Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

148. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

7810.

Geneva, July 24, 1990, 0910Z

SUBJECT

• START: Looking at The New Joint Draft Text

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. By now, you should have had time to memorize the new JDT. START trivia buffs will be interested to know that it was completed on Friday the 13th, that it marked the end of Round XIII, and that it is the 13th JDT we have produced. JCS, who apparently have people with time for such matters, reports that it is 450 pages long and has 1750 brackets. The length will increase considerably when the MOU is filled in. We will complete a totally new set of annotations this week and get a copy back to Washington by courier. We are trying to hold the Soviets at bay this week while we do this and also conduct an internal review of all the documents. We understand Washington plans a quick JDT review the week of August 6.

3. The new JDT is a major improvement over its predecessor. We must now stop reorganizing and concentrate on substance. The attribution annex appears to be the last major organizational controversy which needs to be resolved. We also need to stop injecting complicated new proposals which send out tentacles all through the text and create many new brackets. An example is the new accountability/prototype proposal which we introduced last week, with treaty language to be tabled this week.

4. The greatest activity continues to be in the ambassadors’ afternoon meetings and the treaty text working group. Jim Medas left the del July 16, and I am now in charge of the TTWG. We are close to ad ref deals on several important problems, which are noted below.

Road-Mobile ICBMs

5. On July 20, the Soviets accepted in a non-paper our proposal for a call-back OSI regime. Within the quota of short-notice inspections, a side could require all road-mobiles in a deployment area to return to their restricted areas within 24 hours. The inspection team would be transported to the relevant base before the end of this period. They would then designate a specific RA and be transported there within 3 hours. They would then inspect all the returned systems at the RA plus the associated maintenance facility. We think we can also get a provision to inspect in the field any launchers which do not return on time due to force majeure. RAs would be limited to 5 km2 and DAs to 125,000 km2 as before.

6. This is a good provision—in some ways better than what we originally sought. I am disappointed that we are empty-handed on notifications for routine movements, especially when compared to our ingoing position, but this appears to be the best we can get. We will, of course, have a good notification regime for relocations, transits and dispersals. We will also continue to push vigorously for tagging of mobile ICBM launchers.

Phasing of Reductions

7. This problem appears to be finally resolved and I still do not understand why the detailed shape of the reduction curves was allowed to become such a hot issue. In any case, the winning numbers are as follows for the ends of the 3 phases:

• Delivery vehicles — 2100, 1900, 1600
• Warheads — 9150, 7950, 6000
• Warheads on ballistic missiles — 8050, 6750, 4900.

These are close to straight-line reductions and should please everyone. For heavy ICBMs, we can get a binding declaration (probably a joint statement) which certifies that the Soviets will reduce no fewer than 22 per year.
This is an excellent outcome, with 7 straight-line points rather than 3. This is all essentially what I recommended from the outset—just put a ruler on the beginning and end points, draw a line and call out 2 or 3 intermediate points. The fact that an unreasonable U.S. opening position was allowed to get through cost us a great deal of time and effort here.

8. On the subject of heavy ICBMs, an additional important point has arisen. The Soviets have asked if they could convert the remaining 154 silos for other missles. The current U.S. language would forbid this, although the intent was to ban increases in capability, not decreases. Some here argue that only destruction of these silos is acceptable. I would think that it would be a good deal if we could get rid of heavy ICBMs through conversion to a less threatening system, since we might get rid of them faster and without the high negotiating cost of reducing them in START II. Naturally, the procedures would have to be such that reconversion for heavy ICBMs would be infeasible.

Submarine Package

9. Another good compromise has emerged in this case. The sides could have up to 72 SLBM launchers under conversion or modification (48 after 7 years), 50 ICBM launchers under conversion or modification and 48 SLBM launchers on subs which are nearly constructed (afloat) but not yet on sea trials. More than 48 would be allowed, but counted under the central treaty limits. We also agree to allow conversion of SSBNs to other uses. The detailed procedures for moving things in and out of these categories is still the subject of tough debates in the conversion or elimination working group, but progress is being made.

Other Issues

10. We have also been having intensive discussions on the tough issues of deployed/non-deployed systems and test and training launchers. I am hopeful we can get ad ref agreements on these before too long. The Soviets have said they will have an answer on the produce/develop controversy soon. If we can get all this material nailed down by mid-August, things will look a lot brighter.

Discussions with the UK

11. Rick and Lint had good discussions in London July 18–19. These covered Holy Loch, Diego Garcia, a possible British statement regarding the ratio of their future forces to reduced Soviet forces, etc. A reporting cable is being sent from Embassy London.²

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D900674–0061. Secret; Immediate.
2. In telegram 14608 from London, July 23, the Embassy reported: “During July 18–19 meetings in London, Senior British Officials told NST Negotiator Richard Burt that HMG favors a no compromise/no negotiation approach” to the non-circumvention issue.” “They indicated, however, that they would be willing to emphasize in public statements issued for other purposes (including the forthcoming defense White Paper) that they had no plans to expand the size of their independent deterrent, which, even after START, would be a smaller fraction of Soviet strategic forces than in 1963.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D900671–0426)