Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

143. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 1, 1990, 11:49 a.m.–12:58 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• James A. Baker, Secretary of State
• John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
• Brent Scowcroft, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Reginald Bartholemew, Under Secretary of State
• Dennis Ross,
• Condoleezza Rice, Senior Director for Soviet Affairs, NSC Staff
• Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, President
• Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
• Sergey Akhromeyev,
• Viktor Karpov, Deputy Foreign Minister
• Aleksey Obukhov, Deputy Foreign Minister

The President. I understand that you want to begin with arms control. Please, the floor is yours. (U)

President Gorbachev: I want to turn this over for the moment to Mr. Karpov to outline what has been done—where we are. (U)

Ambassador Karpov: As a part of the preparations for this Summit, we have been meeting to prepare documents that encompass agreement on several arms control issues. On strategic arms there are two: (1) A paper on limitations on strategic offensive arms which would summarize the major points of agreement on START; (2) A statement on future negotiations. There are already many agreed for this second effort but others remain including the approach to heavy missiles; the question of the elimination of MIRVed systems. We believe that we could record the already agreed progress without second guessing these other issues. The U.S. side insists on the elimination of systems—heavy missiles and a ban on MIRVed ICBMs. These are subjects for serious discussion and it is premature to try to close them out. (S)

On CFE, there is an agreed statement that states the intentions of the two sides to progress and in connection with this statement we have also discussed the matters of limitation on aviation; manpower limits on the basis of the Ottawa Accords; and, issues pertaining to tanks, artillery and armor. We have had some convergence of views. (S)

We have prepared the agreement on the bilateral chemical weapons which offers a serious breakthrough. We note our need to do something about the multilateral problem. There are testing protocols on TTBT and PNET and for those thorough—very technical work—was required. Now the issue is to decide the next phase and how to implement the agreement to a step by step process eventually leading to a cessation of nuclear testing. (S)

Now, I want to turn to the first document I mentioned. The U.S. draft of a unilateral declaration on non-circumvention of the treaty contains an exception for Great Britain. We said that we can accept such an exception only if it is confined to present practices and the U.S. does not have in it an idea to confine further its commitment to non-circumvention. (S)

On the Soviet Backfire bomber, the U.S. side raised the possibility of a unilateral commitment by the Soviet Union concerning intercontinental capability for this bomber. We have proposed a limitation of four-hundred aircraft of the air forces. As to the problem of limiting naval aircraft—we are prepared to negotiate these under future arms reductions which have a broader mandate. (S)

With limitations of weapons under START—it is important that there be no basing on the territory of a third country. We have agreed with the U.S. on how to do this and to make it possible to verify that no strategic arms are outside the territory of the signatories. (S)

We also discussed the problem of warhead destruction. The Soviet side proposes the destruction physically of the warheads—breaking the casings so that they cannot be used. The U.S. says that it cannot consent to this. (S)

President Gorbachev. What is your impression? Are the issues that remain such that we have to resolve them before there is agreement on the major elements and we sign a statement to that effect. (S)

Mr. Karpov: We have accomplished a lot. I believe as regards a statement—there is also agreement on mobile ICBM limits at 1100 but this is an understanding—Ambassador Bartholemew and I have not finalized it. Now on the matter of future negotiations, the fundamental question is how much to try and predetermine. We believe that much should be addressed at Geneva. (S)

President Gorbachev: So in the opinion of the experts will we be able to conclude a treaty this year? Marshal Akhromeyev, do you have anything to offer. (S)

Marshal Akhromeyev: No. I think Karpov has outlined everything accurately. I have nothing to add. (S)

Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov: There is also a document in the form of a statement on non-proliferation that is agreed upon. (S)

President Gorbachev: Mr. President. The ball is now in your court. (U)

The President. Maybe it would be best to ask Ambassador Bartholomew to summarize. Reggie would you? (U)

