Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

147. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

6955.

Geneva, July 3, 1990, 0921Z

SUBJECT

• START: New Kinds and Old Arguments

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Encouraged (alarmed?) by reports that the treaty is to be signed in November, the delegations continue to bang away at the 49 issues, on the ambassadors’ list, plus the 490 issues that did not make the list. We are so enmeshed in these, rushing from meeting to meeting in a war with many fronts, that it is difficult to make an assessment of our overall progress. We are approaching another watershed in the form of a new joint draft text, to be dated July 14. We hope to spend a few days the following week doing a new set of annotations for the new JDT. At that point, both Geneva and Washington will be in a better position to see where things stand. We have managed to convince the Soviets that the period after July 14 will be called Round XIV.

3. The center ring here continues to be the Ambassadors’ daily afternoon meetings. These continue to be substantive and generally productive sessions. Nazarkin is proceeding more slowly and cautiously in these meetings than we would like, but that is to be expected in the wake of having some of his ad ref agreements overturned by Moscow. We have emphasized in recent meetings non-deployed systems, PPCM, sub tunnels, verification of road-mobiles, test and training launchers, and definition of weapon delivery vehicle. I believe we will have ad ref agreement soon on test and training launchers, facility terminology, sub tunnels, and initial accountability. The rest of this message deals with other specific issues. If what follows sounds as though I am a bit frustrated, it is because these are frustrating times.

Weapon Delivery Vehicle

4. We have reached ad ref agreement with Nazarkin on a definition of “weapon delivery vehicle,” based upon the Kampelman–Karpov INF letter of May 12, 1988.² Our START definition is “the term ‘weapon-delivery vehicle’ means, when used in connection with ballistic or cruise missiles, any ballistic or cruise missile that has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, any mechanism or device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it.” This is a sensitive subject because of the fuss which took place during INF ratification. Unanimous opinion here is that this is the correct solution.

Future Negotiations

5. The Soviets tabled on June 25 a poorly done and selective summary of the summit statement on future negotiations as article XIV. We have rejected the idea of any such article, making some strange arguments in the process. The Soviets say it is very important to them to have some commitment to further negotiations in the treaty. I believe an article with a short bland commitment to further START negotiations would be a good outcome. Since one of our best arguments in ratification will be that the shortcomings of START (if any) will be corrected in START II, a commitment to START II in the treaty itself could be helpful.

Road-mobile ICBMs

6. In an effort to break the impasse on how to deal with verification of routine movements of road-mobiles, we have proposed a 3-part ad ref solution:

— All routine movements from RAS to maintenance facilities and return, and all routine movements from RAS to conduct a launch from the field and return, would be pre- and post-notified.

— In a variation of the call-back option proposed earlier by the Soviets, all launchers in a DA, except those already notified as noted above, could be called back to their RAS for a short-notice inspection. The inspecting side would then actually go to one RA and inspect the launchers and missiles there. Any which did not make it back could be inspected in the field.

— A side would have to tell the other side upon demand 2–3 times per month how many launchers/missiles were out of a specified RA at a specified earlier time.

Nazarkin’s reaction was basically positive to these ideas. He is awaiting Moscow’s reaction and I am optimistic that some variation of these ideas will finally resolve this difficult issue.

OSI of Heavy Bombers/ALCMs/Airbases

7. The Soviets are just beginning to understand our convoluted proposals in this area. I am pessimistic on this one. Even our military people here admit that our position is a mish mash with a lot of inconsistencies and no chance of being negotiated. The final solution will have to involve more intrusiveness in the OSI allowed for heavy bombers, ALCMs and airbases. This is not likely to happen if we continue to give the Air Force carte blanche.

New Kinds

8. A major battle is shaping up over the issue of new kinds and future systems in general. The Soviets are rather shocked and confused at the U.S. proposal. The deal was supposed to be that we would agree to ban ASBMs and ICCMs and they would drop their new kinds concept. Instead, we seem to have embraced the new kinds concept, while opening big loopholes for ASBMs and ICCMs, all of which strikes me as not negotiable, and bad arms control, even if negotiable. Although many of us are confused as to the real intent of the guidance on new kinds, we understand it is driven by the desire to protect the boost-glide vehicle. I would make several points:

— Writing treaty obligations based upon “new kinds of strategic offensive arms” is dangerous. No one on either side knows what “new kinds” means, and the ABM treaty experience with “based on other physical principles” is not something either side should wish to repeat. Perhaps more importantly, there is not, and will not be, any agreed understanding in this treaty of what constitutes “strategic offensive arms.” A tacit understanding was reached long ago that a definition of this term is too difficult to achieve. Fortunately, a definition is not necessary, provided that we keep the phrase out of provisions which contain formal obligations, and instead specify exactly what systems we are talking about. This also has some relevance to the non-transfer commitment.

