key arms control issues. It is essential that the Moscow discussions not get out in front of that process; otherwise we would risk taking positions at Moscow that we would later have cause to regret.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, STARS, Document Number 198930120-0. Secret. Copied to Scowcroft.↩
- Under cover of a briefing memorandum of May 3, Ridgway sent Baker talking points for a May 4 White House meeting to discuss the upcoming Moscow Ministerial. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, STARS, Document Number 198909978-0)According to the President’s Daily Diary, Bush met with Baker, Cheney, Webster, Crowe, Gates, and Sununu in the Oval Office from 2:23 to 2:55 p.m. on May 4. No minutes were found.↩