Ambassador Bartholemew: As is usual, I agree with most, but not all of what Mr. Karpov has said. We agree that the chemical weapons accord is a major achievement and the Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation should serve everyone’s interest. The protocols on nuclear testing are fifteen years old and it’s good to finish that. On next steps, we stand by the policy but believe that we need a pause to consider the lay of the land. (S)

On Vienna, we have a strong joint statement for the two of you to issue this afternoon underscoring the need to finish that treaty this year. It is fundamental for building the security structure in Europe and is a precondition for a CSCE Summit. There is significant convergence on armor issues and destruction which opens the door to settling that. We had hoped for more progress on aircraft and we need to work hard to meet the timetable you have reaffirmed. (S)

Let me focus for a minute on the outstanding START issues. There are two joint statements—one records progress on START to date on major issues and the second is a statement of our common objectives after START. The first is more or less complete except for the 1100 number and in addition there are three outstanding issues that we would like to try to resolve so that they too could be included—non-circumvention; Backfire; and heavy ICBMs. Let me review where we stand on those issues. (S)

On heavies, we proposed a series of steps to establish a limit of two flight tests per year. This is at the end of a long series of U.S. efforts to find resolution of this issue. The two flight tests would permit the Soviet Union to maintain the reliability of its systems so that the current modernization program could continue but it would prohibit more ambitious upgrades which would make future negotiations difficult. When the Soviet Union said this would be too constraining we tried several variants—perhaps seven-eight tests over three years. The issue remains open. (S)

On Backfire, we agreed that the Soviet Union could make a politically binding declaration committing the Soviet Union not to give Backfire intercontinental capability through in-air refueling. The U.S. proposed a total number, not to exceed 400, much as we did with SLCM. We proposed that Backfire then be examined in CFE and that the total include both naval and airforce Backfires. We do not have resolution. As Mr. Karpov said, the Soviet side wants to cover any airforce Backfires in the number. This would mean that the Soviet Union could build as many naval Backfires as it wanted or change airforce Backfires into naval. We would have no assurance what the politically binding declaration would mean. (S)

On non-circumvention, we feel that we have gone very far to meet Soviet concerns. We have a forty year old patent of cooperation with Britain that must remain in effect. The Soviet proposal would require us to give up that commitment and that fact would affect not only our relations with the United Kingdom but with other allies. We cannot sign a treaty that does this. (S)

All of the issues above relate to the START joint statement. Concerning future negotiations, the question is not whether to speak of ICBMs, MIRVed ICBMs, mobile ICBMs—the question is whether to point the direction on any of these. We propose to set the direction by using the term elimination because that is the best path to a stable strategic balance and that is what we both want. (S)

In sum, there is a great deal of work done on START and we have already recorded that in a statement but we should add these highly visible issues and put them to rest—heavies, noncircumvention and Backfire. If it came out of this meeting that this was done, the impetus to the treaty this year would be great. As to the future negotiations statement—we want to point the negotiations in the direction of elimination. (S)

The President: I am impressed with the progress that I hear and as I listen it sounds like we’re not too far apart. The noncircumvention issue is difficult because there is an important history there with the British. But we sound awfully close on Backfire and on heavies. Maybe we could ask Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Baker to go and work on this. The statement on future negotiations needs to give a good forward thrust which would be well received in the context of the whole climate of our relationship. Jim, did I leave out anything? (S)

Secretary Baker: You did not, Mr. President. If we assume closure on a mobile sublimit, the three other issues—noncircumvention, Backfire and heavies, should be concluded if you and President Gorbachev are going to do what you said you would at Malta—agree on the remaining issues of substance. (S)