— We seem to be headed toward a treaty regime in which cruise missiles over 600 km range on aircraft are subject to a comprehensive system of constraints, while ballistic missiles over 600 km range on aircraft are subject to no constraints at all. According to our own rhetoric, the latter are far more dangerous and destabilizing than the former.

— For the umpteenth time, I will point out that an arms control regime which bans land-based cruise missiles from 500 km up to 5500 km range but has no constraints at all on land-based cruise missiles of longer range makes absolutely no sense. A major premise of the INF treaty was that ICCMs would be banned or at least counted as ICBMs.

— Guidance on this and other subjects continues to use words in their common usage. It is important to keep in mind the treaty definitions for terms—e.g., ICBM, SLBM, warhead, long-range nuclear ALCM, etc. Such terms have been used incorrectly in several instances in recent guidance cables.

— Deliberately building in loopholes in the treaty, or taking the view that the treaty should deal only with what exists now and ignore the future, would repeat the mistakes of SALT I and SALT II. Such an approach seems particularly hard to justify in the new political and budgetary climate which now exists, and in view of the building criticism of the treaty that it is too permissive and sets levels which are too high.

— If we must preserve a place for the boost-glide vehicle, and can’t decide whether it is a heavy bomber, ASBM, ICCM or “new kind,” perhaps as a compromise we could at least tighten the rules on future systems somewhat. For example, the sides could agree that ICCMs and air-launched ballistic missiles over 5500 km range would be counted like ICBMs, with perhaps a regime similar to that for long-range ALCMs used for ASBMs between 600 km and 5500 km.

— Another related and surprising loophole has just appeared in Article IV, Paragraph 12, where JCS has refused to let us ban cruise missiles over 600 km range on waterborne vehicles other than submarines or surface ships. This has become entangled in theological arguments over SLCMs and “nuclear-armed” (see below).

Nuclear vs Conventional

9. The appearance of “nuclear-armed” in the U.S. position on new kinds has caused to burst into flame an issue which has been smoldering unnoticed by most people for years. It is related to the question of what are “strategic offensive arms” noted above. Generations of U.S. negotiators and Washington spokesmen as well, have been asserting to themselves, visiting congressmen and U.S. allies that, “this treaty does not deal with/does not constrain conventionally-armed systems.” This assertion is always made as if it is (a) self-evident and (b) agreed with the Soviets. Neither is true. The argument is always laid to rest by a simple question—“Do you believe an SS–18 with a conventional front-end should be excluded from treaty constraints?” A week later, however, someone will again make the same categorical assertion.

10. The treaty contains numerous constraints on conventionally-armed systems. In many cases, of course, these are hypothetical systems which will never be built, but the constraint is real nevertheless. In some cases, we have been able to focus provisions on nuclear-armed versions of systems. ALCMs and SLCMs are the prime examples, but even here, a long-range conventionally-armed ALCM indistinguishable from its nuclear-armed cousin will be constrained. In other cases (ICBMs, SLBMs, creepy crawlers on the ocean floor) constraints are formulated in terms of delivery vehicles and their launchers, and the form of armament is irrelevant. There is even one example of a system exclusively conventional which is singled out for special constraints—heavy bombers converted to carry only conventional armaments.

11. Please note that I do not mean to imply that Rick and Lint do not understand all this—they have a far clearer understanding of this problem than any of their predecessors. This discussion is intended to make two points. First, we have led congress to believe something that is not true. This is an emotional issue and we must begin to describe what this treaty does and doesn’t do more carefully. Second, there is a major disagreement with the Soviets on this point and it comes into focus on the new kinds/future systems issue.

12. As highly accurate, conventionally-armed systems gain the capability to perform the missions now performed by nuclear-armed systems, how should they be classified and constrained? Should “strategic” be understood as primarily related to armament or should “strategic” refer to the range over which weapons are delivered? There are profound and difficult questions here. Some of these systems should be dealt with now and others we may have to finesse in a treaty which only has to cover 15 years. Any volunteers for the JCIC?

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D900606–0228. Secret; Immediate.
2. In telegram 5553 from NST Geneva, May 13, 1988, the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks submitted the text of notes exchanged with the Soviet delegation stating a common understanding for a “weapon-delivery vehicle” in the INF Treaty as “any ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile in the 500 kilometer to 5500 kilometer range that has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon—that is, any warhead, mechanism or device, which, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880791–0303)