It is also important as Ambassador Bartholemew said that the goals and objectives of future strategic arms be set forth clearly. There is a signing ceremony at 5:00 p.m. today. Minister Shevardnadze has said the Soviet side wants to initial a statement of agreed elements, goals and objectives. We should see if we can reach agreement on this and the follow-on by then. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I am prepared to work with the Secretary of State on this. On the first, the agreement already has the basic agreed elements—some issues do remain—but there is time for the experts to elaborate them. The second part—the outline for the future—is of great importance. We will try to agree but if we fail maybe we can confine ourselves to a brief statement that the sides want to have future negotiations for stability immediately following the current treaty. That should be done even if we fail to resolve anything more. Non-circumvention could also be transferred to the follow-on. (S)

Secretary Baker: There are a number of issues that we think are technical but our view is that non-circumvention, Backfire and heavies are major issues and must be dealt with if we are to say we are ready to sign a statement that the major elements are agreed. In order to resolve these issues this afternoon, we will need direction from the Presidents. (S)

President Gorbachev: I share the statement that major work has been done and that we have travelled a major portion of the road as the experts have testified. First, I want to emphasize that we have a firm intention to continue to act so that the treaty can be done this year. I put the question to Karpov about what should be done. There are issues which are very important if we are to elaborate the treaty fully and with complete clarity. We must ensure that the issues are clear which prevent or enable us to sign a major elements statement. We must separate these to keep from complicating things. The work is not over but it is time to record what has been accomplished. We should ask Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Baker to work on the basis of this approach and try to wrap it. But I must say that we are embarrassed by the fact that all of a sudden when we thought what cooperation between the U.S. and the UK meant—the modernization of Trident II—and when no other problems or issues have been raised for all this time—now we are made mindful of a change. This brings up the broad interpretation of the ABM treaty and this is dangerous. The logic will be upset. We made a big step forward at Reykjavik when we said we would not raise the issue of French and British nuclear forces. That was a big concession. In doing so, we recorded an understanding that as soon as the particular approach of deep cuts, we said that others would have to get involved. Mrs. Thatcher has said that as soon as the U.S. and USSR sign 50 percent reductions, the British can get involved. Mitterrand too has said something and China. We are in reach of an agreement and others in the nuclear club should be ready to join us. (S)

This idea that is now coming up would just let NATO continue to build up. This is illogical and we reiterate our understanding that this means only rearmament concerning the Trident II—only that. Ambassador Bartholomew is always passionately agitating on this—but this is a question that requires a series argument. It isn’t possible to rely on passionate appeals. We are moving ahead with our American friends and all of a sudden. We must involve the British and French after we sign this treaty. It is important to emphasize interrelationships—the future treaty, the 1972 treaty from which we reiterated certain statements in 1987. We are about to reiterate a major issue. (S)

Now speaking to intentions for the future. We will surprise our people if we in our statements outline and define specifically and clearly what we will do in the future when we haven’t even begun discussions. To already be saying that we will do this or that would be illogical. We should raise, as we did in Reykjavik, the level of the discussion. There we agreed on 50% reductions and stated that the mix of strategic arms depended on geography and other things that had made our forces develop differently. We said yes, you have concerns about our heavy ICBMs, we have concerns about some of yours too. Let’s reduce equally—but keeping the same correlation. I think this is the approach we should use now. We should look at all elements of strategic arms. You are concerned by some of ours but we are too. SLCM has brought new life to this. Let us get more in the spirit of doing it this way. If we do it differently, we will generate all kind of speculation and the scholars and experts will start offering proposals and analyses. Here we should be reaffirming a general approach. Our experts are putting forth their concerns and yours are too. Let the Ministers work and we will welcome the results of that work. (S)

The President: I accept the suggestion that the Ministers should do this. Anything to add? (S)

Ambassador Bartholemew: No, Mr. President.² (U)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D012, Dennis Ross Files, US/Soviet Memos of Conversation—1989/1990. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The complete memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, on June 2 Bush met Gorbachev at the North Portico of the White House at 9:42 a.m. and escorted him to the South Grounds, where they flew via Marine helicopter to Camp David. Memoranda of conversation of their meetings at Camp David are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.